Narrative:

After exiting the runway I noted that the rudder trim was in fact centered. I specifically remember checking the trims prior to the takeoff roll. An uncommanded rudder trim actuation was considered as a possible explanation for the alert but unless it centered by itself I presume that the alert was erroneous. The normal time to get an alert of this nature would be on throttle advance not at 120 KIAS. On takeoff roll; accelerating through about 120 KIAS; we got a 'beep-beep' attention tone followed by a 'rudder trim' CAWS alert. I elected to abort the takeoff. After closing the throttles I immediately applied heavy braking. The spoilers automatic deployed. My main focus was to maintain directional control. Directional control assured; I noted the IAS was already below 100 IAS and dropping rapidly. With more than enough runway remaining and 'safe stop assured' I elected not to deploy the thrust reversers. I had the first officer call tower to report the aborted takeoff. We rolled to the end and exited the runway at taxiway B9. Coordination with maintenance and operations followed for movement of passenger and inspection of landing gear. At some point after coming to a stop on E4 a mechanic climbed from a tug through the R1 door and into the cockpit. He stated that as he was climbing into the airplane he heard the tire begin to deflate. Brake temperatures were noted in the high 300's; approaching 400 degrees. Aural CAWS alert on takeoff roll. Possibly some training events that call for immediate go-no go decisions for more benign alerts than fire or engine failure. The nature of this alert and the unusual timing was confusing. I personally have changed the position of my hand on the throttles during the takeoff roll so that closing the throttles and deploying the reversers can be done in one fluid motion without repositioning my hand.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B717 PILOT REJECTED A TKOF BECAUSE OF A FLT CONTROL WARNING AT ABOUT 120 KTS. HIGH BRAKE TEMPS AND A TIRE DEFLATION RESULTED.

Narrative: AFTER EXITING THE RWY I NOTED THAT THE RUDDER TRIM WAS IN FACT CTRED. I SPECIFICALLY REMEMBER CHKING THE TRIMS PRIOR TO THE TKOF ROLL. AN UNCOMMANDED RUDDER TRIM ACTUATION WAS CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE ALERT BUT UNLESS IT CTRED BY ITSELF I PRESUME THAT THE ALERT WAS ERRONEOUS. THE NORMAL TIME TO GET AN ALERT OF THIS NATURE WOULD BE ON THROTTLE ADVANCE NOT AT 120 KIAS. ON TKOF ROLL; ACCELERATING THROUGH ABOUT 120 KIAS; WE GOT A 'BEEP-BEEP' ATTN TONE FOLLOWED BY A 'RUDDER TRIM' CAWS ALERT. I ELECTED TO ABORT THE TKOF. AFTER CLOSING THE THROTTLES I IMMEDIATELY APPLIED HVY BRAKING. THE SPOILERS AUTO DEPLOYED. MY MAIN FOCUS WAS TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. DIRECTIONAL CTL ASSURED; I NOTED THE IAS WAS ALREADY BELOW 100 IAS AND DROPPING RAPIDLY. WITH MORE THAN ENOUGH RWY REMAINING AND 'SAFE STOP ASSURED' I ELECTED NOT TO DEPLOY THE THRUST REVERSERS. I HAD THE FO CALL TWR TO RPT THE ABORTED TKOF. WE ROLLED TO THE END AND EXITED THE RWY AT TXWY B9. COORD WITH MAINT AND OPS FOLLOWED FOR MOVEMENT OF PAX AND INSPECTION OF LNDG GEAR. AT SOME POINT AFTER COMING TO A STOP ON E4 A MECH CLBED FROM A TUG THROUGH THE R1 DOOR AND INTO THE COCKPIT. HE STATED THAT AS HE WAS CLBING INTO THE AIRPLANE HE HEARD THE TIRE BEGIN TO DEFLATE. BRAKE TEMPS WERE NOTED IN THE HIGH 300'S; APCHING 400 DEGS. AURAL CAWS ALERT ON TKOF ROLL. POSSIBLY SOME TRAINING EVENTS THAT CALL FOR IMMEDIATE GO-NO GO DECISIONS FOR MORE BENIGN ALERTS THAN FIRE OR ENG FAILURE. THE NATURE OF THIS ALERT AND THE UNUSUAL TIMING WAS CONFUSING. I PERSONALLY HAVE CHANGED THE POS OF MY HAND ON THE THROTTLES DURING THE TKOF ROLL SO THAT CLOSING THE THROTTLES AND DEPLOYING THE REVERSERS CAN BE DONE IN ONE FLUID MOTION WITHOUT REPOSITIONING MY HAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.