Narrative:

While proceeding south on airway UL776 from nekob to tir level at FL330; requested climb to FL350; from paramaribo control on frequency 120.9. Turned on all exterior lights for safety and commenced climb to FL350. While approaching FL340 we had a TCAS caution indicating that there was an aircraft 600 ft above us. We did not get a TA/RA or any evasive action from TCAS. Communicated with air carrier Y on VHF 123.45; as we had been communicating prior to this incident about our RA. Captain on air carrier Y advised; they had taken evasive action because of the RA caution and the fact that it was night VFR and observed our bright lights coming at them. We questioned paramaribo control of this situation and he stated that in rvsm we were 1000 foot separation. We then asked him to confirm our estimates we had given him. Captain on flight air carrier Y also requested confirmation of his estimates. All estimates of both flts he had were correct. Both capts on these two flts were pilots who initiated the one mile offset to the right of track over a decade ago; as a safety technique. Instead of air carrier management making it a mandatory requirement worldwide; they have elected to not make it an SOP in south america. Even after the incident a few months ago of a mid-air collision in brazil; air carrier training center has still not made this SOP. I mentioned this to two standards capts just within the last two weeks of the urgency to do the one mile offset to the right in south american operations. Upon reporting this near miss to paramaribo control; we were told that flight air carrier Y would not pass us for '9 more minutes and that this must be another aircraft.' confirmed with captain of air carrier Y that it was him that passed us; then relayed this information to center. Again was told we were in error; he was totally incorrect. We were communicating on VHF 2 on 123.45 and we knew who we were passing. We passed over position nekob at XA49 and estimated position tir at XB17. Incident occurred at XA57 while climbing from FL330 to FL350. If these two aircraft had been on LNAV without each aircraft on a one mile right offset; we would have had a mid air collision; if we had climbed in vertical speed for passenger comfort; instead we climbed in VNAV. The physical location of our two aircraft were probably in excess of 2 miles apart at closest point; and 600 ft vertically; I strongly and humbly recommend to air carrier management that they immediately put out a bulletin that all aircraft flying in the south american arena fly one mile right of track; south of us FAA; miami center or san juan center; regardless of the fact that south american countries have radar or in radar contact. Their radar in the region is not dependable at all as witnessed with the boeing 737 mid air over brazilian airspace. Recommend climb at maximum rate (VNAV or climb power) to minimize time in danger zone. We continued to climb to FL350 and got to destination at gru in a safe and efficient manner.supplemental from information acn 763983: all flts operating in any non-radar environment should be mandated by standard operating procedure to operate with a 1 mile right lateral offset. Standard operating procedure should also be amended to require the use of all available exterior lighting during a climb; and full available thrust should always be used to minimize the time away from assigned altitudes. Lastly; the use of interior cockpit flood lighting during night operations should be discouraged in non radar environments; especially during climbs; dscnts; or lateral deviations.supplemental information from acn 763982: at approximately XA57; while proceeding north on airway from tir to nekob level at FL340; took evasive action deviation right of airway approximately 30 degrees right of course to avoid air carrier X who was in climb from FL330 to FL350 and passing through our altitude; very close; dead ahead. Very shortly after; received TCAS caution. Notified air carrier X and paramaribo on VHF of our action. Captain of air carrier X had lights on; and passed us to left. Upon passing; returned to airway without further incident. Was flying 1 mile offset to right of airway. Upon reporting near miss to paramaribo control; again; and after ABOUT1 minute of initial report of evasive action. Was told that that air carrier X would not pass us for '9 more minutes and that this must be another aircraft.' confirmed with captain of air carrier X that it was him that passed us; then relayed this information to center; again. Again was told we were in err. Even though airplanes were probably in excess of 1 to 2 miles laterally apart at closest point; and 800 ft vertically; had both airplanes been on course; and his climb been started 15 to 20 seconds later...or at a slightly slower rate of climb; this would not be a good ending now. 1) recommend to always fly 1 mile right (offset) of any airway south of san juan control. 2) any climb in this part of world should be made at maximum rate (VNAV or climb power) to minimize time in danger zone. No 'cruise' climbs. 3) this part of the world will continue to be a very dangerous place until radar facilities are available here. I have had numerous such incidents occur with in 500 miles of this area; over my 15+ years of flying in this region. It is not getting better. As more aircraft are crammed into this area; the problem will only get worse unless significant and prudent action is taken.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWO FLT CREWS RPT THAT THEY ARE OPPOSITE DIRECTION CONFLICTING TFC ON UL776 AIRWAY IN PARAMARIBO CTL; SURINAME; PARAMARIBO DENIES CONFLICT EXISTED.

