Narrative:

The CRJ200 is equipped with only 1 nosewheel steering tiller; located on the left side of the flight deck (the captain's side). It should be noted that the captain of the flight is a new captain; upgraded within the last 2 weeks. The flight was cleared to land on runway 27L. I asked the captain if we needed to hold short of taxiway C. He responded by saying; I don't think so. I then asked him to re-verify that with the tower since the captain had the radio and he did not. Together; we agreed that we were to make taxiway C for a possible lahso clearance. We also decided that the captain would help me on the brakes to make the intersection since I was the PF. After landing; the captain did not assist with the brakes and was told by O'hare tower to turn left on runway 22R. Before I had a chance to repeat the instructions back to the tower; the captain initiated a turn to the right on runway 22R. After realizing his mistake; the captain attempted to make a 180 degree turn on runway 22R with the tiller. While that was happening; the nosewheel steering became inoperative from jogging the tiller back and forth. Consequently; it needed to be reset. Additionally; there was an airbus on final approach for runway 22R. The tower instructed the airbus to go around. We then reset the nosewheel steering system and taxied off runway 22R. We received taxi instructions to the gate ramp area. I strongly feel that these problems could be avoided in the future with proper training. Unfortunately; new capts are trained only at smaller airports; a fact that doesn't prepare them for the chaos of a larger airport like O'hare. Supplemental information from acn 756118: it was the first officer's leg to fly. We were assigned to land on runway 27L in VMC conditions. During the brief I told the first officer to expect to exit the runway with a left turn at taxiway C and that he should plan accordingly. We were cleared to land on runway 27L. The first officer executed the landing but was somewhat fast on touchdown due to speed fluctuations on final. The landing was subsequently slightly long. As we approached taxiway C I began to assist with braking. The tower instructed us to exit taxiway C; if unable; right turn on runway 22R. It was obvious that we would be unable to exit at taxiway C. I took the controls and began braking in anticipation of a right turn onto runway 22R. As I initiated the right turn; the tower instructed us to 'turn left on runway 22R; not right!' using the tiller; I began to correct the turn. In an attempt to expeditiously turn the aircraft; I moved the tiller too abruptly and caused the nosewheel steering to disengage. I had already initiated the turn to the right and was pointed in a direction toward the north. Using the rudder pedals I straightened the nosewheel and brought the aircraft to a stop. By the time I stopped the aircraft; I was not in a position to successfully turn the aircraft back to the left and remain on the paved surface of the runway (with or without the tiller). I complied with the cfm procedure and reset the nosewheel steering. Unable to make the left turn; I quickly moved to the nearest taxiway and exited runway 22R at taxiway Z. The incident resulted in an aircraft on final for runway 22R executing a go around. We taxied to parking without further incident. The tower requested a phone call when I arrived at the gate. I spoke with the tower supervisor and advised him of the situation. He believed that the controller had given us instructions to turn left on runway 22R and not right. I asked him to review the tapes in order to confirm the instructions but I have had no chance to re-contact him. He also indicated that he would be forwarding this incident to the FSDO because he felt that air carrier experienced too many maintenance issues that impacted airport operations and he was tired of it. I did contact maintenance control to determine if this aircraft had any history of problems with nosewheel steering and was informed it did not. No entry was made in the log for the pilot induced nosewheel steering failure. I left the aircraft at gate X and proceeded to gate Y where an aircraft was boarded and waiting for me to fly. Reflecting on the incident afterwards; I feel I should have made an entry in the log despite the fact that the failure was pilot induced. With regards to the taxi instructions; the first officer and I believe we were given instructions to make a right turn. If; in fact; the instructions were to turn left; then the fact that the runway in question is marked as 22 'right' may have caused some confusion. Additionally; the instructions to turn were given at the same time I was taking the controls. We had no opportunity to read back the instructions before the turn was upon us. In the future; I will continue safely down the runway until instructions are confirmed. In addition; in the 2 weeks I've been assigned to ord I have found that the controllers often give rapid fire instructions to aircraft with the expectation that the instructions will be understood and complied with without readback. The ground controllers often give multiple aircraft complex taxi instructions without an intervening pause between individual aircraft. They frequently instruct aircraft to begin their taxi 'now' without benefit of readback; clarification or break in transmission. The expectation from the controllers is that you will comply immediately without opportunity for readback. The atmosphere in ord; especially with ground control; is that you will comply with instructions immediately and without readback. This; I believe; creates an opportunity for mistakes and mishaps and is contrary to safety practices established for aircraft movement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 FLT CREW LANDING RWY 27L AT ORD ARE INSTRUCTED TO TURN LEFT ON RWY 22R. CAPTAIN TURNS RIGHT AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING DISCONNECTS WHEN TURN BACK TO THE LEFT IS ATTEMPTED; CAUSING ACFT ON FINAL FOR 22R TO GO AROUND.

