Narrative:

We were flying the arrival. We were instructed to cross XXX at 9000 ft MSL and 250 KIAS. I was the first officer and PF. During the descent I noticed that we were high and fast and to complicate problems had a higher than normal ground speed due to a strong tailwind. I had my GPS set to monitor the intersection as I descended. As I descended; the captain; who is not comfortable with the GNS-xls FMS; kept changing the display on my GPS unit from the intersection to ZZZ. He kept wanting to see where the airport was. I told him to stop and that I was using the information to monitor our descent. He just blew me off. I told him again and he told me don't worry; we have plenty of room. I then began using raw data from the navigation radios and HSI to monitor our descent. We were still high and fast. I reached over and deployed the speed brakes to full. The captain said those just waste gas and stowed them. At which point I increased the descent rate to try and get down with time to level and bleed off speed. The flight engineer also was concerned about the crossing restr and pointed it out to myself and to the captain. During my attempt to cross XXX at 9000 ft I was distraction with the flight engineer warning me and the captain about the restrs and the games the captain seemed to be playing with the speed brakes and GPS. I ended up missing the speed reduction 10000 ft and missed XXX at 9000 ft by at least 500 ft and crossed it in excess of 330 KIAS. I was quite frustrated with this captain after the trip and his entire attitude during the whole day. He seemed behind the plane and arrogant the entire trip and pushed almost all the work onto me; from programming my GPS and his FMS; doing most of the navigation; and all of the cockpit paperwork for the trip. The flight engineer also had to remind him to sign the weight and balance and aircraft logbook. I have had problems with this captain as have other capts who flew with him as a right seat qualified captain. The captain; in nearing 60 and some days; seems completely out of it and behind the plane. I am not sure what more I could have done on the flight other than to tell him 'your controls' and let him fly the arrival since he wanted to micro-manage the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 FO REPORTS DISSENSION IN THE COCKPIT AND HIS ATTEMPT TO MAKE A CROSSING RESTRICTION AT 9000 FEET. RESULT; 9500 FEET AT 330 KNOTS.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING THE ARR. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CROSS XXX AT 9000 FT MSL AND 250 KIAS. I WAS THE FO AND PF. DURING THE DSCNT I NOTICED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND FAST AND TO COMPLICATE PROBS HAD A HIGHER THAN NORMAL GND SPD DUE TO A STRONG TAILWIND. I HAD MY GPS SET TO MONITOR THE INTXN AS I DSNDED. AS I DSNDED; THE CAPT; WHO IS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE GNS-XLS FMS; KEPT CHANGING THE DISPLAY ON MY GPS UNIT FROM THE INTXN TO ZZZ. HE KEPT WANTING TO SEE WHERE THE ARPT WAS. I TOLD HIM TO STOP AND THAT I WAS USING THE INFO TO MONITOR OUR DSCNT. HE JUST BLEW ME OFF. I TOLD HIM AGAIN AND HE TOLD ME DON'T WORRY; WE HAVE PLENTY OF ROOM. I THEN BEGAN USING RAW DATA FROM THE NAV RADIOS AND HSI TO MONITOR OUR DSCNT. WE WERE STILL HIGH AND FAST. I REACHED OVER AND DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES TO FULL. THE CAPT SAID THOSE JUST WASTE GAS AND STOWED THEM. AT WHICH POINT I INCREASED THE DSCNT RATE TO TRY AND GET DOWN WITH TIME TO LEVEL AND BLEED OFF SPD. THE FE ALSO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE XING RESTR AND POINTED IT OUT TO MYSELF AND TO THE CAPT. DURING MY ATTEMPT TO CROSS XXX AT 9000 FT I WAS DISTR WITH THE FE WARNING ME AND THE CAPT ABOUT THE RESTRS AND THE GAMES THE CAPT SEEMED TO BE PLAYING WITH THE SPD BRAKES AND GPS. I ENDED UP MISSING THE SPD REDUCTION 10000 FT AND MISSED XXX AT 9000 FT BY AT LEAST 500 FT AND CROSSED IT IN EXCESS OF 330 KIAS. I WAS QUITE FRUSTRATED WITH THIS CAPT AFTER THE TRIP AND HIS ENTIRE ATTITUDE DURING THE WHOLE DAY. HE SEEMED BEHIND THE PLANE AND ARROGANT THE ENTIRE TRIP AND PUSHED ALMOST ALL THE WORK ONTO ME; FROM PROGRAMMING MY GPS AND HIS FMS; DOING MOST OF THE NAV; AND ALL OF THE COCKPIT PAPERWORK FOR THE TRIP. THE FE ALSO HAD TO REMIND HIM TO SIGN THE WT AND BAL AND ACFT LOGBOOK. I HAVE HAD PROBS WITH THIS CAPT AS HAVE OTHER CAPTS WHO FLEW WITH HIM AS A R SEAT QUALIFIED CAPT. THE CAPT; IN NEARING 60 AND SOME DAYS; SEEMS COMPLETELY OUT OF IT AND BEHIND THE PLANE. I AM NOT SURE WHAT MORE I COULD HAVE DONE ON THE FLT OTHER THAN TO TELL HIM 'YOUR CTLS' AND LET HIM FLY THE ARR SINCE HE WANTED TO MICRO-MANAGE THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.