Narrative:

On takeoff roll; just prior to 80 KTS we encountered a master caution light; ding and several other indications of a problem. The first officer called 80 KTS and then I saw that generator #1 had tripped offline. I elected to abort the takeoff. The first officer communicated that we had aborted to ATC and we taxied off the runway onto the taxiway. The first officer told the passenger to please remain seated and we complied with the aborted takeoff QRH checklist. I am trying to figure out why I elected to abort the takeoff for a generator trip. I knew better than that. I brief the first officer's that we will abort above 80 KTS only for engine failure; fire; inability to fly the windshear. I have had a past experience with electrical smoke in the cockpit with emergency landing and that may have wrongly influenced my decision to reject. The warning happened at a critical time and I was slow to identify and react correctly. I did hear the first officer call 80 KTS after the warning. Bottom-line is that you need to pay special attention to the 80 KT call and don't let any distrs lead you to an unnecessary reject and to realize that a generator trip or most other warnings are not critical and can be taken care of airborne. Supplemental information from acn 774124: on takeoff roll; after power was set but prior to 80 KT call; we had a master caution light illuminate. I scanned the annunciator panels and saw 1 amber light on the captain's annunciator panel. I looked at his overhead panel and saw the #1 generator off bus light illuminated. I was about to tell the captain what the malfunction was (the reason for the master caution light) when he initiated the abort. I was not expecting an abort; but quickly transitioned to that procedure. I verified the memory items were accomplished; noted the airspeed; and notified tower of our abort. As best as I can recall; the airspeed was about 90 KTS. I don't think the abort was initiated above 80 KTS; but the speed did peak above 80 KTS during the procedure. After exiting the runway and bringing the aircraft to a stop; we completed the rejected takeoff checklist and the generator off bus checklist. The generator came back on and stayed on. I ran the brake energy data using the opc and used 90 KTS for our brake-on speed. A brake cooling period of 45 mins was computed. We returned to the gate and cooled the brakes as recommended. Things I could have done better were to identify and announce the malfunction more quickly. Had I done that; the captain may not have elected to abort the takeoff. Also; since I saw the airspeed above 80 KTS during the abort; I must have failed to announce 80 KTS as we passed that speed. I suspect I was looking for the cause of the master caution light or was verifying the rejected takeoff procedural steps during that airspeed transition. Review cockpit layout to more quickly identify warning and caution light.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW REJECTS TKOF AFTER RECEIVING MASTER CAUTION FOR GEN TRIP AT 80 KNOTS.

Narrative: ON TKOF ROLL; JUST PRIOR TO 80 KTS WE ENCOUNTERED A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT; DING AND SEVERAL OTHER INDICATIONS OF A PROB. THE FO CALLED 80 KTS AND THEN I SAW THAT GENERATOR #1 HAD TRIPPED OFFLINE. I ELECTED TO ABORT THE TKOF. THE FO COMMUNICATED THAT WE HAD ABORTED TO ATC AND WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY ONTO THE TXWY. THE FO TOLD THE PAX TO PLEASE REMAIN SEATED AND WE COMPLIED WITH THE ABORTED TKOF QRH CHKLIST. I AM TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY I ELECTED TO ABORT THE TKOF FOR A GENERATOR TRIP. I KNEW BETTER THAN THAT. I BRIEF THE FO'S THAT WE WILL ABORT ABOVE 80 KTS ONLY FOR ENG FAILURE; FIRE; INABILITY TO FLY THE WINDSHEAR. I HAVE HAD A PAST EXPERIENCE WITH ELECTRICAL SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT WITH EMER LNDG AND THAT MAY HAVE WRONGLY INFLUENCED MY DECISION TO REJECT. THE WARNING HAPPENED AT A CRITICAL TIME AND I WAS SLOW TO IDENT AND REACT CORRECTLY. I DID HEAR THE FO CALL 80 KTS AFTER THE WARNING. BOTTOM-LINE IS THAT YOU NEED TO PAY SPECIAL ATTN TO THE 80 KT CALL AND DON'T LET ANY DISTRS LEAD YOU TO AN UNNECESSARY REJECT AND TO REALIZE THAT A GENERATOR TRIP OR MOST OTHER WARNINGS ARE NOT CRITICAL AND CAN BE TAKEN CARE OF AIRBORNE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 774124: ON TKOF ROLL; AFTER PWR WAS SET BUT PRIOR TO 80 KT CALL; WE HAD A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATE. I SCANNED THE ANNUNCIATOR PANELS AND SAW 1 AMBER LIGHT ON THE CAPT'S ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. I LOOKED AT HIS OVERHEAD PANEL AND SAW THE #1 GENERATOR OFF BUS LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I WAS ABOUT TO TELL THE CAPT WHAT THE MALFUNCTION WAS (THE REASON FOR THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT) WHEN HE INITIATED THE ABORT. I WAS NOT EXPECTING AN ABORT; BUT QUICKLY TRANSITIONED TO THAT PROC. I VERIFIED THE MEMORY ITEMS WERE ACCOMPLISHED; NOTED THE AIRSPD; AND NOTIFIED TWR OF OUR ABORT. AS BEST AS I CAN RECALL; THE AIRSPD WAS ABOUT 90 KTS. I DON'T THINK THE ABORT WAS INITIATED ABOVE 80 KTS; BUT THE SPD DID PEAK ABOVE 80 KTS DURING THE PROC. AFTER EXITING THE RWY AND BRINGING THE ACFT TO A STOP; WE COMPLETED THE RTO CHKLIST AND THE GENERATOR OFF BUS CHKLIST. THE GENERATOR CAME BACK ON AND STAYED ON. I RAN THE BRAKE ENERGY DATA USING THE OPC AND USED 90 KTS FOR OUR BRAKE-ON SPD. A BRAKE COOLING PERIOD OF 45 MINS WAS COMPUTED. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AND COOLED THE BRAKES AS RECOMMENDED. THINGS I COULD HAVE DONE BETTER WERE TO IDENT AND ANNOUNCE THE MALFUNCTION MORE QUICKLY. HAD I DONE THAT; THE CAPT MAY NOT HAVE ELECTED TO ABORT THE TKOF. ALSO; SINCE I SAW THE AIRSPD ABOVE 80 KTS DURING THE ABORT; I MUST HAVE FAILED TO ANNOUNCE 80 KTS AS WE PASSED THAT SPD. I SUSPECT I WAS LOOKING FOR THE CAUSE OF THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT OR WAS VERIFYING THE RTO PROCEDURAL STEPS DURING THAT AIRSPD TRANSITION. REVIEW COCKPIT LAYOUT TO MORE QUICKLY IDENT WARNING AND CAUTION LIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.