Narrative:

I was working sector 46; a very difficult; complex sector. I had 4 aircraft (6 alerts in uret). B737 at FL220 on SUNSS6; TBM7 on SUNSS6; C560 on SUNSS6; and a crj (with an overtake). The B737 had to go to 11000 ft; tbm to 10000 ft; C560 to 9000 ft. They were all on the wrong side of each other. I turned the tbm 10 degrees left to get the C560 down and gave him direct bball to effect some route separation. I left the tbm on the runway 10L to go behind the B737 and gave the C560 an altitude restr 12 mi southeast of bball in order to procedurally separate him from the B737. Once I had about 7 mi between the C560 and the tbm; I turned the tbm back to bball (a 60 KT pull away). The next aircraft that checked on was a B737 off elp. We have a new arrival; the KOOLY1; an RNAV arrival. Multiple automation issues have increased the complexity on an already busy; complex sector. The B737 did not have the kooly; so I had to issue (due to phx LOA requirements) and amended it in the machine; necessitating head down time). When I looked up at the scope; I realized that the tbm and C560 weren't working as the space had compressed to 6 mi and I wasn't going to keep 5 mi. I tried to stop the C560 at 14000 ft; but he was already through it. I turned the tbm 10L and called traffic. He got the C560 in sight at just over 5 mi and I used visual separation 7 seconds before the snitch patch printed. I had a halo on both aircraft; for each other and the B737 from the south (the first aircraft). Had I not had to amend a flight plan that should haven't had to be fixed with adequate automation (primarily due to poor planning in implementation of the KOOLY1); I would have noticed the compression and speed changes far before it became a problem. I turned the tbm back too early; however the automation and complexity was a severe problem that did not allow me to see the situation developing; only the aftermath. Because of poor planning by the airspace office and management in implementing and designing the kooly arrival (due to P08 jump activity); we have created an inordinately unsafe situation on the southeast cornerpost in phx where multiple aircraft conflict and complexity is exceeding the cognitive capacity of every controller in the southwest; especially at ZAB. It needs to be redesigned or notamed unusable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAB CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR OPERROR AT 14000 FT; CLAIMING POORLY DESIGNED RNAV ARR PROC TO PHX COUPLED WITH AUTOMATION COMPLICATIONS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING SECTOR 46; A VERY DIFFICULT; COMPLEX SECTOR. I HAD 4 ACFT (6 ALERTS IN URET). B737 AT FL220 ON SUNSS6; TBM7 ON SUNSS6; C560 ON SUNSS6; AND A CRJ (WITH AN OVERTAKE). THE B737 HAD TO GO TO 11000 FT; TBM TO 10000 FT; C560 TO 9000 FT. THEY WERE ALL ON THE WRONG SIDE OF EACH OTHER. I TURNED THE TBM 10 DEGS L TO GET THE C560 DOWN AND GAVE HIM DIRECT BBALL TO EFFECT SOME RTE SEPARATION. I LEFT THE TBM ON THE RWY 10L TO GO BEHIND THE B737 AND GAVE THE C560 AN ALT RESTR 12 MI SE OF BBALL IN ORDER TO PROCEDURALLY SEPARATE HIM FROM THE B737. ONCE I HAD ABOUT 7 MI BTWN THE C560 AND THE TBM; I TURNED THE TBM BACK TO BBALL (A 60 KT PULL AWAY). THE NEXT ACFT THAT CHKED ON WAS A B737 OFF ELP. WE HAVE A NEW ARR; THE KOOLY1; AN RNAV ARR. MULTIPLE AUTOMATION ISSUES HAVE INCREASED THE COMPLEXITY ON AN ALREADY BUSY; COMPLEX SECTOR. THE B737 DID NOT HAVE THE KOOLY; SO I HAD TO ISSUE (DUE TO PHX LOA REQUIREMENTS) AND AMENDED IT IN THE MACHINE; NECESSITATING HEAD DOWN TIME). WHEN I LOOKED UP AT THE SCOPE; I REALIZED THAT THE TBM AND C560 WEREN'T WORKING AS THE SPACE HAD COMPRESSED TO 6 MI AND I WASN'T GOING TO KEEP 5 MI. I TRIED TO STOP THE C560 AT 14000 FT; BUT HE WAS ALREADY THROUGH IT. I TURNED THE TBM 10L AND CALLED TFC. HE GOT THE C560 IN SIGHT AT JUST OVER 5 MI AND I USED VISUAL SEPARATION 7 SECONDS BEFORE THE SNITCH PATCH PRINTED. I HAD A HALO ON BOTH ACFT; FOR EACH OTHER AND THE B737 FROM THE S (THE FIRST ACFT). HAD I NOT HAD TO AMEND A FLT PLAN THAT SHOULD HAVEN'T HAD TO BE FIXED WITH ADEQUATE AUTOMATION (PRIMARILY DUE TO POOR PLANNING IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KOOLY1); I WOULD HAVE NOTICED THE COMPRESSION AND SPD CHANGES FAR BEFORE IT BECAME A PROB. I TURNED THE TBM BACK TOO EARLY; HOWEVER THE AUTOMATION AND COMPLEXITY WAS A SEVERE PROB THAT DID NOT ALLOW ME TO SEE THE SIT DEVELOPING; ONLY THE AFTERMATH. BECAUSE OF POOR PLANNING BY THE AIRSPACE OFFICE AND MGMNT IN IMPLEMENTING AND DESIGNING THE KOOLY ARR (DUE TO P08 JUMP ACTIVITY); WE HAVE CREATED AN INORDINATELY UNSAFE SIT ON THE SE CORNERPOST IN PHX WHERE MULTIPLE ACFT CONFLICT AND COMPLEXITY IS EXCEEDING THE COGNITIVE CAPACITY OF EVERY CTLR IN THE SW; ESPECIALLY AT ZAB. IT NEEDS TO BE REDESIGNED OR NOTAMED UNUSABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.