Narrative:

The departure; en route and descent segments of the flight proceeded normally with the exception of ATC holding us at altitude longer than normal which required a steep descent to the terminal area. During the initial approach to the airport I performed the approach checklist which includes a fuel check and I noted that there was 500 pounds of fuel per wing tank and that there was approximately 1400 pounds in the fuselage tank. The gravity flow line was not open and I called this to the attention of the captain and at that time I observed the captain move the gravity flow switch to the forward position (xfer) and I visually confirmed that the valve opened (disagreement light) and noted that the checklist item was complete and proceeded to complete the remainder of the approach checklist. We were cleared by ATC to conduct a visual approach with a speed restr of 170 KIAS and handed off to the control tower. We were cleared to land and were instructed to land and exit midfield at taxiway X. We confirmed the clearance and proceeded to land. After landing the captain applied spoilers; maximum braking and thrust reversers but that was not enough to stop in time to make a safe turnoff on taxiway X. The tower immediately issued an instruction to make a 180 degree turn and expedite exiting the runway at taxiway X. As we were proceeding to enter a left turn the tower controller informed us that he observed smoke coming from the right engine. I looked out my right window and observed white smoke moving forward on the right side of the aircraft as we were preparing to execute a left 180 degree turn. We had no indication of an engine fire on the flight deck. As we proceeded into the left 180 degree turn on the runway the captain announced that 'we just lost both engines...' I looked at the engine gauges and noted the turbines were indeed spooling down. The tower controller repeated his instruction to expedite our exit and I informed the tower that we were unable to comply. He asked us to confirm unable and I confirmed that we were unable. We then proceeded to communicate our status and the tower controller asked us if we needed assistance and we replied that we had no indication of fire and that we were going to try and restart one of the engines so as to exit as soon as possible. At that time the captain was attempting to restart the right engine. I monitored the start and confirmed stagnation and the start was aborted. We discussed waiting before attempting to restart the left engine. The attempt to restart the left engine was aborted as well. I informed the tower that we would need a tow off of the runway. The tower told us that help was on the way. The tug arrived and we were off of the runway in 5-10 mins. Postflt: at the time the passenger were being accommodated I was approached by a lear mechanic and we discussed what could cause both engines to flame out at the same time during a landing roll. I explained that we had used maximum braking and thrust reverse and that we had approximately 250 pounds in each main fuel tank. I asked him if it was possible for the fuel to unport under those conditions and briefly discussed scavenge pumps installed in the wing tanks of the lear and how they should prevent that. Soon thereafter the mechanic entered the aircraft and examined the thrust levers. He said it was possible for the thrust levers to move past the idle detent and into cutoff if they were not rigged properly. In subsequent discussions with the company it was determined that poor CRM and fuel management had led to a lower than normal fuel condition with a resulting unporting of wing tank fuel under heavy deceleration and that was the cause of the engine flameouts. The fact that we accepted a land short instruction from the tower that required a maximum deceleration effort was discussed at length. Analysis: in the aftermath of this incident I could not help feel that I was not getting a straight answer to the