Narrative:

Early in the flight we noticed the left engine N2 vibration indication moving erratically between 3.3 and 4.1. Since there is no upper limit we continued to monitor the engine. About 3 hours into the flight we began to notice an unidentifiable odor which slowly began to permeate the whole aircraft. Some of the crew idented the smell as being similar to smelly feet/socks. We began to suspect the odor may be emanating from the left engine; subsequently the captain initiated a SELCAL to maintenance to explore the possibilities. After further discussion and analysis we elected to turn the left pack and trim air off to determine if the left engine was the source. After a suitable period of time the concentration of odor had significantly diminished. We reported the findings to maintenance through dispatch and continued with those system off. By this time we were coasting in towards ZZZ. We were at FL360 and maintaining a steady cabin altitude of 5900 ft. Since the left trim air was off the cockpit began to cool considerably as well as several zones in the cabin. We decided to close the left bleed air valve to allow the center isolation valve to open and provide right bleed air for the left trim air system. We coordinated the procedure with the purser and requested he report any increase in the odor level after allowing an initial reactivation period. Although implausible as it would seem after a period of time the odor level became more concentrated. In reaction to this information we returned the system to their previous confign. With each passing hour the upper limit of the N2 vibration oscillation slowly creeped upwards now reaching approximately 4.4 by our initial descent. During the dscnts and especially with the increase of power during leveloffs the upper limit was seen to increase up to approximately 5.5. On initial contact with approach we were cleared to maintain 10000 ft. Continuing the descent to 10000 ft we were then cleared for further descent; slowing through 250 KTS. At approximately 9000 ft EICAS displayed 'engine oil pressure left' at which time I noticed the oil pressure indicating 60 psi in a red box. The captain directed the first officer to continue to fly the airplane and initiated the non-normal checklist. The captain directed me to back her up on all checklist items and actions. After engine shutdown and checklist completion we reviewed single engine procedures and reconfigured (approach speed and autobrakes 3) as necessary. While the captain declared an emergency with ATC I briefed the flight attendant on the engine shutdown; time to landing (opposite direction); and directed a cabin advisory. We were given the option to land opposite direction straight-in from present position to runway 19L which the captain accepted. From the beginning of the non-normal checklist to rollout was compressed but the sequence of events; actions taken and SOP's were executed methodically. After rollout we cleared the runway at the end and turned onto taxiway J where a fire truck was waiting. Once stopped a dozen fire vehicles encircled us and the fire marshall proceeded to inspect the engine for fire potential. It wasn't until that point I was finally able to brief the passenger on what transpired. After determining the leaking fluid was oil and no fire hazard existed we were cleared to continue to our gate. We briefly considered whether to be towed or taxi single engine. We were sufficiently light enough; 413000 pounds; and considered it safe to continue taxiing to the gate. After engine shutdown and checklist completion we debriefed and the captain debriefed the flight attendant in first class with the in-flight supervisor in attendance. Maintenance was also debriefed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777-200 EXPERIENCES LOSS OF OIL QUANTITY AND PRESSURE ALONG WITH INCREASED VIBRATION IN LEFT ENGINE. FLT CREW SHUTS DOWN ENGINE; DECLARES EMERGENCY AND LANDS AT DESTINATION.

