Narrative:

While towing company B777 to gate for dispatch; ground control cleared us to proceed taxiway C hold short of taxiway Z. While approaching taxiway U; B747 stopped on taxiway U/runway 28R hold bars. Ground told B747 to 'hold 777 under tow right to left' then 'proceed on taxiway U to ramp.' B747 increase engine power crossed runway 28R and cut us off. B747's wingtip was approximately 50-60 ft from coming into the cockpit window. Tow tractor driver braked hard to avoid collision. After event; ground contacted us and gave us clearance to proceed to ramp via txwys Z; B1; B. I repeated the instructions and told ground that heavy aircraft under tow cannot stop as quickly as a taxiing aircraft. Also thinking about this event I don't recall feedback from the B747 to ground instructions. Taxiway C seems to have a lot of aircraft taxiing out onto the taxiway without clearance from ground. I have called the supervisor several times to express my concerns; however; the problems don't or not being resolved. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states he was in the cockpit riding brakes listening to ground control clearly telling the taxiing B-747-400 to hold short for the B-777 under tow. Reporter emphasizes the difficulty in trying to suddenly stop a heavy transport aircraft under tow without jackknifing the tug and causing damage to the aircraft nose or the nose landing gear assembly. When the tug driver; who had been applying heavy braking; finally stopped the B-777; the taxiing B-747's wingtip sliced past less than 50' feet from the B-777's cockpit windshields. Reporter adds; this is not the first time his fellow mechanics have raised this issue of close encounters; of being cut-off while under tow with their company management. He has also discussed the same concerns with the operations supervisor in the control tower. The lack of response; or even acknowledgment of their concerns by his company management and the ground control group makes the mechanics feel no one cares until someone gets hurt; and most likely they will be the ones injured due to being the most vulnerable out in the elements.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777-200 ACFT UNDER TOW BY COMPANY MAINT PERSONNEL AND CLEARED BY GROUND CONTROL; WAS CUT OFF BY A TAXIING OUTBOUND B-747;WHO WAS TOLD TO HOLD SHORT FOR B-777. TOW DRIVER BRAKED HARD TO AVOID COLLISION.

Narrative: WHILE TOWING COMPANY B777 TO GATE FOR DISPATCH; GND CTL CLRED US TO PROCEED TXWY C HOLD SHORT OF TXWY Z. WHILE APCHING TXWY U; B747 STOPPED ON TXWY U/RWY 28R HOLD BARS. GND TOLD B747 TO 'HOLD 777 UNDER TOW R TO L' THEN 'PROCEED ON TXWY U TO RAMP.' B747 INCREASE ENG PWR CROSSED RWY 28R AND CUT US OFF. B747'S WINGTIP WAS APPROX 50-60 FT FROM COMING INTO THE COCKPIT WINDOW. TOW TRACTOR DRIVER BRAKED HARD TO AVOID COLLISION. AFTER EVENT; GND CONTACTED US AND GAVE US CLRNC TO PROCEED TO RAMP VIA TXWYS Z; B1; B. I REPEATED THE INSTRUCTIONS AND TOLD GND THAT HVY ACFT UNDER TOW CANNOT STOP AS QUICKLY AS A TAXIING ACFT. ALSO THINKING ABOUT THIS EVENT I DON'T RECALL FEEDBACK FROM THE B747 TO GND INSTRUCTIONS. TXWY C SEEMS TO HAVE A LOT OF ACFT TAXIING OUT ONTO THE TXWY WITHOUT CLRNC FROM GND. I HAVE CALLED THE SUPVR SEVERAL TIMES TO EXPRESS MY CONCERNS; HOWEVER; THE PROBS DON'T OR NOT BEING RESOLVED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATES HE WAS IN THE COCKPIT RIDING BRAKES LISTENING TO GROUND CONTROL CLEARLY TELLING THE TAXIING B-747-400 TO HOLD SHORT FOR THE B-777 UNDER TOW. REPORTER EMPHASIZES THE DIFFICULTY IN TRYING TO SUDDENLY STOP A HEAVY TRANSPORT ACFT UNDER TOW WITHOUT JACKKNIFING THE TUG AND CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE ACFT NOSE OR THE NOSE LANDING GEAR ASSEMBLY. WHEN THE TUG DRIVER; WHO HAD BEEN APPLYING HEAVY BRAKING; FINALLY STOPPED THE B-777; THE TAXIING B-747'S WINGTIP SLICED PAST LESS THAN 50' FEET FROM THE B-777'S COCKPIT WINDSHIELDS. REPORTER ADDS; THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME HIS FELLOW MECHANICS HAVE RAISED THIS ISSUE OF CLOSE ENCOUNTERS; OF BEING CUT-OFF WHILE UNDER TOW WITH THEIR COMPANY MANAGEMENT. HE HAS ALSO DISCUSSED THE SAME CONCERNS WITH THE OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR IN THE CONTROL TOWER. THE LACK OF RESPONSE; OR EVEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THEIR CONCERNS BY HIS COMPANY MANAGEMENT AND THE GROUND CONTROL GROUP MAKES THE MECHANICS FEEL NO ONE CARES UNTIL SOMEONE GETS HURT; AND MOST LIKELY THEY WILL BE THE ONES INJURED DUE TO BEING THE MOST VULNERABLE OUT IN THE ELEMENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.