obvious question. How could both engines flame out at the same time? According to the captain there was 250 pounds of fuel in each wing tank and even with hard deceleration and scavenge pumps should have triggered and kicked in at a low fuel warning condition. According to the mechanics that examined the aircraft there were no discrepancies foundwithin the scope of the inspection. It was not until I was on a subsequent road trip with another captain that I started to gain insight into what probably happened. He said that of the 3 switches on the fuel control panel that are used to move fuel to and from the aft fuselage tank that only 1 has a dual function. This would be the fuselage fuel xfer/fill and it has 3 position. 1) center (closed) -- valve xfer line is closed. 2) forward (xfer) -- send fuel forward from the fuselage tank to the wing tanks. 3) rear position (fill) -- xfer fuel from the wings to the fuselage tank. The fuselage xfer switch is right next to the gravity flow switch and to turn off the gravity flow switch you have to move it to the rearward position. If someone were to inadvertently move the switch next to the gravity flow switch to the rear position without confirming that it was indeed the gravity flow switch they would be in effect moving fuel from the main tanks and to the rear fuselage tank. This might explain what happened to fuel that should have been left in the wing tanks as a result of not being burned by the engines. Conclusion: our ultimate conclusion was that one of us had inadvertently moved the fuselage fuel xfer switch to the rear position thinking that it was the fuel gravity flow switch and went on to say that it is well known among learjet drivers that this was an accident waiting to happen inherent in the design of and dual function built into this switch. In the final analysis it matters not who did what but what actually happened and how can this be prevented in the future operation of the learjet. Recommendation: the fuel control panel in the learjet only has 1 switch that provides an annunciation on the cap (central annunciator panel) when it is opened. That switch controls the cross flow valve. When the cross flow valve is opened it turns on a green light on the cap (central annunciator panel). I recommend the following items be rolled into 1 mandatory airworthiness directive for the learjet model 35/55. 1) modify the lear to indicate on the cap when the fuselage tank xfer line valve is in the fill position. The light should be amber. 2) the same airworthiness directive should require the valve to close when any engine is in operation and the fuel level in any 1 wing tank falls below a certain level (fuel low threshold quantity?) 3) the amber fuel low warning light on the cap should trigger the mws (main warning system) to alert both pilots of a low fuel condition and it should be red; not amber. (The lear 35 has a red cap light during a low fuel condition and for some reason the lear 55 does not.) currently on the lear 55 the amber low fuel warning light is located on the upper left position of the cap and is closer to the captain's scan than that of the pilot in the right seat. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter believes that fuel was being transferred from the wings to the fuselage during the last few minutes of the approach and may have led to fuel exhaustion during the quick stop. These two switches look alike and work in the same way; making them easy to mix up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LEAR FO REPORTS DUAL ENGINE FLAME OUT AFTER MAX EFFORT STOP. FUEL STARVATION IS SUSPECTED.

