Narrative:

One of my flts to ZZZ calls me to say that they needed a patch with maintenance control due to a captain's windshield problem. The crew was concerned that the windshield heat was inoperative because the window was extremely cold in areas and extremely hot in other areas. They also had a concern that the window was cracking. There were ice crystals or cracks in the corner of the window and a loud shrieking sound was originating from that area. The sound kept getting louder. I patched the crew through to maintenance control and we consulted the afm for guidance on cracked windows. After reviewing the procedure the crew decided to drop to FL230 to see if the noise would change. They dropped to FL230 and nothing changed. I ran the numbers for continuing the flight to ZZZ and there wasn't enough fuel to get to ZZZ at FL230; keeping the original required alternate; and 45 mins (far reserve). I told the crew this and they agreed that we couldn't make ZZZ. The crew had mentioned earlier that they may want to go to ZZZ1. I was in agreement with the captain; but I figured we would make that decision after maintenance control offered any pertinent advice. The crew paused for a min to drop to FL230; and when they returned; maintenance control tells the crew maintenance control and operations think that they should go to ZZZ1. (Maintenance control never asked me what I thought.) the crew didn't respond. The maintenance controller tells me over the patch that he had called operations and asked them what they wanted this flight to do. They wanted the flight to go to ZZZ1 because they had a spare airbus there. I called the flight to tell them dispatch and maintenance control wanted them to go to ZZZ1. The crew didn't respond. They were already coordinating with ATC to get into ZZZ1. I sent the crew the numbers for ZZZ1 (verifying they would be under maximum landing weight). My concern is with operational control and safety of flight. Dispatch and the flight crews share operational control over each flight; per 121.533; which states in (B) that the PIC and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning; delay; and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications. Part C states that: the aircraft dispatcher is responsible for: 1) monitoring the progress of each flight; 2) issuing necessary information for the safety of flight; and 3) canceling or redispatching a flight if; in his opinion or the opinion of the PIC; the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released. Maintenance control called operations and never bothered to ask me anything about the flight other than if they could make ZZZ. He jumped off a patch to consult with a party (operations) with information irrelevant to what was going on (safety issue). I fail to see where maintenance control or operations hold any operational control. They aren't mentioned anywhere in the far's with reference to operational control; and as stated above; dispatch is explicitly given this authority/authorized. The maintenance controller told my crew on the patch to go to ZZZ1. I should have been the one to make that call. I did happen to agree with ZZZ1 as the safest place to go but; not for the reason that operations chose. Operations and maintenance control were in no position to make a call on my flight's safest options. Operations was not even on the patch to know what was actually going on. They also have no access to the information that dispatch uses to make these decisions. If they were licensed dispatchers they may actually be able to understand why we look at the things we do; but they aren't. The crew and I were referencing the afm for guidance; and I was considering our options since there was a concern for a rapid decompression and icing concerns. ZZZ2 was out due to icing from the tsra in the area with the possibility of hail from those storms. ZZZ was out of my flight's fuel range. ZZZ1 was almost on route; had good WX; no operational restrs for my flight; and could provide aarf or medical facilities if this incident escalated into a catastrophic event. I also was considering escape route for a rapid decompression; if an emergency situation were to occur. Had the worst-case scenario happened ZZZ3 may have been considered. But; maintenance control by telling mycrew where he and operations thought they should go; at the very least undermined my operational control; was disrespectful to me and the rest of dispatch; and could have caused confusion for the flight crew as to where they should go. The crew proceeded to ZZZ1 and landed without incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER OF A319 FLT EXPERIENCING COCKPIT WINDOW PROBLEMS IS CONCERNED THAT A DIVERSION DECISION WAS MADE BY MAINT WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH DISPATCH.

