Narrative:

On an IFR flight plan in VMC from ZZZ1 in cruise at 6000 ft; with the autoplt engaged; I began to remove my pullover sweater. As I pulled the sweater over my head; I heard the engine go quiet. Believing I had inadvertently 'hit' something on the panel while leaning forward to remove my sweater; I immediately began to check the controls; ignition; master; etc; to no avail. Realizing I was over the ZZZ airport; I declared an emergency on my assigned frequency and was advised I was downwind for the runway and was cleared to land. While in a descent and turning base; I realized I had time to go through the emergency checklist and realized I had not switched tanks to the fullest tank. I immediately switched tanks; switched the fuel pump to low and the engine started. The rear auxiliary tank ran dry at the exact same time I was pulling my sweater over my head. I could have prevented the incident by remembering to set the timer (with alarm) to remind me to switch tanks. I did not set the timer to alert me to switch tanks. Because the tank ran dry while I was removing my sweater; I became focused on believing I had 'hit' something on the panel. This belief or 'tunnel vision' caused my delay in remembering to follow one of the first items on the emergency checklist -- to switch the fuel to the fullest tank. Another fact that delayed my following the emergency checklist procedure was the fact that I was over an airport and made the decision that I should concentrate my attention to flying and landing the airplane. It was only after I had declared an emergency and was turning on a high base that I realized my error. I believe the entire experience took under 3 mins. What I should have done to prevent the incident: 1) set the timer to remind me to switch tanks before running it dry. What I should have done when the tank ran dry: 1) immediately pulled out the emergency checklist and followed the procedure. 2) not have become so focused on one possibility for the engine going quiet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF BL17 IS SURPRISED WHEN THE ENGINE FAILS AS HE IS PULLING HIS SWEATER OVER HIS HEAD. DECLARES AN EMERGENCY AND PREPARES TO LAND AT NEARBY ARPT BEFORE DISCOVERING THE ENGINE FAILED DUE TO FUEL EXHAUSTION IN THE TANK SELECTED. SWITCHING TANKS RESTORES POWER.

Narrative: ON AN IFR FLT PLAN IN VMC FROM ZZZ1 IN CRUISE AT 6000 FT; WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED; I BEGAN TO REMOVE MY PULLOVER SWEATER. AS I PULLED THE SWEATER OVER MY HEAD; I HEARD THE ENG GO QUIET. BELIEVING I HAD INADVERTENTLY 'HIT' SOMETHING ON THE PANEL WHILE LEANING FORWARD TO REMOVE MY SWEATER; I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO CHK THE CTLS; IGNITION; MASTER; ETC; TO NO AVAIL. REALIZING I WAS OVER THE ZZZ ARPT; I DECLARED AN EMER ON MY ASSIGNED FREQ AND WAS ADVISED I WAS DOWNWIND FOR THE RWY AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. WHILE IN A DSCNT AND TURNING BASE; I REALIZED I HAD TIME TO GO THROUGH THE EMER CHKLIST AND REALIZED I HAD NOT SWITCHED TANKS TO THE FULLEST TANK. I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED TANKS; SWITCHED THE FUEL PUMP TO LOW AND THE ENG STARTED. THE REAR AUX TANK RAN DRY AT THE EXACT SAME TIME I WAS PULLING MY SWEATER OVER MY HEAD. I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INCIDENT BY REMEMBERING TO SET THE TIMER (WITH ALARM) TO REMIND ME TO SWITCH TANKS. I DID NOT SET THE TIMER TO ALERT ME TO SWITCH TANKS. BECAUSE THE TANK RAN DRY WHILE I WAS REMOVING MY SWEATER; I BECAME FOCUSED ON BELIEVING I HAD 'HIT' SOMETHING ON THE PANEL. THIS BELIEF OR 'TUNNEL VISION' CAUSED MY DELAY IN REMEMBERING TO FOLLOW ONE OF THE FIRST ITEMS ON THE EMER CHKLIST -- TO SWITCH THE FUEL TO THE FULLEST TANK. ANOTHER FACT THAT DELAYED MY FOLLOWING THE EMER CHKLIST PROC WAS THE FACT THAT I WAS OVER AN ARPT AND MADE THE DECISION THAT I SHOULD CONCENTRATE MY ATTN TO FLYING AND LNDG THE AIRPLANE. IT WAS ONLY AFTER I HAD DECLARED AN EMER AND WAS TURNING ON A HIGH BASE THAT I REALIZED MY ERROR. I BELIEVE THE ENTIRE EXPERIENCE TOOK UNDER 3 MINS. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE TO PREVENT THE INCIDENT: 1) SET THE TIMER TO REMIND ME TO SWITCH TANKS BEFORE RUNNING IT DRY. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE WHEN THE TANK RAN DRY: 1) IMMEDIATELY PULLED OUT THE EMER CHKLIST AND FOLLOWED THE PROC. 2) NOT HAVE BECOME SO FOCUSED ON ONE POSSIBILITY FOR THE ENG GOING QUIET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.