Narrative: THE DEP; ENRTE AND DSCNT SEGMENTS OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ATC HOLDING US AT ALT LONGER THAN NORMAL WHICH REQUIRED A STEEP DSCNT TO THE TERMINAL AREA. DURING THE INITIAL APCH TO THE ARPT I PERFORMED THE APCH CHKLIST WHICH INCLUDES A FUEL CHK AND I NOTED THAT THERE WAS 500 LBS OF FUEL PER WING TANK AND THAT THERE WAS APPROX 1400 LBS IN THE FUSELAGE TANK. THE GRAVITY FLOW LINE WAS NOT OPEN AND I CALLED THIS TO THE ATTN OF THE CAPT AND AT THAT TIME I OBSERVED THE CAPT MOVE THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH TO THE FORWARD POS (XFER) AND I VISUALLY CONFIRMED THAT THE VALVE OPENED (DISAGREEMENT LIGHT) AND NOTED THAT THE CHKLIST ITEM WAS COMPLETE AND PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH CHKLIST. WE WERE CLRED BY ATC TO CONDUCT A VISUAL APCH WITH A SPD RESTR OF 170 KIAS AND HANDED OFF TO THE CTL TWR. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO LAND AND EXIT MIDFIELD AT TXWY X. WE CONFIRMED THE CLRNC AND PROCEEDED TO LAND. AFTER LNDG THE CAPT APPLIED SPOILERS; MAX BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSERS BUT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO STOP IN TIME TO MAKE A SAFE TURNOFF ON TXWY X. THE TWR IMMEDIATELY ISSUED AN INSTRUCTION TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN AND EXPEDITE EXITING THE RWY AT TXWY X. AS WE WERE PROCEEDING TO ENTER A L TURN THE TWR CTLR INFORMED US THAT HE OBSERVED SMOKE COMING FROM THE R ENG. I LOOKED OUT MY R WINDOW AND OBSERVED WHITE SMOKE MOVING FORWARD ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT AS WE WERE PREPARING TO EXECUTE A L 180 DEG TURN. WE HAD NO INDICATION OF AN ENG FIRE ON THE FLT DECK. AS WE PROCEEDED INTO THE L 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY THE CAPT ANNOUNCED THAT 'WE JUST LOST BOTH ENGS...' I LOOKED AT THE ENG GAUGES AND NOTED THE TURBINES WERE INDEED SPOOLING DOWN. THE TWR CTLR REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTION TO EXPEDITE OUR EXIT AND I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY. HE ASKED US TO CONFIRM UNABLE AND I CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE UNABLE. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO COMMUNICATE OUR STATUS AND THE TWR CTLR ASKED US IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE AND WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD NO INDICATION OF FIRE AND THAT WE WERE GOING TO TRY AND RESTART ONE OF THE ENGS SO AS TO EXIT ASAP. AT THAT TIME THE CAPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO RESTART THE R ENG. I MONITORED THE START AND CONFIRMED STAGNATION AND THE START WAS ABORTED. WE DISCUSSED WAITING BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO RESTART THE L ENG. THE ATTEMPT TO RESTART THE L ENG WAS ABORTED AS WELL. I INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED A TOW OFF OF THE RWY. THE TWR TOLD US THAT HELP WAS ON THE WAY. THE TUG ARRIVED AND WE WERE OFF OF THE RWY IN 5-10 MINS. POSTFLT: AT THE TIME THE PAX WERE BEING ACCOMMODATED I WAS APCHED BY A LEAR MECH AND WE DISCUSSED WHAT COULD CAUSE BOTH ENGS TO FLAME OUT AT THE SAME TIME DURING A LNDG ROLL. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD USED MAX BRAKING AND THRUST REVERSE AND THAT WE HAD APPROX 250 LBS IN EACH MAIN FUEL TANK. I ASKED HIM IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE FUEL TO UNPORT UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS AND BRIEFLY DISCUSSED SCAVENGE PUMPS INSTALLED IN THE WING TANKS OF THE LEAR AND HOW THEY SHOULD PREVENT THAT. SOON THEREAFTER THE MECH ENTERED THE ACFT AND EXAMINED THE THRUST LEVERS. HE SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE THRUST LEVERS TO MOVE PAST THE IDLE DETENT AND INTO CUTOFF IF THEY WERE NOT RIGGED PROPERLY. