Narrative:

The first officer and I reported to ZZZ for an XA58 departure to ZZZ1. During the preflight inspection; I discovered on the ECAM hydraulic page that the blue and yellow hydraulic system were over-svced. Per SOP; I entered the items into the ACARS and called maintenance on the radio. About 10 mins later; a mechanic came out and said he was going to drain some hydraulic fluid. The service was complete at 10 mins past departure time and the new maintenance release arrived. All 3 hydraulic system now showed mid-range in the normal brackets. After pushback and engine start; we immediately received an ECAM warning of low blue hydraulic system quantity followed shortly thereafter by the blue hydraulic system low pressure ECAM. The quantity gauge showed almost zero and the pressure was dropping below 700 psi. The first officer called ramp and told them to come back and get us. At 20 mins past departure time; we blocked back in. As we approached the gate; the same mechanic was ready with the barrel of hydraulic fluid and the blue system gauge was increasing before we had completed the parking checklist. After the system was re-filled; the mechanic came up to the cockpit. I relinquished my seat to him so he could run the hydraulic pump and cycle the controls. As he did this; the gauge showed a slight decrease in quantity to a level below the fill range. He stated that he was going to pump more fluid into the system and sign it off. I asked him what had been done to verify that there were no leaks in the blue system. He stated that there were no leaks and that the problem was an error in servicing. I told him that was fine 'except' that I would not be flying the aircraft. I had to then explain to him that the blue system had lost quantity due to an unknown reason and I was not satisfied that they had done 'any' troubleshooting for leaks. He re-stated that the problem was that another mechanic had accidentally removed too much fluid when the system had been drained earlier and that the system was full of air. I further explained that the blue system gauge had showed normal quantity at pushback and had only decreased after the pump came on at engine start. He then told me that they would defer the quantity gauge. At this point; it was quite unclr to any of us what the actual problem was. I had no reason to suspect the quantity gauge; especially due to the fact that it indicated properly during the fluid loss. This was confirmed by the drop in pressure. I then entered the refusal into the log page. I then thoughtfully looked over at my first officer and told him to pack his bags and follow me off of the aircraft. We were in operations for about 10 mins before the assistant chief came looking for me. He politely requested that I follow him into his office. After a polite discussion about what had transpired; we ended up on a conference call with several parties including zone supervisors and maintenance supervisors. After much discussion on the call; the assistant chief pilot and myself ended the conversation and talked privately. We mutually came to the following conclusions: first of all; the deferral was improper and not correct. Secondly; based on information gleaned during the conference call; we agreed with the conclusion that the system most likely had too much fluid removed during servicing. Finally; I agreed that I would take the aircraft under the following conditions: 1) that the gauges be checked and verified for accuracy. 2) that the gauge deferral be signed off as done in error if accuracy verified. 3) that the blue system be leak checked and run with load to verify integrity. 4) that the logbook reflect what really happened. The assistant chief pilot then called to get the ball rolling while I headed back to the gate. All of the above conditions were met to my satisfaction; and we flew the aircraft uneventfully for 3 legs. Here are observations: 1) maintenance admitted on the conference call that they were trying to 'expedite' the aircraft off of the gate. I explained to them that this 'was not satisfactory in the least!' we do not need to be rushing things! Safety is not worth rushing and we need to take the time to do things right. 2) ZZZ maintenance tried to rush the aircraft off of the gate without properly inspecting the hydraulic system and then tried to cover up the issue with an improper; illegal; and unsafe deferral. 3) I have no problem at all with the mechanic making a mistake by taking out too much fluid. Mistakes happen. The problem is that we need to then follow up the mistakes with integrity and fix the problems correctly! 4) the assistant chief pilot never said or did anything to make me feel pressured to take this aircraft. He was quite supportive and respectful. I appreciate this. The whole event caused a 3 hour delay. If things had not been rushed and done improperly; I am sure that the schedule could have been much better maintained. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states in the past couple of years; he's seen a system wide shift in the maintenance approach to log write-ups and how discrepancies are handled. His company recently notified the pilots of concerns that contract maintenance providers may be over-servicing the hydraulic systems. Appears the hydraulic quantity indication is not a deferrable item. Reporter adds his company has good line mechanics; but; the pressure on maintenance to expedite aircraft appears to be system wide.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRBUS A320 PILOT CONCERNED THAT MAINT IS NOT PROPERLY INSPECTING THE HYD SYSTEM AND TRYING TO COVER THE ISSUE WITH IMPROPER AND UNSAFE DEFERRAL. MAINT ALSO BEING PRESSURED TO EXPEDITE THE ACFT OFF THE GATE.