Narrative: EARLY IN THE FLT WE NOTICED THE L ENG N2 VIBRATION INDICATION MOVING ERRATICALLY BTWN 3.3 AND 4.1. SINCE THERE IS NO UPPER LIMIT WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE ENG. ABOUT 3 HRS INTO THE FLT WE BEGAN TO NOTICE AN UNIDENTIFIABLE ODOR WHICH SLOWLY BEGAN TO PERMEATE THE WHOLE ACFT. SOME OF THE CREW IDENTED THE SMELL AS BEING SIMILAR TO SMELLY FEET/SOCKS. WE BEGAN TO SUSPECT THE ODOR MAY BE EMANATING FROM THE L ENG; SUBSEQUENTLY THE CAPT INITIATED A SELCAL TO MAINT TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS WE ELECTED TO TURN THE L PACK AND TRIM AIR OFF TO DETERMINE IF THE L ENG WAS THE SOURCE. AFTER A SUITABLE PERIOD OF TIME THE CONCENTRATION OF ODOR HAD SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED. WE RPTED THE FINDINGS TO MAINT THROUGH DISPATCH AND CONTINUED WITH THOSE SYS OFF. BY THIS TIME WE WERE COASTING IN TOWARDS ZZZ. WE WERE AT FL360 AND MAINTAINING A STEADY CABIN ALT OF 5900 FT. SINCE THE L TRIM AIR WAS OFF THE COCKPIT BEGAN TO COOL CONSIDERABLY AS WELL AS SEVERAL ZONES IN THE CABIN. WE DECIDED TO CLOSE THE L BLEED AIR VALVE TO ALLOW THE CTR ISOLATION VALVE TO OPEN AND PROVIDE R BLEED AIR FOR THE L TRIM AIR SYS. WE COORDINATED THE PROC WITH THE PURSER AND REQUESTED HE RPT ANY INCREASE IN THE ODOR LEVEL AFTER ALLOWING AN INITIAL REACTIVATION PERIOD. ALTHOUGH IMPLAUSIBLE AS IT WOULD SEEM AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME THE ODOR LEVEL BECAME MORE CONCENTRATED. IN REACTION TO THIS INFO WE RETURNED THE SYS TO THEIR PREVIOUS CONFIGN. WITH EACH PASSING HR THE UPPER LIMIT OF THE N2 VIBRATION OSCILLATION SLOWLY CREEPED UPWARDS NOW REACHING APPROX 4.4 BY OUR INITIAL DSCNT. DURING THE DSCNTS AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE INCREASE OF PWR DURING LEVELOFFS THE UPPER LIMIT WAS SEEN TO INCREASE UP TO APPROX 5.5. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH APCH WE WERE CLRED TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT. CONTINUING THE DSCNT TO 10000 FT WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR FURTHER DSCNT; SLOWING THROUGH 250 KTS. AT APPROX 9000 FT EICAS DISPLAYED 'ENG OIL PRESSURE L' AT WHICH TIME I NOTICED THE OIL PRESSURE INDICATING 60 PSI IN A RED BOX. THE CAPT DIRECTED THE FO TO CONTINUE TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AND INITIATED THE NON-NORMAL CHKLIST. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO BACK HER UP ON ALL CHKLIST ITEMS AND ACTIONS. AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN AND CHKLIST COMPLETION WE REVIEWED SINGLE ENG PROCS AND RECONFIGURED (APCH SPD AND AUTOBRAKES 3) AS NECESSARY. WHILE THE CAPT DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC I BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANT ON THE ENG SHUTDOWN; TIME TO LNDG (OPPOSITE DIRECTION); AND DIRECTED A CABIN ADVISORY. WE WERE GIVEN THE OPTION TO LAND OPPOSITE DIRECTION STRAIGHT-IN FROM PRESENT POS TO RWY 19L WHICH THE CAPT ACCEPTED. FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE NON-NORMAL CHKLIST TO ROLLOUT WAS COMPRESSED BUT THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; ACTIONS TAKEN AND SOP'S WERE EXECUTED METHODICALLY. AFTER ROLLOUT WE CLRED THE RWY AT THE END AND TURNED ONTO TXWY J WHERE A FIRE TRUCK WAS WAITING. ONCE STOPPED A DOZEN FIRE VEHICLES ENCIRCLED US AND THE FIRE MARSHALL PROCEEDED TO INSPECT THE ENG FOR FIRE POTENTIAL. IT WASN'T UNTIL THAT POINT I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO BRIEF THE PAX ON WHAT TRANSPIRED. AFTER DETERMINING THE LEAKING FLUID WAS OIL AND NO FIRE HAZARD EXISTED WE WERE CLRED TO CONTINUE TO OUR GATE. WE BRIEFLY CONSIDERED WHETHER TO BE TOWED OR TAXI SINGLE ENG. WE WERE SUFFICIENTLY LIGHT ENOUGH; 413000 LBS; AND CONSIDERED IT SAFE TO CONTINUE TAXIING TO THE GATE. AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN AND CHKLIST COMPLETION WE DEBRIEFED AND THE CAPT DEBRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANT IN FIRST CLASS WITH THE INFLT SUPVR IN ATTENDANCE. MAINT WAS ALSO DEBRIEFED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.