Narrative:

I was inbound to the brunswick golden isles airport (bqk) from the south; flying single pilot. I was working with ZJX on 126.75; he was busy. There was an area of moderate WX (painting yellow on nexrad) just south of the localizer for runway 7 at bqk. I had desired to go around the WX to the west and join the localizer course from the north; in an attempt to avoid the WX. Unfortunately; I could not get a word in to the controller with the amount of other traffic he was working. I had been cleared direct the airport at about 18 mi south. At about 9 mi south the controller began to give me vectors and asked me if I'd like to go direct to bertt intersection to avoid the WX; his suggestion would have flown me the longest/worst possible way through the WX; so I declined. He continued to give me headings to fly; the last appeared to me that it was to join the localizer; and it came with an altitude assignment of '1700 ft until yokho cleared the ILS 7.' the heading was something like 030 degrees (a 40 degree intercept I thought). This was 7 mi away from the airport. Less than 30 seconds later; I joined the localizer very close to yokho and well above the GS. I had anticipated a bad turn onto the localizer and had previously put the flaps and gear down; which allowed me to rejoin the GS below. After joining the GS; on the localizer now inside of yokho; the controller began to question what I was doing; asking me if I was not gong to do the procedure turn; informing me that he had expected me to do a procedure turn and that he had a phone number for me to call; I told him that I was established and the approach was going to work out; I was still IMC. The controller again called me to tell me he had a phone number for me to call right away; I was no higher than 700 ft above the field at this point and still IMC. The controller again continued to badger me about getting the phone number. I informed him he would have to wait until I was on the ground. At this point he allowed me to switch to CTAF. After landing I got the phone number and had a brief conversation with his supervisor who had very little interest in anything other than getting me to say I deviated from a clearance. Contributing factors/human performance considerations: WX. 1) I assume the WX increased the controller's workload. 2) I had a desire to limit my exposure to the WX and thought the last heading given was the controller's way in helping me do this. I didn't consider the fact that he wanted me to reverse course on the localizer and fly back through the WX for a procedure turn. Fatigue. 1) I was near the end of a 4-DAY trip to new places and had poor sleep the previous evenings. I also showed up to the airport to find trouble with the aircraft. 2) I normally don't assume things but; with the last heading and the clearance to descend to 1700 ft until crossing yokho cleared the ILS 7; I had assumed I was cleared the approach from radar vectors. Had I been better rested I may not have made this assumption without asking the controller. Ambiguity. I told the controller upon checking in with him that I wanted the ILS 7. I was advised to expect it. I was not told 'how' to expect it. Again; all the vectors made me assume it would be vectored. Had any mention of a procedure turn such as 'report procedure turn inbound;' or 'cleared direct bertt' or 'cleared direct yokho' been mentioned; it would have cleared things up for me. By the time the last clearance of 'descend to 1700 ft until crossing yokho; cleared the ILS 7' had been given; I was very close to the localizer course and this was the first time yokho was mentioned. I joined the localizer course well under 30 seconds after this clearance; I had the instrument set up for a radar vectored straight-in approach. Unfamiliar with the area. Single pilot IFR. Had another crew member been with me; we may have thought to question the controller. Corrective actions: 1) in retrospect; I should have refused the approach when I thought the controller had just 'shoehorned' me on to it at yokho. 2) it was unwise of me to entertain the controller's badgering to copy a phone number while I cleaned up a terrible entry to an ILS in IMC while single pilot. 3) I could have avoided this situation by telling the controller where and how I wanted to join the approach. Less assumptions by both parties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA ACFT ON VECTORS FROM ZJX TO ILS RWY 7 AT BQK WAS QUESTIONED BY ATC BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO EXECUTE PROC TURN.