Narrative: WHILE PROCEEDING S ON AIRWAY UL776 FROM NEKOB TO TIR LEVEL AT FL330; REQUESTED CLB TO FL350; FROM PARAMARIBO CONTROL ON FREQ 120.9. TURNED ON ALL EXTERIOR LIGHTS FOR SAFETY AND COMMENCED CLB TO FL350. WHILE APCHING FL340 WE HAD A TCAS CAUTION INDICATING THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT 600 FT ABOVE US. WE DID NOT GET A TA/RA OR ANY EVASIVE ACTION FROM TCAS. COMMUNICATED WITH ACR Y ON VHF 123.45; AS WE HAD BEEN COMMUNICATING PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT ABOUT OUR RA. CAPT ON ACR Y ADVISED; THEY HAD TAKEN EVASIVE ACTION BECAUSE OF THE RA CAUTION AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS NIGHT VFR AND OBSERVED OUR BRIGHT LIGHTS COMING AT THEM. WE QUESTIONED PARAMARIBO CONTROL OF THIS SITUATION AND HE STATED THAT IN RVSM WE WERE 1000 FOOT SEPARATION. WE THEN ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM OUR ESTIMATES WE HAD GIVEN HIM. CAPT ON FLIGHT ACR Y ALSO REQUESTED CONFIRMATION OF HIS ESTIMATES. ALL ESTIMATES OF BOTH FLTS HE HAD WERE CORRECT. BOTH CAPTS ON THESE TWO FLTS WERE PLTS WHO INITIATED THE ONE MILE OFFSET TO THE R OF TRACK OVER A DECADE AGO; AS A SAFETY TECHNIQUE. INSTEAD OF ACR MANAGEMENT MAKING IT A MANDATORY REQUIREMENT WORLDWIDE; THEY HAVE ELECTED TO NOT MAKE IT AN SOP IN SOUTH AMERICA. EVEN AFTER THE INCIDENT A FEW MONTHS AGO OF A MID-AIR COLLISION IN BRAZIL; ACR TRAINING CTR HAS STILL NOT MADE THIS SOP. I MENTIONED THIS TO TWO STANDARDS CAPTS JUST WITHIN THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF THE URGENCY TO DO THE ONE MILE OFFSET TO THE R IN SOUTH AMERICAN OPS. UPON RPTING THIS NEAR MISS TO PARAMARIBO CONTROL; WE WERE TOLD THAT FLIGHT ACR Y WOULD NOT PASS US FOR '9 MORE MINUTES AND THAT THIS MUST BE ANOTHER ACFT.' CONFIRMED WITH CAPT OF ACR Y THAT IT WAS HIM THAT PASSED US; THEN RELAYED THIS INFO TO CTR. AGAIN WAS TOLD WE WERE IN ERROR; HE WAS TOTALLY INCORRECT. WE WERE COMMUNICATING ON VHF 2 ON 123.45 AND WE KNEW WHO WE WERE PASSING. WE PASSED OVER POSITION NEKOB AT XA49 AND ESTIMATED POSITION TIR AT XB17. INCIDENT OCCURRED AT XA57 WHILE CLBING FROM FL330 TO FL350. IF THESE TWO ACFT HAD BEEN ON LNAV WITHOUT EACH ACFT ON A ONE MILE R OFFSET; WE WOULD HAVE HAD A MID AIR COLLISION; IF WE HAD CLBED IN VERTICAL SPEED FOR PAX COMFORT; INSTEAD WE CLBED IN VNAV. THE PHYSICAL LOCATION OF OUR TWO ACFT WERE PROBABLY IN EXCESS OF 2 MILES APART AT CLOSEST POINT; AND 600 FT VERTICALLY; I STRONGLY AND HUMBLY RECOMMEND TO ACR MANAGEMENT THAT THEY IMMEDIATELY PUT OUT A BULLETIN THAT ALL ACFT FLYING IN THE SOUTH AMERICAN ARENA FLY ONE MILE R OF TRACK; SOUTH OF U.S. FAA; MIAMI CENTER OR SAN JUAN CENTER; REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE RADAR OR IN RADAR CONTACT. THEIR RADAR IN THE REGION