Narrative:

When we picked up the aircraft; we knew we had no APU as it was MEL'ed on the release. So after doing an external air start of the right engine; we pushed back from the gate; I informed the first officer that we would do a xbleed start while we waited for ground to call us to taxi. I also informed him not to set flaps for takeoff till after we started the second engine. Shortly after the second engine was running; ground called us to taxi and on the taxi out I had the first officer complete the delayed engine start checklist. Ground then advised us of an airbus to give way to; then continue taxi and stay in right side of the run-up pad; and switch to tower; which we complied with. There was no line up at the end of the runway. I then called for the before takeoff checklist. After reaching the hold short of the runway; tower advised us to position and hold then cleared us for takeoff. As the thrust levers were being advanced for takeoff thrust; we got a confign flaps warning; and proceeded to reject the takeoff. Airspeed never got above 40 KTS; and we were able to clear the runway quickly. We ran all the associated checklists for an aborted takeoff and confign checklists; and advised the tower that everything is ok; and that we would like to taxi back for takeoff. While waiting; both of us realized that we never ran the taxi checklist after starting the second engine on taxi out from the ramp. Both of us; especially me; have learned a valuable lesson in regards of aircraft and checklist situational awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL600 FLT CREW OMITS TAXI CHECK AFTER DELAYED ENGINE START AND ATTEMPTS FLAPS UP TKOF. CONFIGURATION WARNING SOUNDS AND FLT CREW REJECTS TKOF.

Narrative: WHEN WE PICKED UP THE ACFT; WE KNEW WE HAD NO APU AS IT WAS MEL'ED ON THE RELEASE. SO AFTER DOING AN EXTERNAL AIR START OF THE R ENG; WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE; I INFORMED THE FO THAT WE WOULD DO A XBLEED START WHILE WE WAITED FOR GND TO CALL US TO TAXI. I ALSO INFORMED HIM NOT TO SET FLAPS FOR TKOF TILL AFTER WE STARTED THE SECOND ENG. SHORTLY AFTER THE SECOND ENG WAS RUNNING; GND CALLED US TO TAXI AND ON THE TAXI OUT I HAD THE FO COMPLETE THE DELAYED ENG START CHKLIST. GND THEN ADVISED US OF AN AIRBUS TO GIVE WAY TO; THEN CONTINUE TAXI AND STAY IN R SIDE OF THE RUN-UP PAD; AND SWITCH TO TWR; WHICH WE COMPLIED WITH. THERE WAS NO LINE UP AT THE END OF THE RWY. I THEN CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. AFTER REACHING THE HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY; TWR ADVISED US TO POS AND HOLD THEN CLRED US FOR TKOF. AS THE THRUST LEVERS WERE BEING ADVANCED FOR TKOF THRUST; WE GOT A CONFIGN FLAPS WARNING; AND PROCEEDED TO REJECT THE TKOF. AIRSPD NEVER GOT ABOVE 40 KTS; AND WE WERE ABLE TO CLR THE RWY QUICKLY. WE RAN ALL THE ASSOCIATED CHKLISTS FOR AN ABORTED TKOF AND CONFIGN CHKLISTS; AND ADVISED THE TWR THAT EVERYTHING IS OK; AND THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO TAXI BACK FOR TKOF. WHILE WAITING; BOTH OF US REALIZED THAT WE NEVER RAN THE TAXI CHKLIST AFTER STARTING THE SECOND ENG ON TAXI OUT FROM THE RAMP. BOTH OF US; ESPECIALLY ME; HAVE LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON IN REGARDS OF ACFT AND CHKLIST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.