Narrative:

I was the first officer on this flight and was the pm on this leg. We were cleared on the delta one RNAV STAR into slc and were maintaining an altitude of 11000 ft on the downwind for a planned landing on runway 16R. The WX was VMC and there was a normal amount of air traffic in and around slc. As we were just about to come abeam the departure end of the 16 runways; slc approach control issued a traffic alert to us about an aircraft departing slc in a climbing turn to the northwest leveling at 10000 ft which was at our 2 O'clock position and traveling from aircraft right to left. I acknowledged ATC and began to search visually for the aircraft. I saw the aircraft on TCAS about 3000 ft below us (or approximately 8000 ft MSL) and then visually acquired it. It seemed to have a very steep climb angle for having less than 2000 ft to level off so I queried the captain as to what altitude they were supposed to be leveling off. He said they should level at 10000 ft and pass under us. I continued to watch both the aircraft visually and the TCAS and as soon as I saw the TCAS show the aircraft at 900 ft below us; I told the captain that I didn't think they were going to level at 10000 ft and perhaps a turn was necessary to avoid a conflict. He seemed to acquire the other aircraft visually at about this same time and; to his credit; without hesitation he began a 30-35 degree bank right turn inside of the other aircraft's flight path. At this same time; the TCAS RA commanded a 'climb; climb' or approximately 1500-1800 FPM. The captain began a climb in addition to his turn and we saw the other aircraft on the TCAS at about 300 ft below our altitude. (We were about 11500 ft at this time.) also about this time; slc approach issued instructions to turn right immediately to avoid an air conflict and I informed them that we were already in a turn and climbing for a TCAS RA. We both heard the 'bank angle' annunciator go off at which time I noticed the captain make an immediate bank correction back to 30 degrees. After this event; we returned to altitude and course and then asked approach control for a phone number to call about the incident once we landed. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. As we left the terminal for the crew van; the flight attendants mentioned that they felt quite an abrupt turn and climb and also that some of the forward passenger gripped their armrests and tightened their seatbelts in response to this turn. Our turning and climbing maneuver did not seem overly aggressive to me; but was undertaken with a little more importance than a normal turn for obvious reasons. No passenger said anything to either of the pilots about any uncomfortable maneuvers as they were leaving the aircraft. After leaving the airport; the captain took care of the phone calls to ATC and the chief pilots for further guidance. That is the details of the event to the best of my recollection. A) better communication to pilots when an airport issues a completely new set departure procedures at a time prior to their actual release (reference the read before fly when lax released their new RNAV departures). B) a more thorough departure briefing requirement by the PF. C) the use of the VNAV function in both the climb and descent modes to add an extra level of safety to our altitude compliance procedures. Supplemental information from acn 770328: I was captain on this flight and was PF this leg. This arrival takes an aircraft to the north and then the landing to the south. Slc approach control issued a traffic alert to us about an aircraft departing slc climbing to 10000 ft at about our 2 O'clock position; traveling from our right to our left. First officer acknowledged approach's warning and began to search for the aircraft. The aircraft was on our right side and just below our nose so I could not see it for quite some time. I noticed this aircraft on our TCAS display at about 7000-8000 ft and climbing. After 1 min or so first officer