Narrative:

Amt reports that shaft residing in the B737 CFM56 engine's gearbox did not receive the fpi on 4 different units. 3 of the units have been placed on wing; the other is in the shop and is being repaired. Manual was revised in nov 2006; adding the required fpi to the shaft; and the shop order did not get changed to address inspection. Engineering was contacted; and is presently working with the original equipment manufacturer in getting approval for deviation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated he found out after he had sent in this report; the fluorescent dye penetrant (fpi) inspections on the suspect engine's accessory gearbox cases were not part of the engines that would require the fpi under the new manual revisions. However; the shop manuals still did not reflect the fpi requirement on the engine accessory case splined shaft for the incoming units. Reporter also stated engineering and the shop management were going to make the necessary updates. This splined shaft; which really is very short and more like a coupling; is the focus of attention and located at the #9 pad location on the aft side of the accessory case where the lube unit attaches to the case. Reporter adds that cfm-56 mfg hasn't indicated why this small shaft has been added to the fpi requirement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MAINT TECHNICIAN REPORTS THAT FOUR DIFFERENT B737 CFM-56 ENGINE GEARBOX SHAFTS DID NOT RECEIVE REQUIRED FLUORESCENT DYE PENETRANT INSPECTIONS (FPI).

Narrative: AMT RPTS THAT SHAFT RESIDING IN THE B737 CFM56 ENG'S GEARBOX DID NOT RECEIVE THE FPI ON 4 DIFFERENT UNITS. 3 OF THE UNITS HAVE BEEN PLACED ON WING; THE OTHER IS IN THE SHOP AND IS BEING REPAIRED. MANUAL WAS REVISED IN NOV 2006; ADDING THE REQUIRED FPI TO THE SHAFT; AND THE SHOP ORDER DID NOT GET CHANGED TO ADDRESS INSPECTION. ENGINEERING WAS CONTACTED; AND IS PRESENTLY WORKING WITH THE ORIGINAL EQUIP MANUFACTURER IN GETTING APPROVAL FOR DEV. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HE FOUND OUT AFTER HE HAD SENT IN THIS REPORT; THE FLUORESCENT DYE PENETRANT (FPI) INSPECTIONS ON THE SUSPECT ENGINE'S ACCESSORY GEARBOX CASES WERE NOT PART OF THE ENGINES THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE FPI UNDER THE NEW MANUAL REVISIONS. HOWEVER; THE SHOP MANUALS STILL DID NOT REFLECT THE FPI REQUIREMENT ON THE ENGINE ACCESSORY CASE SPLINED SHAFT FOR THE INCOMING UNITS. REPORTER ALSO STATED ENGINEERING AND THE SHOP MANAGEMENT WERE GOING TO MAKE THE NECESSARY UPDATES. THIS SPLINED SHAFT; WHICH REALLY IS VERY SHORT AND MORE LIKE A COUPLING; IS THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION AND LOCATED AT THE #9 PAD LOCATION ON THE AFT SIDE OF THE ACCESSORY CASE WHERE THE LUBE UNIT ATTACHES TO THE CASE. REPORTER ADDS THAT CFM-56 MFG HASN'T INDICATED WHY THIS SMALL SHAFT HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE FPI REQUIREMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.