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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 759647 |
Time | |
Date | 200710 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dfw.airport |
State Reference | TX |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : ground |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller limited radar : 15 controller radar : 3 |
ASRS Report | 759647 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA |
Primary Problem | FAA |
Narrative:
Dfw east tower was in a south flow. Controller was working L1 and L3 combined. This means they were responsible for arrs; departures and crossing on runways 13L; 17L; 17C; and 17R. They were also responsible for overflt through class B airspace. Controller requested help from supervisor by breaking off and manning L3. This would have relieved controller from working runway 17L arrs; runway 13L departures and overflts in class B airspace. Supervisor refused to open L3 because he didn't have the staffing to open it. Additionally; supervisor didn't assist controller by restricting arrival rates or providing a controller to work local assist (an extra set of eyes for L1). Subsequently; controller continued to work L1 and L3 combined. He was busy with runway 17C arrs and 17R departures; while arrs continued for runway 17L. Dfw east tower is located between runway 17C and runway 17L; this requires the controller to walk to the other side of the tower cabin attendant to be able to adequately scan the aircraft and runway in critical phases of flight. Taxi instructions were complicated by the closure of taxiway er from taxiway Q to runway 17C and taxiway P from taxiway er to taxiway el. This forced all aircraft landing runway 17L; including w-side parking to taxi via txwys P and el to hold short of runway 17C. The aircraft are not accustomed to these taxi instructions; they are used to taxiing straight across taxiway er to hold short of runway 17C. Local controller not only had to ensure a proper readback; but also ensure that aircraft actually taxi that route. I believe safety is compromised when a controller is forced to work additional position where workload is on opposite sides of the tower cabin attendant. The controller needs to scan aircraft and runways at critical phases of flight. This may not happen if their attention is drawn to the other side of the tower cabin attendant. Adding to the safety concern was the numerous closures in the southeast airport quadrant forced usage of non-standard taxi rtes.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DFW GND CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN LCL CTLR'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS DENIED BECAUSE OF STAFFING AVAILABILITY.
Narrative: DFW E TWR WAS IN A S FLOW. CTLR WAS WORKING L1 AND L3 COMBINED. THIS MEANS THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRS; DEPS AND XING ON RWYS 13L; 17L; 17C; AND 17R. THEY WERE ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERFLT THROUGH CLASS B AIRSPACE. CTLR REQUESTED HELP FROM SUPVR BY BREAKING OFF AND MANNING L3. THIS WOULD HAVE RELIEVED CTLR FROM WORKING RWY 17L ARRS; RWY 13L DEPS AND OVERFLTS IN CLASS B AIRSPACE. SUPVR REFUSED TO OPEN L3 BECAUSE HE DIDN'T HAVE THE STAFFING TO OPEN IT. ADDITIONALLY; SUPVR DIDN'T ASSIST CTLR BY RESTRICTING ARR RATES OR PROVIDING A CTLR TO WORK LCL ASSIST (AN EXTRA SET OF EYES FOR L1). SUBSEQUENTLY; CTLR CONTINUED TO WORK L1 AND L3 COMBINED. HE WAS BUSY WITH RWY 17C ARRS AND 17R DEPS; WHILE ARRS CONTINUED FOR RWY 17L. DFW E TWR IS LOCATED BTWN RWY 17C AND RWY 17L; THIS REQUIRES THE CTLR TO WALK TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TWR CAB TO BE ABLE TO ADEQUATELY SCAN THE ACFT AND RWY IN CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE COMPLICATED BY THE CLOSURE OF TXWY ER FROM TXWY Q TO RWY 17C AND TXWY P FROM TXWY ER TO TXWY EL. THIS FORCED ALL ACFT LNDG RWY 17L; INCLUDING W-SIDE PARKING TO TAXI VIA TXWYS P AND EL TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17C. THE ACFT ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO THESE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS; THEY ARE USED TO TAXIING STRAIGHT ACROSS TXWY ER TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 17C. LCL CTLR NOT ONLY HAD TO ENSURE A PROPER READBACK; BUT ALSO ENSURE THAT ACFT ACTUALLY TAXI THAT RTE. I BELIEVE SAFETY IS COMPROMISED WHEN A CTLR IS FORCED TO WORK ADDITIONAL POS WHERE WORKLOAD IS ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF THE TWR CAB. THE CTLR NEEDS TO SCAN ACFT AND RWYS AT CRITICAL PHASES OF FLT. THIS MAY NOT HAPPEN IF THEIR ATTN IS DRAWN TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TWR CAB. ADDING TO THE SAFETY CONCERN WAS THE NUMEROUS CLOSURES IN THE SE ARPT QUADRANT FORCED USAGE OF NON-STANDARD TAXI RTES.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.