Narrative: I WAS INBOUND TO THE BRUNSWICK GOLDEN ISLES ARPT (BQK) FROM THE S; FLYING SINGLE PLT. I WAS WORKING WITH ZJX ON 126.75; HE WAS BUSY. THERE WAS AN AREA OF MODERATE WX (PAINTING YELLOW ON NEXRAD) JUST S OF THE LOC FOR RWY 7 AT BQK. I HAD DESIRED TO GO AROUND THE WX TO THE W AND JOIN THE LOC COURSE FROM THE N; IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE WX. UNFORTUNATELY; I COULD NOT GET A WORD IN TO THE CTLR WITH THE AMOUNT OF OTHER TFC HE WAS WORKING. I HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT THE ARPT AT ABOUT 18 MI S. AT ABOUT 9 MI S THE CTLR BEGAN TO GIVE ME VECTORS AND ASKED ME IF I'D LIKE TO GO DIRECT TO BERTT INTXN TO AVOID THE WX; HIS SUGGESTION WOULD HAVE FLOWN ME THE LONGEST/WORST POSSIBLE WAY THROUGH THE WX; SO I DECLINED. HE CONTINUED TO GIVE ME HDGS TO FLY; THE LAST APPEARED TO ME THAT IT WAS TO JOIN THE LOC; AND IT CAME WITH AN ALT ASSIGNMENT OF '1700 FT UNTIL YOKHO CLRED THE ILS 7.' THE HDG WAS SOMETHING LIKE 030 DEGS (A 40 DEG INTERCEPT I THOUGHT). THIS WAS 7 MI AWAY FROM THE ARPT. LESS THAN 30 SECONDS LATER; I JOINED THE LOC VERY CLOSE TO YOKHO AND WELL ABOVE THE GS. I HAD ANTICIPATED A BAD TURN ONTO THE LOC AND HAD PREVIOUSLY PUT THE FLAPS AND GEAR DOWN; WHICH ALLOWED ME TO REJOIN THE GS BELOW. AFTER JOINING THE GS; ON THE LOCALIZER NOW INSIDE OF YOKHO; THE CTLR BEGAN TO QUESTION WHAT I WAS DOING; ASKING ME IF I WAS NOT GONG TO DO THE PROC TURN; INFORMING ME THAT HE HAD EXPECTED ME TO DO A PROC TURN AND THAT HE HAD A PHONE NUMBER FOR ME TO CALL; I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS ESTABLISHED AND THE APCH WAS GOING TO WORK OUT; I WAS STILL IMC. THE CTLR AGAIN CALLED ME TO TELL ME HE HAD A PHONE NUMBER FOR ME TO CALL RIGHT AWAY; I WAS NO HIGHER THAN 700 FT ABOVE THE FIELD AT THIS POINT AND STILL IMC. THE CTLR AGAIN CONTINUED TO BADGER ME ABOUT GETTING THE PHONE NUMBER. I INFORMED HIM HE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL I WAS ON THE GND. AT THIS POINT HE ALLOWED ME TO SWITCH TO CTAF. AFTER LNDG I GOT THE PHONE NUMBER AND HAD A BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH HIS SUPVR WHO HAD VERY LITTLE INTEREST IN ANYTHING OTHER THAN GETTING ME TO SAY I DEVIATED FROM A CLRNC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: WX. 1) I ASSUME THE WX INCREASED THE CTLR'S WORKLOAD. 2) I HAD A DESIRE TO LIMIT MY EXPOSURE TO THE WX AND THOUGHT THE LAST HDG GIVEN WAS THE CTLR'S WAY IN HELPING ME DO THIS. I DIDN'T CONSIDER THE FACT THAT HE WANTED ME TO REVERSE COURSE ON THE LOC AND FLY BACK THROUGH THE WX FOR A PROC TURN. FATIGUE. 1) I WAS NEAR THE END OF A 4-DAY TRIP TO NEW PLACES AND HAD POOR SLEEP THE PREVIOUS EVENINGS. I ALSO SHOWED UP TO THE ARPT TO FIND TROUBLE WITH THE ACFT. 2) I NORMALLY DON'T ASSUME THINGS BUT; WITH THE LAST HDG AND THE CLRNC TO DSND TO 1700 FT UNTIL XING YOKHO CLRED THE ILS 7; I HAD ASSUMED I WAS CLRED THE APCH FROM RADAR VECTORS. HAD I BEEN BETTER RESTED I MAY NOT HAVE MADE THIS ASSUMPTION WITHOUT ASKING THE CTLR. AMBIGUITY. I TOLD THE CTLR UPON CHKING IN WITH HIM THAT I WANTED THE ILS 7. I WAS ADVISED TO EXPECT IT. I WAS NOT TOLD 'HOW' TO EXPECT IT. AGAIN; ALL THE VECTORS MADE ME ASSUME IT WOULD BE VECTORED. HAD ANY MENTION OF A PROC TURN SUCH AS 'RPT PROC TURN INBOUND;' OR 'CLRED DIRECT BERTT' OR 'CLRED DIRECT YOKHO' BEEN MENTIONED; IT WOULD HAVE CLRED THINGS UP FOR ME. BY THE TIME THE LAST CLRNC OF 'DSND TO 1700 FT UNTIL XING YOKHO; CLRED THE ILS 7' HAD BEEN GIVEN; I WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE LOC COURSE AND THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME YOKHO WAS MENTIONED. I JOINED THE LOC COURSE WELL UNDER 30 SECONDS AFTER THIS CLRNC; I HAD THE INSTRUMENT SET UP FOR A RADAR VECTORED STRAIGHT-IN APCH. UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA. SINGLE PLT IFR. HAD ANOTHER CREW MEMBER BEEN WITH ME; WE MAY HAVE THOUGHT TO QUESTION THE CTLR. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) IN RETROSPECT; I SHOULD HAVE REFUSED THE APCH WHEN I THOUGHT THE CTLR HAD JUST 'SHOEHORNED' ME ON TO IT AT YOKHO. 2) IT WAS UNWISE OF ME TO ENTERTAIN THE CTLR'S BADGERING TO COPY A PHONE NUMBER WHILE I CLEANED UP A TERRIBLE ENTRY TO AN ILS IN IMC WHILE SINGLE PLT. 3) I COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS SITUATION BY TELLING THE CTLR WHERE AND HOW I WANTED TO JOIN THE APCH. LESS ASSUMPTIONS BY BOTH PARTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.