IS NOT DEPENDABLE AT ALL AS WITNESSED WITH THE BOEING 737 MID AIR OVER BRAZILIAN AIRSPACE. RECOMMEND CLB AT MAX RATE (VNAV OR CLIMB POWER) TO MINIMIZE TIME IN DANGER ZONE. WE CONTINUED TO CLB TO FL350 AND GOT TO DEST AT GRU IN A SAFE AND EFFICIENT MANNER.SUPPLEMENTAL FROM INFO ACN 763983: ALL FLTS OPERATING IN ANY NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT SHOULD BE MANDATED BY STANDARD OPERATING PROC TO OPERATE WITH A 1 MILE R LATERAL OFFSET. STANDARD OPERATING PROC SHOULD ALSO BE AMENDED TO REQUIRE THE USE OF ALL AVAILABLE EXTERIOR LIGHTING DURING A CLB; AND FULL AVAILABLE THRUST SHOULD ALWAYS BE USED TO MINIMIZE THE TIME AWAY FROM ASSIGNED ALTITUDES. LASTLY; THE USE OF INTERIOR COCKPIT FLOOD LIGHTING DURING NIGHT OPERATIONS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED IN NON RADAR ENVIRONMENTS; ESPECIALLY DURING CLBS; DSCNTS; OR LATERAL DEVS.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 763982: AT APPROX XA57; WHILE PROCEEDING N ON AIRWAY FROM TIR TO NEKOB LEVEL AT FL340; TOOK EVASIVE ACTION DEV R OF AIRWAY APPROX 30 DEGS R OF COURSE TO AVOID ACR X WHO WAS IN CLB FROM FL330 TO FL350 AND PASSING THROUGH OUR ALTITUDE; VERY CLOSE; DEAD AHEAD. VERY SHORTLY AFTER; RECEIVED TCAS CAUTION. NOTIFIED ACR X AND PARAMARIBO ON VHF OF OUR ACTION. CAPT OF ACR X HAD LIGHTS ON; AND PASSED US TO L. UPON PASSING; RETURNED TO AIRWAY WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. WAS FLYING 1 MILE OFFSET TO R OF AIRWAY. UPON RPTING NEAR MISS TO PARAMARIBO CONTROL; AGAIN; AND AFTER ABOUT1 MINUTE OF INITIAL RPT OF EVASIVE ACTION. WAS TOLD THAT THAT ACR X WOULD NOT PASS US FOR '9 MORE MINUTES AND THAT THIS MUST BE ANOTHER AIRCRAFT.' CONFIRMED WITH CAPT OF ACR X THAT IT WAS HIM THAT PASSED US; THEN RELAYED THIS INFO TO CENTER; AGAIN. AGAIN WAS TOLD WE WERE IN ERR. EVEN THOUGH AIRPLANES WERE PROBABLY IN EXCESS OF 1 TO 2 MILES LATERALLY APART AT CLOSEST POINT; AND 800 FT VERTICALLY; HAD BOTH AIRPLANES BEEN ON COURSE; AND HIS CLB BEEN STARTED 15 TO 20 SECONDS LATER...OR AT A SLIGHTLY SLOWER RATE OF CLB; THIS WOULD NOT BE A GOOD ENDING NOW. 1) RECOMMEND TO ALWAYS FLY 1 MILE R (OFFSET) OF ANY AIRWAY S OF SAN JUAN CONTROL. 2) ANY CLB IN THIS PART OF WORLD SHOULD BE MADE AT MAX RATE (VNAV OR CLIMB POWER) TO MINIMIZE TIME IN DANGER ZONE. NO 'CRUISE' CLBS. 3) THIS PART OF THE WORLD WILL CONTINUE TO BE A VERY DANGEROUS PLACE UNTIL RADAR FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE HERE. I HAVE HAD NUMEROUS SUCH INCIDENTS OCCUR WITH IN 500 MILES OF THIS AREA; OVER MY 15+ YEARS OF FLYING IN THIS REGION. IT IS NOT GETTING BETTER. AS MORE ACFT ARE CRAMMED INTO THIS AREA; THE PROBLEM WILL ONLY GET WORSE UNLESS SIGNIFICANT AND PRUDENT ACTION IS TAKEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.