asked me what altitude this aircraft was climbing to and I replied; '10000.' I then noticed the TCAS displaying the aircraft 500 ft below us. I then made visual contact with the aircraft just in front of our nose and still climbing. At this point the TCAS started to command a climb. I immediately turned off the autoplt and kept my eye on the aircraft and started a climbing right turn. The aircraft was very close and I didn't want totake my eyes off the aircraft. We climbed about 300-400 ft above our assigned altitude of 11000 ft and we turned somewhat to the right; how much I could not tell you. The voice-activated 'bank angle' warning then went off and I remember getting the bank angle back to about 30 degrees. During these maneuvers I tried to be smooth and easy on the controls for passenger comfort. After the aircraft was well clear of us; I returned the aircraft to 11000 ft; got the local phone number for slc approach; and made a normal approach and landing to runway 16R at slc. As I was home for the night I called approach. He told me the other aircraft; was only cleared to 10000 ft and that they were investigating this event and that he would call me back within the hour. Supervisor then returned my call and said that we came within 300 ft and 1.6 NM of each other and that the other aircraft was on the leetz RNAV SID. He also mentioned that today was the first day of these brand new departure out of slc. Supplemental information from acn 770327: on flight from slc; we briefed the departure (leetz one RNAV departure) at the gate and noted the unusual turn shortly after takeoff. Our concern was the low altitude of the turn and the sharpness of it. I; as pm; read the initial climb verbiage and routing at the bottom of the page and matched it with the visual description. I also noted the initial altitude cleared to and matched it with the verbiage at the bottom of the page. What I missed was the hold down altitude at the zeeta fix. My first officer who was going to fly this departure is extremely competent but he had set the initial altitude on the MCP at FL230 and not 10000 ft like we should have. We had discussed the initial route and that it had a hard turn initially to the west and that it was at a fairly low altitude. I noted that this was so we could clear the mountains to the east as we departed. On departure we took off of runway 16L and followed the departure procedures including hooking up the LNAV at about 400-500 ft. We followed the route as depicted on the departure plate. As we were climbing out we saw an aircraft on downwind for landing. ATC asked us if we had the other aircraft in sight and we replied affirmatively. We initially checked in with departure control with our call sign and climbing to FL230. ATC then said that the other aircraft would pass over us at 11000 ft. We were at about 10300 ft when this exchange took place. We had gotten an advisory of the other aircraft on the TCAS shortly before this and I noted that it would be interesting since we were so close. Since ATC asked if we had the other aircraft in sight; I wrongly assumed that they would let us climb VFR with them. Shortly after this we got an RA alert on the TCAS and ATC told us to maintain 10000 ft. We promptly complied with all instructions from ATC and the TCAS alert. Upon further review we both noticed the hold down at zeeta. After we were clear of the traffic we were given a further climb to FL230 and that we had a possible flight violation. They asked us to call back when we got to our destination. About 45 mins into the flight we got an ACARS message to call a phone number that happened to be our ATC specialist that day. After we arrived; we called him and were informed that we had gotten within 1 1/3 mi and 300 ft of the other aircraft. He also said that he would call the number for slc departure and talk to them for us. He indicated that there have been a lot of problems with this departure. That does not excuse us for what we did