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMPANY IT WAS DETERMINED THAT POOR CRM AND FUEL MGMNT HAD LED TO A LOWER THAN NORMAL FUEL CONDITION WITH A RESULTING UNPORTING OF WING TANK FUEL UNDER HVY DECELERATION AND THAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FLAMEOUTS. THE FACT THAT WE ACCEPTED A LAND SHORT INSTRUCTION FROM THE TWR THAT REQUIRED A MAX DECELERATION EFFORT WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH. ANALYSIS: IN THE AFTERMATH OF THIS INCIDENT I COULD NOT HELP FEEL THAT I WAS NOT GETTING A STRAIGHT ANSWER TO THE OBVIOUS QUESTION. HOW COULD BOTH ENGS FLAME OUT AT THE SAME TIME? ACCORDING TO THE CAPT THERE WAS 250 LBS OF FUEL IN EACH WING TANK AND EVEN WITH HARD DECELERATION AND SCAVENGE PUMPS SHOULD HAVE TRIGGERED AND KICKED IN AT A LOW FUEL WARNING CONDITION. ACCORDING TO THE MECHS THAT EXAMINED THE ACFT THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUNDWITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE INSPECTION. IT WAS NOT UNTIL I WAS ON A SUBSEQUENT ROAD TRIP WITH ANOTHER CAPT THAT I STARTED TO GAIN INSIGHT INTO WHAT PROBABLY HAPPENED. HE SAID THAT OF THE 3 SWITCHES ON THE FUEL CTL PANEL THAT ARE USED TO MOVE FUEL TO AND FROM THE AFT FUSELAGE TANK THAT ONLY 1 HAS A DUAL FUNCTION. THIS WOULD BE THE FUSELAGE FUEL XFER/FILL AND IT HAS 3 POS. 1) CTR (CLOSED) -- VALVE XFER LINE IS CLOSED. 2) FORWARD (XFER) -- SEND FUEL FORWARD FROM THE FUSELAGE TANK TO THE WING TANKS. 3) REAR POS (FILL) -- XFER FUEL FROM THE WINGS TO THE FUSELAGE TANK. THE FUSELAGE XFER SWITCH IS RIGHT NEXT TO THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH AND TO TURN OFF THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH YOU HAVE TO MOVE IT TO THE REARWARD POS. IF SOMEONE WERE TO INADVERTENTLY MOVE THE SWITCH NEXT TO THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH TO THE REAR POS WITHOUT CONFIRMING THAT IT WAS INDEED THE GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH THEY WOULD BE IN EFFECT MOVING FUEL FROM THE MAIN TANKS AND TO THE REAR FUSELAGE TANK. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHAT HAPPENED TO FUEL THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT IN THE WING TANKS AS A RESULT OF NOT BEING BURNED BY THE ENGS. CONCLUSION: OUR ULTIMATE CONCLUSION WAS THAT ONE OF US HAD INADVERTENTLY MOVED THE FUSELAGE FUEL XFER SWITCH TO THE REAR POS THINKING THAT IT WAS THE FUEL GRAVITY FLOW SWITCH AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT IS WELL KNOWN AMONG LEARJET DRIVERS THAT THIS WAS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN INHERENT IN THE DESIGN OF AND DUAL FUNCTION BUILT INTO THIS SWITCH. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS IT MATTERS NOT WHO DID WHAT BUT WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND HOW CAN THIS BE PREVENTED IN THE FUTURE OP OF THE LEARJET. RECOMMENDATION: THE FUEL CTL PANEL IN THE LEARJET ONLY HAS 1 SWITCH THAT PROVIDES AN ANNUNCIATION ON THE CAP (CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL) WHEN IT IS OPENED. THAT SWITCH CTLS THE CROSS FLOW VALVE. WHEN THE CROSS FLOW VALVE IS OPENED IT TURNS ON A GREEN LIGHT ON THE CAP (CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL). I RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS BE ROLLED INTO 1 MANDATORY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE FOR THE LEARJET MODEL 35/55. 1) MODIFY THE LEAR TO INDICATE ON THE CAP WHEN THE FUSELAGE TANK XFER LINE VALVE IS IN THE FILL POS. THE LIGHT SHOULD BE AMBER. 2) THE SAME AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE SHOULD REQUIRE THE VALVE TO CLOSE WHEN ANY ENG IS IN OP AND THE FUEL LEVEL IN ANY 1 WING TANK FALLS BELOW A CERTAIN LEVEL (FUEL LOW THRESHOLD QUANTITY?) 3) THE AMBER FUEL LOW WARNING LIGHT ON THE CAP SHOULD TRIGGER THE MWS (MAIN WARNING SYS) TO ALERT BOTH PLTS OF A LOW FUEL CONDITION AND IT SHOULD BE RED; NOT AMBER. (THE LEAR 35 HAS A RED CAP LIGHT DURING A LOW FUEL CONDITION AND FOR SOME REASON THE LEAR 55 DOES NOT.) CURRENTLY ON THE LEAR 55 THE AMBER LOW FUEL WARNING LIGHT IS LOCATED ON THE UPPER L POS OF THE CAP AND IS CLOSER TO THE CAPT'S SCAN THAN THAT OF THE PLT IN THE R SEAT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER BELIEVES THAT FUEL WAS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM THE WINGS TO THE FUSELAGE DURING THE LAST FEW MINUTES OF THE APPROACH AND MAY HAVE LED TO FUEL EXHAUSTION DURING THE QUICK STOP. THESE TWO SWITCHES LOOK ALIKE AND WORK IN THE SAME WAY; MAKING THEM EASY TO MIX UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.