Narrative: THE CRJ200 IS EQUIPPED WITH ONLY 1 NOSEWHEEL STEERING TILLER; LOCATED ON THE L SIDE OF THE FLT DECK (THE CAPT'S SIDE). IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CAPT OF THE FLT IS A NEW CAPT; UPGRADED WITHIN THE LAST 2 WKS. THE FLT WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 27L. I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE NEEDED TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING; I DON'T THINK SO. I THEN ASKED HIM TO RE-VERIFY THAT WITH THE TWR SINCE THE CAPT HAD THE RADIO AND HE DID NOT. TOGETHER; WE AGREED THAT WE WERE TO MAKE TXWY C FOR A POSSIBLE LAHSO CLRNC. WE ALSO DECIDED THAT THE CAPT WOULD HELP ME ON THE BRAKES TO MAKE THE INTXN SINCE I WAS THE PF. AFTER LNDG; THE CAPT DID NOT ASSIST WITH THE BRAKES AND WAS TOLD BY O'HARE TWR TO TURN L ON RWY 22R. BEFORE I HAD A CHANCE TO REPEAT THE INSTRUCTIONS BACK TO THE TWR; THE CAPT INITIATED A TURN TO THE R ON RWY 22R. AFTER REALIZING HIS MISTAKE; THE CAPT ATTEMPTED TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN ON RWY 22R WITH THE TILLER. WHILE THAT WAS HAPPENING; THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING BECAME INOP FROM JOGGING THE TILLER BACK AND FORTH. CONSEQUENTLY; IT NEEDED TO BE RESET. ADDITIONALLY; THERE WAS AN AIRBUS ON FINAL APCH FOR RWY 22R. THE TWR INSTRUCTED THE AIRBUS TO GO AROUND. WE THEN RESET THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING SYS AND TAXIED OFF RWY 22R. WE RECEIVED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GATE RAMP AREA. I STRONGLY FEEL THAT THESE PROBS COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE WITH PROPER TRAINING. UNFORTUNATELY; NEW CAPTS ARE TRAINED ONLY AT SMALLER ARPTS; A FACT THAT DOESN'T PREPARE THEM FOR THE CHAOS OF A LARGER ARPT LIKE O'HARE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 756118: IT WAS THE FO'S LEG TO FLY. WE WERE ASSIGNED TO LAND ON RWY 27L IN VMC CONDITIONS. DURING THE BRIEF I TOLD THE FO TO EXPECT TO EXIT THE RWY WITH A L TURN AT TXWY C AND THAT HE SHOULD PLAN ACCORDINGLY. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 27L. THE FO EXECUTED THE LNDG BUT WAS SOMEWHAT FAST ON TOUCHDOWN DUE TO SPD FLUCTUATIONS ON FINAL. THE LNDG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SLIGHTLY LONG. AS WE APCHED TXWY C I BEGAN TO ASSIST WITH BRAKING. THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO EXIT TXWY C; IF UNABLE; R TURN ON RWY 22R. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO EXIT AT TXWY C. I TOOK THE CTLS AND BEGAN BRAKING IN ANTICIPATION OF A R TURN ONTO RWY 22R. AS I INITIATED THE R TURN; THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO 'TURN L ON RWY 22R; NOT R!' USING THE TILLER; I BEGAN TO CORRECT THE TURN. IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPEDITIOUSLY TURN THE ACFT; I MOVED THE TILLER TOO ABRUPTLY AND CAUSED THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING TO DISENGAGE. I HAD ALREADY INITIATED THE TURN TO THE R AND WAS POINTED IN A DIRECTION TOWARD THE N. USING THE RUDDER PEDALS I STRAIGHTENED THE NOSEWHEEL AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. BY THE TIME I STOPPED THE ACFT; I WAS NOT IN A POS TO SUCCESSFULLY TURN THE ACFT BACK TO THE L