Narrative:

During cruise portion of flight captain briefed that he did not plan to arm spoilers for landing in ZZZZ. WX at destination was ok; we were expecting to land with over 20000 pounds of fuel. During approach checklist; captain left spoilers disarmed even though tower was calling a slight tailwind. Captain disconnected autoplt once the aircraft had intercepted the final approach course. At approximately 1300 ft AGL in VMC; predawn conditions; captain called for flaps 25 degrees and then again for flaps 30 degrees. Just after selecting the 30 degree flap position; ZZZZ approach called with a frequency change to tower. As I was changing the frequency; the relief pilot noted the EICAS annunciate trailing edge flap disagree and announced it and I repeated it as well and informed the captain that flaps were both indicating 20 degrees. The captain directed that I get him flaps 20 degree landing speeds and press the ground proximity flap ovrd switch. As I was heads down accomplishing these items we received an aural GPWS alert of GS. Captain directed me to inhibit the GS warning; but I left that request unmet. Captain corrected back to GS and at that point I asked him if now he was gong to arm the spoilers; which he did. We are now a couple hundred ft above touchdown and I get a radio call from ZZZZ approach with a landing clearance and instructions again to contact tower. I had failed to make the frequency change due to the distraction of the previously described events. I switched to tower; confirmed our landing clearance and we landed without further complications. I have never finished a flight so completely angry with myself for my handling of the situation. From the moment at cruise when I didn't immediately challenge the idea that we might intentionally land without arming spoilers; I piled error upon error -- my failure to direct a go around to accomplish the emergency checklist; my failure to declare an emergency; my failure to direct a go around when the approach became unstabilized as indicated by the GPWS warning are all serious errors; breakdowns in flight discipline that I allowed to happen. There are no excuses. We all need to let capts be capts; but we also need to be ever mindful of the need to not let that overrule the flight discipline expected and demanded of us. Supplemental information from acn 776942: flaps would not extend past 15 degrees when handle was moved to 20 degrees. Captain was flying and requested flaps from first officer. When flaps would not extend to requested position; flap ovrd was selected and approach continued. Handle was repositioned to match flap indication. Landing was uneventful. Supplemental information from acn 777600: established on a stabilized ILS to runway 34 in visual conditions; flaps were at 20 degrees at 1500 ft AGL. Flaps were commanded to be moved to 30 degrees and the first officer moved the handle with no flap movement beyond 20 degrees. We received an EICAS message of trailing edge flap and I realized that we had a repeat fault that a previous flight had had; but theirs was at 15 degrees. I asked the copilot for a flaps 20 degrees reference speed; as well as a ground proximity flap override to be actuated. At 300 ft we received a sink rate warning; since runway 34 has a steeper GS than normal and we had a little faster approach speed; resulting in a greater sink rate. Landing was normal; with moderate braking on the wet runway; turning off at the 2ND to last turnoff; which is the normal turnoff point on that runway if a flaps 30 degree landing was accomplished. We accomplished the QRH procedure and left flaps at 20 degrees for the mechanic to view. We waited for the mechanic to arrive at the aircraft to debrief the malfunction. In retrospect; I evaled as to whether an emergency was to be declared and I believe my choice of landing was exactly the correct thing to do. If we had taken the time to analyze the problem; we would have had to execute a missed approach and reenter the WX; with icing conditions; turbulence and mountainous terrain to deal with. I have almost 10000 hours in the B757/767 aircraft type and know it like I know myself. I know what my capabilities are and I felt this was not a serious event. I am also quite familiar with brake energy use and realized that with the length of runway and the rather strong wind; the touchdown speed would be within reason and I wouldn't require the crash/fire/rescue to be scrambled; due to hot brakes. This was the second time that this has occurred in my career and both times the landing was uneventful.