Narrative:

On aug/xa/07; I was assigned to the TRACON. At about XA45Z; operations manager mr X came into the TRACON. For several mins; he sat at the supervisor's desk talking quietly with the operations supervisor; mr Y. After several mins; the inbound push was getting ready to start. Position were adequately staffed. Operations manager; mr X; went over to the flow controller; mr Z; then called the tower and talked to operations supervisor; mr west; to coordination a runway change. The wind was indicating 280 degrees at 8 KTS. Nowhere along the line did he get support for this decision. Winds for the day (in fact; the last 3 days) had favored a 36 operation; and the forecast favored a north operation. This short west wind was nothing more than a 'teaser.' we changed runways and then the wind started to swing back to the northwest (310-330 degrees at 14 KTS). When we exceeded the allowable tailwind component; several controllers began relaying the wind. We were ignored. At least twice; I stated the winds; and operations manager; mr X; was again talking to operations supervisor; mr Y; back at the desk. He simply paid no attention to the people working for him. When the wind reached 340-360 degrees at 11-16 KTS; we again advised him; and the phone rang. The tower was calling to report numerous complaints from inbound aircraft and the refusal of departures to leave due to strong tailwinds. Cvg order 7110.28K states that; 'the tailwind component 'must not' be greater than that specified in appendix I.' to stay on the operation once the wind exceeds the component violates the local order; not to mention puts aircraft in an unsafe situation. Well; with aircraft in the airspace; we began the risky maneuver of switching the airport right back around in the middle of the busiest inbound push of the shift. Aircraft were not held; but some either opted to land with what was at one point a direct 15 KT tailwind; or were vectored excessively into airspace that did not belong to the controller who was communicating with them. Operations manager; mr X; is barely current in the operation; meaning he's got minimum time on position in the building. I doubt he is current on position in the tower cabin attendant. The currency requirements are there to make sure a person stays somewhat proficient in the operation. The violation to the cvg runway use order; 7110.28K is documented. This order is routinely bent. While the tailwind chart documents maximum winds; if it's exceeded for a min or two; it's not a big deal. But; I recently saw it exceeded for at least an hour several months ago and nothing happened. It will take someone sliding off the end of a runway to get someone to pay attention. The lack of the equivalent of 'CRM' in the ATC environment. Cockpit crews are taught to share information; and those in charge trained to accept input from subordinates and then make an informed decision. I have documented this individual's inability to listen to his subordinates prior to making a decision. I have also expressed my displeasure in private conversations with him on his stance on operational issues and specifically his idea of runway use at cvg. I accept that my statements were blown off. The repeated lack of regard for common sense (let alone FAA and cvg orders) exceeds dangerous levels. The 'if it's not my idea; it's a bad idea' and 'the rules I make don't apply to me' stances are not those we need to see in a position of authority/authorized like this. It's worse when he's in the operating environment with live air traffic around him. Most importantly; the operation he put us in was simply a bad idea from the start. It was dangerous and there was no reason to 'hope' this operation would work. With construction on the airport; there was no operational advantage to landing south.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CVG TRACON CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING OPS MANAGER'S DECISION TO CHANGE RWYS RESULTING IN TAILWIND OPS AND NON COMPLIANCE WITH SOP'S.