wrong. Since we fly other RNAV departures; I should have noticed the hold down restr and changed the MCP altitude setting. I think that with the low altitude turn and the unusual direction for our direction of flight; I did not fully review the whole departure. I did look at the route closely and just missed the altitude boxes with the crossing restrs in them. I think that maybe a verbal point by point talking through of the departure could have prevented this from happening. We were concerned with the low altitude and sharp turn initially that we forget to look further down the road (so to speak). If a note could be added in the initial altitude box in the written description about looking at hold down at zeeta; that would be helpful. I think the departure turn needs to start at a higher altitude since it starts relatively low and is such a sharp turn (something unusual for us). Most of our turn procedures are for only 15 degrees when at low altitude. Also; maybe clearance delivery could give an initial altitude of 10000 ft instead of FL230 when clrncs are given. If we hooked up the VNAV function for the autoplt/command bars; then this also may have been averted. I also think that maybe if we made the autoplt hookup mandatory at 1000 ft that this may help. Callback conversation with reporter acn 770327 revealed the following information: reporter stated that his air carrier is taking steps to avert future slc events of this type by having departing pilots call dispatch prior to departure. There are also discussions in progress about changing the air carrier's automation procedures because ATC is promoting more RNAV departures and arrs requiring that the aircraft be flown with an autoplt.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ACFT ON THE SLC DELTA ONE RNAV STAR FOLLOWED A TCAS RA FROM AN ACR ACFT ON THE SLC LEETZ ONE RNAV DEP AFTER THE DEP ACFT MISSED A HOLD DOWN ALT.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ON THIS FLT AND WAS THE PM ON THIS LEG. WE WERE CLRED ON THE DELTA ONE RNAV STAR INTO SLC AND WERE MAINTAINING AN ALT OF 11000 FT ON THE DOWNWIND FOR A PLANNED LNDG ON RWY 16R. THE WX WAS VMC AND THERE WAS A NORMAL AMOUNT OF AIR TFC IN AND AROUND SLC. AS WE WERE JUST ABOUT TO COME ABEAM THE DEP END OF THE 16 RWYS; SLC APCH CTL ISSUED A TFC ALERT TO US ABOUT AN ACFT DEPARTING SLC IN A CLBING TURN TO THE NW LEVELING AT 10000 FT WHICH WAS AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS AND TRAVELING FROM ACFT R TO L. I ACKNOWLEDGED ATC AND BEGAN TO SEARCH VISUALLY FOR THE ACFT. I SAW THE ACFT ON TCAS ABOUT 3000 FT BELOW US (OR APPROX 8000 FT MSL) AND THEN VISUALLY ACQUIRED IT. IT SEEMED TO HAVE A VERY STEEP CLB ANGLE FOR HAVING LESS THAN 2000 FT TO LEVEL OFF SO I QUERIED THE CAPT AS TO WHAT ALT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE LEVELING OFF. HE SAID THEY SHOULD LEVEL AT 10000 FT AND PASS UNDER US. I CONTINUED TO WATCH BOTH THE ACFT VISUALLY AND THE TCAS AND AS SOON AS I SAW THE TCAS SHOW THE ACFT AT 900 FT BELOW US; I TOLD THE CAPT THAT I DIDN'T THINK THEY WERE GOING TO LEVEL AT 10000 FT AND PERHAPS A TURN WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID A CONFLICT. HE SEEMED TO ACQUIRE THE OTHER ACFT VISUALLY AT ABOUT THIS SAME TIME AND; TO HIS CREDIT; WITHOUT HESITATION HE BEGAN A 30-35 DEG BANK R TURN INSIDE OF THE OTHER ACFT'S FLT PATH. AT THIS SAME TIME; THE TCAS RA COMMANDED A 'CLB; CLB' OR APPROX 1500-1800 FPM. THE CAPT BEGAN A CLB IN ADDITION TO HIS TURN AND WE SAW THE OTHER ACFT ON THE TCAS AT ABOUT 300 FT BELOW OUR ALT. (WE WERE ABOUT 11500 FT AT THIS TIME.) ALSO ABOUT THIS TIME; SLC APCH ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN R IMMEDIATELY TO AVOID AN AIR CONFLICT AND I INFORMED THEM THAT WE WERE ALREADY IN A TURN AND CLBING FOR A TCAS RA. WE BOTH HEARD THE 'BANK ANGLE' ANNUNCIATOR GO OFF AT WHICH TIME I NOTICED THE CAPT MAKE AN IMMEDIATE BANK CORRECTION BACK TO 30 DEGS. AFTER THIS EVENT; WE RETURNED TO ALT AND COURSE AND THEN ASKED APCH CTL FOR A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL ABOUT THE INCIDENT ONCE WE LANDED. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AS WE LEFT THE TERMINAL FOR THE CREW VAN; THE FLT ATTENDANTS MENTIONED THAT THEY FELT QUITE AN ABRUPT TURN AND CLB AND ALSO THAT SOME OF THE FORWARD PAX GRIPPED THEIR ARMRESTS AND TIGHTENED THEIR SEATBELTS IN RESPONSE TO THIS TURN. OUR TURNING AND CLBING MANEUVER DID NOT SEEM OVERLY AGGRESSIVE TO ME; BUT WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH A LITTLE MORE IMPORTANCE THAN A NORMAL TURN FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. NO PAX SAID ANYTHING TO EITHER OF THE PLTS ABOUT ANY UNCOMFORTABLE MANEUVERS AS THEY WERE LEAVING THE ACFT. AFTER LEAVING THE ARPT; THE CAPT TOOK CARE OF THE PHONE CALLS TO ATC AND THE CHIEF PLTS FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. THAT IS THE DETAILS OF THE EVENT TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION. A) BETTER COM TO PLTS WHEN AN ARPT ISSUES A COMPLETELY NEW SET DEP PROCS AT A TIME PRIOR TO THEIR ACTUAL RELEASE (REF THE READ BEFORE FLY WHEN LAX RELEASED THEIR NEW RNAV DEPS). B) A MORE THOROUGH DEP BRIEFING REQUIREMENT BY THE PF. C) THE USE OF THE VNAV FUNCTION IN BOTH THE CLB AND DSCNT MODES TO ADD AN EXTRA LEVEL OF SAFETY TO OUR ALT COMPLIANCE PROCS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 770328: I WAS CAPT ON THIS FLT AND WAS PF THIS LEG. THIS ARR TAKES AN ACFT TO THE N AND THEN THE LNDG TO THE S. SLC APCH CTL ISSUED A TFC ALERT TO US ABOUT AN ACFT DEPARTING SLC CLBING TO 10000 FT AT ABOUT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS; TRAVELING FROM OUR R TO OUR L. FO ACKNOWLEDGED APCH'S WARNING AND BEGAN TO SEARCH FOR THE ACFT. THE ACFT WAS ON OUR R SIDE AND JUST BELOW OUR NOSE SO I COULD NOT SEE IT FOR QUITE SOME TIME. I NOTICED THIS ACFT ON OUR TCAS DISPLAY AT ABOUT 7000-8000 FT AND CLBING. AFTER 1 MIN OR SO FO ASKED ME WHAT ALT THIS ACFT WAS CLBING TO AND I REPLIED; '10000.' I THEN NOTICED THE TCAS DISPLAYING THE ACFT 500 FT BELOW US. I THEN MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ACFT JUST IN FRONT OF OUR NOSE AND STILL CLBING. AT THIS POINT THE TCAS STARTED TO COMMAND A CLB. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND KEPT MY EYE ON THE ACFT AND STARTED A CLBING R TURN. THE ACFT WAS VERY CLOSE AND I DIDN'T WANT TOTAKE MY EYES OFF THE ACFT. WE CLBED ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 11000 FT AND WE TURNED SOMEWHAT TO THE R; HOW MUCH I COULD NOT TELL YOU. THE VOICE-ACTIVATED 'BANK ANGLE' WARNING THEN WENT OFF AND I REMEMBER GETTING THE BANK ANGLE BACK TO ABOUT 30 DEGS. DURING THESE MANEUVERS I TRIED TO BE SMOOTH AND EASY ON THE CTLS FOR PAX COMFORT. AFTER THE ACFT WAS WELL CLR OF US; I RETURNED THE ACFT TO 11000 FT; GOT THE LCL PHONE NUMBER FOR SLC APCH; AND MADE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 16R AT SLC. AS I WAS HOME FOR THE NIGHT I CALLED APCH. HE TOLD ME THE OTHER ACFT; WAS ONLY CLRED TO 10000 FT AND THAT THEY WERE INVESTIGATING THIS EVENT AND THAT HE WOULD CALL ME BACK WITHIN THE HR. SUPVR THEN RETURNED MY CALL AND SAID THAT WE CAME WITHIN 300 FT AND 1.6 NM OF EACH OTHER AND THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS ON THE LEETZ RNAV SID. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT TODAY WAS THE FIRST DAY OF THESE BRAND NEW DEP OUT OF SLC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 770327: ON FLT FROM SLC; WE BRIEFED THE DEP (LEETZ ONE RNAV DEP) AT THE GATE AND NOTED THE UNUSUAL TURN SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. OUR CONCERN WAS THE LOW ALT OF THE TURN AND THE SHARPNESS OF IT. I; AS PM; READ THE INITIAL CLB VERBIAGE AND ROUTING AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE AND MATCHED IT WITH THE VISUAL DESCRIPTION. I ALSO NOTED THE INITIAL ALT CLRED TO AND MATCHED IT WITH THE VERBIAGE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE. WHAT I MISSED WAS THE HOLD DOWN ALT AT THE ZEETA FIX. MY FO WHO WAS GOING TO FLY THIS DEP IS