Narrative: ONE OF MY FLTS TO ZZZ CALLS ME TO SAY THAT THEY NEEDED A PATCH WITH MAINT CTL DUE TO A CAPT'S WINDSHIELD PROB. THE CREW WAS CONCERNED THAT THE WINDSHIELD HEAT WAS INOP BECAUSE THE WINDOW WAS EXTREMELY COLD IN AREAS AND EXTREMELY HOT IN OTHER AREAS. THEY ALSO HAD A CONCERN THAT THE WINDOW WAS CRACKING. THERE WERE ICE CRYSTALS OR CRACKS IN THE CORNER OF THE WINDOW AND A LOUD SHRIEKING SOUND WAS ORIGINATING FROM THAT AREA. THE SOUND KEPT GETTING LOUDER. I PATCHED THE CREW THROUGH TO MAINT CTL AND WE CONSULTED THE AFM FOR GUIDANCE ON CRACKED WINDOWS. AFTER REVIEWING THE PROC THE CREW DECIDED TO DROP TO FL230 TO SEE IF THE NOISE WOULD CHANGE. THEY DROPPED TO FL230 AND NOTHING CHANGED. I RAN THE NUMBERS FOR CONTINUING THE FLT TO ZZZ AND THERE WASN'T ENOUGH FUEL TO GET TO ZZZ AT FL230; KEEPING THE ORIGINAL REQUIRED ALTERNATE; AND 45 MINS (FAR RESERVE). I TOLD THE CREW THIS AND THEY AGREED THAT WE COULDN'T MAKE ZZZ. THE CREW HAD MENTIONED EARLIER THAT THEY MAY WANT TO GO TO ZZZ1. I WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CAPT; BUT I FIGURED WE WOULD MAKE THAT DECISION AFTER MAINT CTL OFFERED ANY PERTINENT ADVICE. THE CREW PAUSED FOR A MIN TO DROP TO FL230; AND WHEN THEY RETURNED; MAINT CTL TELLS THE CREW MAINT CTL AND OPS THINK THAT THEY SHOULD GO TO ZZZ1. (MAINT CTL NEVER ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT.) THE CREW DIDN'T RESPOND. THE MAINT CTLR TELLS ME OVER THE PATCH THAT HE HAD CALLED OPS AND ASKED THEM WHAT THEY WANTED THIS FLT TO DO. THEY WANTED THE FLT TO GO TO ZZZ1 BECAUSE THEY HAD A SPARE AIRBUS THERE. I CALLED THE FLT TO TELL THEM DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL WANTED THEM TO GO TO ZZZ1. THE CREW DIDN'T RESPOND. THEY WERE ALREADY COORDINATING WITH ATC TO GET INTO ZZZ1. I SENT THE CREW THE NUMBERS FOR ZZZ1 (VERIFYING THEY WOULD BE UNDER MAX LNDG WT). MY CONCERN IS WITH OPERATIONAL CTL AND SAFETY OF FLT. DISPATCH AND THE FLT CREWS SHARE OPERATIONAL CTL OVER EACH FLT; PER 121.533; WHICH STATES IN (B) THAT THE PIC AND THE ACFT DISPATCHER ARE JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREFLT PLANNING; DELAY; AND DISPATCH RELEASE OF A FLT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS CHAPTER AND OPS SPECS. PART C STATES THAT: THE ACFT DISPATCHER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR: 1) MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF EACH FLT; 2) ISSUING NECESSARY INFO FOR THE SAFETY OF FLT; AND 3) CANCELING OR REDISPATCHING A FLT IF; IN HIS OPINION OR THE OPINION OF THE PIC; THE FLT CANNOT OPERATE OR CONTINUE TO OPERATE SAFELY AS PLANNED OR RELEASED. MAINT CTL CALLED OPS AND NEVER BOTHERED TO ASK ME ANYTHING ABOUT THE FLT OTHER THAN IF THEY COULD MAKE ZZZ. HE JUMPED OFF A PATCH TO CONSULT WITH A PARTY (OPS) WITH INFO IRRELEVANT TO WHAT WAS GOING ON (SAFETY ISSUE). I FAIL TO SEE WHERE MAINT CTL OR OPS HOLD ANY OPERATIONAL CTL. THEY AREN'T MENTIONED ANYWHERE IN THE FAR'S WITH REF TO OPERATIONAL CTL; AND AS STATED ABOVE; DISPATCH IS EXPLICITLY GIVEN THIS AUTH. THE MAINT CTLR TOLD MY CREW ON THE PATCH TO GO TO ZZZ1. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE ONE TO MAKE THAT CALL. I DID HAPPEN TO AGREE WITH ZZZ1 AS THE SAFEST PLACE TO GO BUT; NOT FOR THE REASON THAT OPS CHOSE. OPS AND MAINT CTL WERE IN NO POS TO MAKE A CALL ON MY FLT'S SAFEST OPTIONS. OPS WAS NOT EVEN ON THE PATCH TO KNOW WHAT WAS ACTUALLY GOING ON. THEY ALSO HAVE NO ACCESS TO THE INFO THAT DISPATCH USES TO MAKE THESE DECISIONS. IF THEY WERE LICENSED DISPATCHERS THEY MAY ACTUALLY BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE LOOK AT THE THINGS WE DO; BUT THEY AREN'T. THE CREW AND I WERE REFING THE AFM FOR GUIDANCE; AND I WAS CONSIDERING OUR OPTIONS SINCE THERE WAS A CONCERN FOR A RAPID DECOMPRESSION AND ICING CONCERNS. ZZZ2 WAS OUT DUE TO ICING FROM THE TSRA IN THE AREA WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF HAIL FROM THOSE STORMS. ZZZ WAS OUT OF MY FLT'S FUEL RANGE. ZZZ1 WAS ALMOST ON RTE; HAD GOOD WX; NO OPERATIONAL RESTRS FOR MY FLT; AND COULD PROVIDE AARF OR MEDICAL FACILITIES IF THIS INCIDENT ESCALATED INTO A CATASTROPHIC EVENT. I ALSO WAS CONSIDERING ESCAPE RTE FOR A RAPID DECOMPRESSION; IF AN EMER SITUATION WERE TO OCCUR. HAD THE WORST-CASE SCENARIO HAPPENED ZZZ3 MAY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. BUT; MAINT CTL BY TELLING MYCREW WHERE HE AND OPS THOUGHT THEY SHOULD GO; AT THE VERY LEAST UNDERMINED MY OPERATIONAL CTL; WAS DISRESPECTFUL TO ME AND THE REST OF DISPATCH; AND COULD HAVE CAUSED CONFUSION FOR THE FLT CREW AS TO WHERE THEY SHOULD GO. THE CREW PROCEEDED TO ZZZ1 AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.