Narrative: ON AUG/XA/07; I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE TRACON. AT ABOUT XA45Z; OPS MGR MR X CAME INTO THE TRACON. FOR SEVERAL MINS; HE SAT AT THE SUPVR'S DESK TALKING QUIETLY WITH THE OPS SUPVR; MR Y. AFTER SEVERAL MINS; THE INBOUND PUSH WAS GETTING READY TO START. POS WERE ADEQUATELY STAFFED. OPS MGR; MR X; WENT OVER TO THE FLOW CTLR; MR Z; THEN CALLED THE TWR AND TALKED TO OPS SUPVR; MR W; TO COORD A RWY CHANGE. THE WIND WAS INDICATING 280 DEGS AT 8 KTS. NOWHERE ALONG THE LINE DID HE GET SUPPORT FOR THIS DECISION. WINDS FOR THE DAY (IN FACT; THE LAST 3 DAYS) HAD FAVORED A 36 OP; AND THE FORECAST FAVORED A N OP. THIS SHORT W WIND WAS NOTHING MORE THAN A 'TEASER.' WE CHANGED RWYS AND THEN THE WIND STARTED TO SWING BACK TO THE NW (310-330 DEGS AT 14 KTS). WHEN WE EXCEEDED THE ALLOWABLE TAILWIND COMPONENT; SEVERAL CTLRS BEGAN RELAYING THE WIND. WE WERE IGNORED. AT LEAST TWICE; I STATED THE WINDS; AND OPS MGR; MR X; WAS AGAIN TALKING TO OPS SUPVR; MR Y; BACK AT THE DESK. HE SIMPLY PAID NO ATTN TO THE PEOPLE WORKING FOR HIM. WHEN THE WIND REACHED 340-360 DEGS AT 11-16 KTS; WE AGAIN ADVISED HIM; AND THE PHONE RANG. THE TWR WAS CALLING TO RPT NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS FROM INBOUND ACFT AND THE REFUSAL OF DEPS TO LEAVE DUE TO STRONG TAILWINDS. CVG ORDER 7110.28K STATES THAT; 'THE TAILWIND COMPONENT 'MUST NOT' BE GREATER THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN APPENDIX I.' TO STAY ON THE OP ONCE THE WIND EXCEEDS THE COMPONENT VIOLATES THE LCL ORDER; NOT TO MENTION PUTS ACFT IN AN UNSAFE SIT. WELL; WITH ACFT IN THE AIRSPACE; WE BEGAN THE RISKY MANEUVER OF SWITCHING THE ARPT RIGHT BACK AROUND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE BUSIEST INBOUND PUSH OF THE SHIFT. ACFT WERE NOT HELD; BUT SOME EITHER OPTED TO LAND WITH WHAT WAS AT ONE POINT A DIRECT 15 KT TAILWIND; OR WERE VECTORED EXCESSIVELY INTO AIRSPACE THAT DID NOT BELONG TO THE CTLR WHO WAS COMMUNICATING WITH THEM. OPS MGR; MR X; IS BARELY CURRENT IN THE OP; MEANING HE'S GOT MINIMUM TIME ON POS IN THE BUILDING. I DOUBT HE IS CURRENT ON POS IN THE TWR CAB. THE CURRENCY REQUIREMENTS ARE THERE TO MAKE SURE A PERSON STAYS SOMEWHAT PROFICIENT IN THE OP. THE VIOLATION TO THE CVG RWY USE ORDER; 7110.28K IS DOCUMENTED. THIS ORDER IS ROUTINELY BENT. WHILE THE TAILWIND CHART DOCUMENTS MAX WINDS; IF IT'S EXCEEDED FOR A MIN OR TWO; IT'S NOT A BIG DEAL. BUT; I RECENTLY SAW IT EXCEEDED FOR AT LEAST AN HR SEVERAL MONTHS AGO AND NOTHING HAPPENED. IT WILL TAKE SOMEONE SLIDING OFF THE END OF A RWY TO GET SOMEONE TO PAY ATTN. THE LACK OF THE EQUIVALENT OF 'CRM' IN THE ATC ENVIRONMENT. COCKPIT CREWS ARE TAUGHT TO SHARE INFO; AND THOSE IN CHARGE TRAINED TO ACCEPT INPUT FROM SUBORDINATES AND THEN MAKE AN INFORMED DECISION. I HAVE DOCUMENTED THIS INDIVIDUAL'S INABILITY TO LISTEN TO HIS SUBORDINATES PRIOR TO MAKING A DECISION. I HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED MY DISPLEASURE IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM ON HIS STANCE ON OPERATIONAL ISSUES AND SPECIFICALLY HIS IDEA OF RWY USE AT CVG. I ACCEPT THAT MY STATEMENTS WERE BLOWN OFF. THE REPEATED LACK OF REGARD FOR COMMON SENSE (LET ALONE FAA AND CVG ORDERS) EXCEEDS DANGEROUS LEVELS. THE 'IF IT'S NOT MY IDEA; IT'S A BAD IDEA' AND 'THE RULES I MAKE DON'T APPLY TO ME' STANCES ARE NOT THOSE WE NEED TO SEE IN A POS OF AUTH LIKE THIS. IT'S WORSE WHEN HE'S IN THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT WITH LIVE AIR TFC AROUND HIM. MOST IMPORTANTLY; THE OP HE PUT US IN WAS SIMPLY A BAD IDEA FROM THE START. IT WAS DANGEROUS AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO 'HOPE' THIS OP WOULD WORK. WITH CONSTRUCTION ON THE ARPT; THERE WAS NO OPERATIONAL ADVANTAGE TO LNDG S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.