EXTREMELY COMPETENT BUT HE HAD SET THE INITIAL ALT ON THE MCP AT FL230 AND NOT 10000 FT LIKE WE SHOULD HAVE. WE HAD DISCUSSED THE INITIAL RTE AND THAT IT HAD A HARD TURN INITIALLY TO THE W AND THAT IT WAS AT A FAIRLY LOW ALT. I NOTED THAT THIS WAS SO WE COULD CLR THE MOUNTAINS TO THE E AS WE DEPARTED. ON DEP WE TOOK OFF OF RWY 16L AND FOLLOWED THE DEP PROCS INCLUDING HOOKING UP THE LNAV AT ABOUT 400-500 FT. WE FOLLOWED THE RTE AS DEPICTED ON THE DEP PLATE. AS WE WERE CLBING OUT WE SAW AN ACFT ON DOWNWIND FOR LNDG. ATC ASKED US IF WE HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT AND WE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. WE INITIALLY CHKED IN WITH DEP CTL WITH OUR CALL SIGN AND CLBING TO FL230. ATC THEN SAID THAT THE OTHER ACFT WOULD PASS OVER US AT 11000 FT. WE WERE AT ABOUT 10300 FT WHEN THIS EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE. WE HAD GOTTEN AN ADVISORY OF THE OTHER ACFT ON THE TCAS SHORTLY BEFORE THIS AND I NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE INTERESTING SINCE WE WERE SO CLOSE. SINCE ATC ASKED IF WE HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT; I WRONGLY ASSUMED THAT THEY WOULD LET US CLB VFR WITH THEM. SHORTLY AFTER THIS WE GOT AN RA ALERT ON THE TCAS AND ATC TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT. WE PROMPTLY COMPLIED WITH ALL INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATC AND THE TCAS ALERT. UPON FURTHER REVIEW WE BOTH NOTICED THE HOLD DOWN AT ZEETA. AFTER WE WERE CLR OF THE TFC WE WERE GIVEN A FURTHER CLB TO FL230 AND THAT WE HAD A POSSIBLE FLT VIOLATION. THEY ASKED US TO CALL BACK WHEN WE GOT TO OUR DEST. ABOUT 45 MINS INTO THE FLT WE GOT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO CALL A PHONE NUMBER THAT HAPPENED TO BE OUR ATC SPECIALIST THAT DAY. AFTER WE ARRIVED; WE CALLED HIM AND WERE INFORMED THAT WE HAD GOTTEN WITHIN 1 1/3 MI AND 300 FT OF THE OTHER ACFT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL THE NUMBER FOR SLC DEP AND TALK TO THEM FOR US. HE INDICATED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A LOT OF PROBS WITH THIS DEP. THAT DOES NOT EXCUSE US FOR WHAT WE DID WRONG. SINCE WE FLY OTHER RNAV DEPS; I SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THE HOLD DOWN RESTR AND CHANGED THE MCP ALT SETTING. I THINK THAT WITH THE LOW ALT TURN AND THE UNUSUAL DIRECTION FOR OUR DIRECTION OF FLT; I DID NOT FULLY REVIEW THE WHOLE DEP. I DID LOOK AT THE RTE CLOSELY AND JUST MISSED THE ALT BOXES WITH THE XING RESTRS IN THEM. I THINK THAT MAYBE A VERBAL POINT BY POINT TALKING THROUGH OF THE DEP COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM HAPPENING. WE WERE CONCERNED WITH THE LOW ALT AND SHARP TURN INITIALLY THAT WE FORGET TO LOOK FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD (SO TO SPEAK). IF A NOTE COULD BE ADDED IN THE INITIAL ALT BOX IN THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION ABOUT LOOKING AT HOLD DOWN AT ZEETA; THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. I THINK THE DEP TURN NEEDS TO START AT A HIGHER ALT SINCE IT STARTS RELATIVELY LOW AND IS SUCH A SHARP TURN (SOMETHING UNUSUAL FOR US). MOST OF OUR TURN PROCS ARE FOR ONLY 15 DEGS WHEN AT LOW ALT. ALSO; MAYBE CLRNC DELIVERY COULD GIVE AN INITIAL ALT OF 10000 FT INSTEAD OF FL230 WHEN CLRNCS ARE GIVEN. IF WE HOOKED UP THE VNAV FUNCTION FOR THE AUTOPLT/COMMAND BARS; THEN THIS ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN AVERTED. I ALSO THINK THAT MAYBE IF WE MADE THE AUTOPLT HOOKUP MANDATORY AT 1000 FT THAT THIS MAY HELP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 770327 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HIS ACR IS TAKING STEPS TO AVERT FUTURE SLC EVENTS OF THIS TYPE BY HAVING DEPARTING PLTS CALL DISPATCH PRIOR TO DEP. THERE ARE ALSO DISCUSSIONS IN PROGRESS ABOUT CHANGING THE ACR'S AUTOMATION PROCS BECAUSE ATC IS PROMOTING MORE RNAV DEPS AND ARRS REQUIRING THAT THE ACFT BE FLOWN WITH AN AUTOPLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.