AND REMAIN ON THE PAVED SURFACE OF THE RWY (WITH OR WITHOUT THE TILLER). I COMPLIED WITH THE CFM PROC AND RESET THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING. UNABLE TO MAKE THE L TURN; I QUICKLY MOVED TO THE NEAREST TXWY AND EXITED RWY 22R AT TXWY Z. THE INCIDENT RESULTED IN AN ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 22R EXECUTING A GAR. WE TAXIED TO PARKING WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE TWR REQUESTED A PHONE CALL WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE GATE. I SPOKE WITH THE TWR SUPVR AND ADVISED HIM OF THE SITUATION. HE BELIEVED THAT THE CTLR HAD GIVEN US INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN L ON RWY 22R AND NOT R. I ASKED HIM TO REVIEW THE TAPES IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THE INSTRUCTIONS BUT I HAVE HAD NO CHANCE TO RE-CONTACT HIM. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE FORWARDING THIS INCIDENT TO THE FSDO BECAUSE HE FELT THAT ACR EXPERIENCED TOO MANY MAINT ISSUES THAT IMPACTED ARPT OPS AND HE WAS TIRED OF IT. I DID CONTACT MAINT CTL TO DETERMINE IF THIS ACFT HAD ANY HISTORY OF PROBS WITH NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND WAS INFORMED IT DID NOT. NO ENTRY WAS MADE IN THE LOG FOR THE PLT INDUCED NOSEWHEEL STEERING FAILURE. I LEFT THE ACFT AT GATE X AND PROCEEDED TO GATE Y WHERE AN ACFT WAS BOARDED AND WAITING FOR ME TO FLY. REFLECTING ON THE INCIDENT AFTERWARDS; I FEEL I SHOULD HAVE MADE AN ENTRY IN THE LOG DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FAILURE WAS PLT INDUCED. WITH REGARDS TO THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS; THE FO AND I BELIEVE WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A R TURN. IF; IN FACT; THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TURN L; THEN THE FACT THAT THE RWY IN QUESTION IS MARKED AS 22 'R' MAY HAVE CAUSED SOME CONFUSION. ADDITIONALLY; THE INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN WERE GIVEN AT THE SAME TIME I WAS TAKING THE CTLS. WE HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THE TURN WAS UPON US. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL CONTINUE SAFELY DOWN THE RWY UNTIL INSTRUCTIONS ARE CONFIRMED. IN ADDITION; IN THE 2 WKS I'VE BEEN ASSIGNED TO ORD I HAVE FOUND THAT THE CTLRS OFTEN GIVE RAPID FIRE INSTRUCTIONS TO ACFT WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE UNDERSTOOD AND COMPLIED WITH WITHOUT READBACK. THE GND CTLRS OFTEN GIVE MULTIPLE ACFT COMPLEX TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WITHOUT AN INTERVENING PAUSE BTWN INDIVIDUAL ACFT. THEY FREQUENTLY INSTRUCT ACFT TO BEGIN THEIR TAXI 'NOW' WITHOUT BENEFIT OF READBACK; CLARIFICATION OR BREAK IN XMISSION. THE EXPECTATION FROM THE CTLRS IS THAT YOU WILL COMPLY IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT OPPORTUNITY FOR READBACK. THE ATMOSPHERE IN ORD; ESPECIALLY WITH GND CTL; IS THAT YOU WILL COMPLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY AND WITHOUT READBACK. THIS; I BELIEVE; CREATES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MISTAKES AND MISHAPS AND IS CONTRARY TO SAFETY PRACTICES ESTABLISHED FOR ACFT MOVEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.