Narrative: THE FO AND I RPTED TO ZZZ FOR AN XA58 DEP TO ZZZ1. DURING THE PREFLT INSPECTION; I DISCOVERED ON THE ECAM HYD PAGE THAT THE BLUE AND YELLOW HYD SYS WERE OVER-SVCED. PER SOP; I ENTERED THE ITEMS INTO THE ACARS AND CALLED MAINT ON THE RADIO. ABOUT 10 MINS LATER; A MECH CAME OUT AND SAID HE WAS GOING TO DRAIN SOME HYD FLUID. THE SVC WAS COMPLETE AT 10 MINS PAST DEP TIME AND THE NEW MAINT RELEASE ARRIVED. ALL 3 HYD SYS NOW SHOWED MID-RANGE IN THE NORMAL BRACKETS. AFTER PUSHBACK AND ENG START; WE IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED AN ECAM WARNING OF LOW BLUE HYD SYS QUANTITY FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY THE BLUE HYD SYS LOW PRESSURE ECAM. THE QUANTITY GAUGE SHOWED ALMOST ZERO AND THE PRESSURE WAS DROPPING BELOW 700 PSI. THE FO CALLED RAMP AND TOLD THEM TO COME BACK AND GET US. AT 20 MINS PAST DEP TIME; WE BLOCKED BACK IN. AS WE APCHED THE GATE; THE SAME MECH WAS READY WITH THE BARREL OF HYD FLUID AND THE BLUE SYS GAUGE WAS INCREASING BEFORE WE HAD COMPLETED THE PARKING CHKLIST. AFTER THE SYS WAS RE-FILLED; THE MECH CAME UP TO THE COCKPIT. I RELINQUISHED MY SEAT TO HIM SO HE COULD RUN THE HYD PUMP AND CYCLE THE CTLS. AS HE DID THIS; THE GAUGE SHOWED A SLIGHT DECREASE IN QUANTITY TO A LEVEL BELOW THE FILL RANGE. HE STATED THAT HE WAS GOING TO PUMP MORE FLUID INTO THE SYS AND SIGN IT OFF. I ASKED HIM WHAT HAD BEEN DONE TO VERIFY THAT THERE WERE NO LEAKS IN THE BLUE SYS. HE STATED THAT THERE WERE NO LEAKS AND THAT THE PROB WAS AN ERROR IN SVCING. I TOLD HIM THAT WAS FINE 'EXCEPT' THAT I WOULD NOT BE FLYING THE ACFT. I HAD TO THEN EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT THE BLUE SYS HAD LOST QUANTITY DUE TO AN UNKNOWN REASON AND I WAS NOT SATISFIED THAT THEY HAD DONE 'ANY' TROUBLESHOOTING FOR LEAKS. HE RE-STATED THAT THE PROB WAS THAT ANOTHER MECH HAD ACCIDENTALLY REMOVED TOO MUCH FLUID WHEN THE SYS HAD BEEN DRAINED EARLIER AND THAT THE SYS WAS FULL OF AIR. I FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT THE BLUE SYS GAUGE HAD SHOWED NORMAL QUANTITY AT PUSHBACK AND HAD ONLY DECREASED AFTER THE PUMP CAME ON AT ENG START. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD DEFER THE QUANTITY GAUGE. AT THIS POINT; IT WAS QUITE UNCLR TO ANY OF US WHAT THE ACTUAL PROB WAS. I HAD NO REASON TO SUSPECT THE QUANTITY GAUGE; ESPECIALLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT INDICATED PROPERLY DURING THE FLUID LOSS. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE DROP IN PRESSURE. I THEN ENTERED THE REFUSAL INTO THE LOG PAGE. I THEN THOUGHTFULLY LOOKED OVER AT MY FO AND TOLD HIM TO PACK HIS BAGS AND FOLLOW ME OFF OF THE ACFT. WE WERE IN OPS FOR ABOUT 10 MINS BEFORE THE ASSISTANT CHIEF CAME LOOKING FOR ME. HE POLITELY REQUESTED THAT I FOLLOW HIM INTO HIS OFFICE. AFTER A POLITE DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED; WE ENDED UP ON A CONFERENCE CALL WITH SEVERAL PARTIES INCLUDING ZONE SUPVRS AND MAINT SUPVRS. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION ON THE CALL; THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT AND MYSELF ENDED THE CONVERSATION AND TALKED PRIVATELY. WE MUTUALLY CAME TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: FIRST OF ALL; THE DEFERRAL WAS IMPROPER AND NOT CORRECT. SECONDLY; BASED ON INFO GLEANED DURING THE CONFERENCE CALL; WE AGREED WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SYS MOST LIKELY HAD TOO MUCH FLUID REMOVED DURING SVCING. FINALLY; I AGREED THAT I WOULD TAKE THE ACFT UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: 1) THAT THE GAUGES BE CHKED AND VERIFIED FOR ACCURACY. 2) THAT THE GAUGE DEFERRAL BE SIGNED OFF AS DONE IN ERROR IF ACCURACY VERIFIED. 3) THAT THE BLUE SYS BE LEAK CHKED AND RUN WITH LOAD TO VERIFY INTEGRITY. 4) THAT THE LOGBOOK REFLECT WHAT REALLY HAPPENED. THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT THEN CALLED TO GET THE BALL ROLLING WHILE I HEADED BACK TO THE GATE. ALL OF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS WERE MET TO MY SATISFACTION; AND WE FLEW THE ACFT UNEVENTFULLY FOR 3 LEGS. HERE ARE OBSERVATIONS: 1) MAINT ADMITTED ON THE CONFERENCE CALL THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO 'EXPEDITE' THE ACFT OFF OF THE GATE. I EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT THIS 'WAS NOT SATISFACTORY IN THE LEAST!' WE DO NOT NEED TO BE RUSHING THINGS! SAFETY IS NOT WORTH RUSHING AND WE NEED TO TAKE THE TIME TO DO THINGS RIGHT. 2) ZZZ MAINT TRIED TO RUSH THE ACFT OFF OF THE GATE WITHOUT PROPERLY INSPECTING THE HYD SYS AND THEN TRIED TO COVER UP THE ISSUE WITH AN IMPROPER; ILLEGAL; AND UNSAFE DEFERRAL. 3) I HAVE NO PROB AT ALL WITH THE MECH MAKING A MISTAKE BY TAKING OUT TOO MUCH FLUID. MISTAKES HAPPEN. THE PROB IS THAT WE NEED TO THEN FOLLOW UP THE MISTAKES WITH INTEGRITY AND FIX THE PROBS CORRECTLY! 4) THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT NEVER SAID OR DID ANYTHING TO MAKE ME FEEL PRESSURED TO TAKE THIS ACFT. HE WAS QUITE SUPPORTIVE AND RESPECTFUL. I APPRECIATE THIS. THE WHOLE EVENT CAUSED A 3 HR DELAY. IF THINGS HAD NOT BEEN RUSHED AND DONE IMPROPERLY; I AM SURE THAT THE SCHEDULE COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER MAINTAINED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATES IN THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS; HE'S SEEN A SYSTEM WIDE SHIFT IN THE MAINT APPROACH TO LOG WRITE-UPS AND HOW DISCREPANCIES ARE HANDLED. HIS COMPANY RECENTLY NOTIFIED THE PILOTS OF CONCERNS THAT CONTRACT MAINT PROVIDERS MAY BE OVER-SERVICING THE HYD SYSTEMS. APPEARS THE HYD QUANTITY INDICATION IS NOT A DEFERRABLE ITEM. REPORTER ADDS HIS COMPANY HAS GOOD LINE MECHANICS; BUT; THE PRESSURE ON MAINT TO EXPEDITE ACFT APPEARS TO BE SYSTEM WIDE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.