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 FLT CREW MAKES FLAPS 20 LANDING AFTER FLAPS STICK AT THAT POSITION DURING APPROACH.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE PORTION OF FLT CAPT BRIEFED THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO ARM SPOILERS FOR LNDG IN ZZZZ. WX AT DEST WAS OK; WE WERE EXPECTING TO LAND WITH OVER 20000 LBS OF FUEL. DURING APCH CHKLIST; CAPT LEFT SPOILERS DISARMED EVEN THOUGH TWR WAS CALLING A SLIGHT TAILWIND. CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT ONCE THE ACFT HAD INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE. AT APPROX 1300 FT AGL IN VMC; PREDAWN CONDITIONS; CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS 25 DEGS AND THEN AGAIN FOR FLAPS 30 DEGS. JUST AFTER SELECTING THE 30 DEG FLAP POS; ZZZZ APCH CALLED WITH A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR. AS I WAS CHANGING THE FREQ; THE RELIEF PLT NOTED THE EICAS ANNUNCIATE TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE AND ANNOUNCED IT AND I REPEATED IT AS WELL AND INFORMED THE CAPT THAT FLAPS WERE BOTH INDICATING 20 DEGS. THE CAPT DIRECTED THAT I GET HIM FLAPS 20 DEG LNDG SPDS AND PRESS THE GND PROX FLAP OVRD SWITCH. AS I WAS HEADS DOWN ACCOMPLISHING THESE ITEMS WE RECEIVED AN AURAL GPWS ALERT OF GS. CAPT DIRECTED ME TO INHIBIT THE GS WARNING; BUT I LEFT THAT REQUEST UNMET. CAPT CORRECTED BACK TO GS AND AT THAT POINT I ASKED HIM IF NOW HE WAS GONG TO ARM THE SPOILERS; WHICH HE DID. WE ARE NOW A COUPLE HUNDRED FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN AND I GET A RADIO CALL FROM ZZZZ APCH WITH A LNDG CLRNC AND INSTRUCTIONS AGAIN TO CONTACT TWR. I HAD FAILED TO MAKE THE FREQ CHANGE DUE TO THE DISTR OF THE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED EVENTS. I SWITCHED TO TWR; CONFIRMED OUR LNDG CLRNC AND WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER COMPLICATIONS. I HAVE NEVER FINISHED A FLT SO COMPLETELY ANGRY WITH MYSELF FOR MY HANDLING OF THE SITUATION. FROM THE MOMENT AT CRUISE WHEN I DIDN'T IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGE THE IDEA THAT WE MIGHT INTENTIONALLY LAND WITHOUT ARMING SPOILERS; I PILED ERROR UPON ERROR -- MY FAILURE TO DIRECT A GAR TO ACCOMPLISH THE EMER CHKLIST; MY FAILURE TO DECLARE AN EMER; MY FAILURE TO DIRECT A GAR WHEN THE APCH BECAME UNSTABILIZED AS INDICATED BY THE GPWS WARNING ARE ALL SERIOUS ERRORS; BREAKDOWNS IN FLT DISCIPLINE THAT I ALLOWED TO HAPPEN. THERE ARE NO EXCUSES. WE ALL NEED TO LET CAPTS BE CAPTS; BUT WE ALSO NEED TO BE EVER MINDFUL OF THE NEED TO NOT LET THAT OVERRULE THE FLT DISCIPLINE EXPECTED AND DEMANDED OF US. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 776942: FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND PAST 15 DEGS WHEN HANDLE WAS MOVED TO 20 DEGS. CAPT WAS FLYING AND REQUESTED FLAPS FROM FO. WHEN FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND TO REQUESTED POS; FLAP OVRD WAS SELECTED AND APCH CONTINUED. HANDLE WAS REPOSITIONED TO MATCH FLAP INDICATION. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 777600: ESTABLISHED ON A STABILIZED ILS TO RWY 34 IN VISUAL CONDITIONS; FLAPS WERE AT 20 DEGS AT 1500 FT AGL. FLAPS WERE COMMANDED TO BE MOVED TO 30 DEGS AND THE FO MOVED THE HANDLE WITH NO FLAP MOVEMENT BEYOND 20 DEGS. WE RECEIVED AN EICAS MESSAGE OF TRAILING EDGE FLAP AND I REALIZED THAT WE HAD A REPEAT FAULT THAT A PREVIOUS FLT HAD HAD; BUT THEIRS WAS AT 15 DEGS. I ASKED THE COPLT FOR A FLAPS 20 DEGS REF SPD; AS WELL AS A GND PROX FLAP OVERRIDE TO BE ACTUATED. AT 300 FT WE RECEIVED A SINK RATE WARNING; SINCE RWY 34 HAS A STEEPER GS THAN NORMAL AND WE HAD A LITTLE FASTER APCH SPD; RESULTING IN A GREATER SINK RATE. LNDG WAS NORMAL; WITH MODERATE BRAKING ON THE WET RWY; TURNING OFF AT THE 2ND TO LAST TURNOFF; WHICH IS THE NORMAL TURNOFF POINT ON THAT RWY IF A FLAPS 30 DEG LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE QRH PROC AND LEFT FLAPS AT 20 DEGS FOR THE MECH TO VIEW. WE WAITED FOR THE MECH TO ARRIVE AT THE ACFT TO DEBRIEF THE MALFUNCTION. IN RETROSPECT; I EVALED AS TO WHETHER AN EMER WAS TO BE DECLARED AND I BELIEVE MY CHOICE OF LNDG WAS EXACTLY THE CORRECT THING TO DO. IF WE HAD TAKEN THE TIME TO ANALYZE THE PROB; WE WOULD HAVE HAD TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH AND REENTER THE WX; WITH ICING CONDITIONS; TURB AND MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN TO DEAL WITH. I HAVE ALMOST 10000 HRS IN THE B757/767 ACFT TYPE AND KNOW IT LIKE I KNOW MYSELF. I KNOW WHAT MY CAPABILITIES ARE AND I FELT THIS WAS NOT A SERIOUS EVENT. I AM ALSO QUITE FAMILIAR WITH BRAKE ENERGY USE AND REALIZED THAT WITH THE LENGTH OF RWY AND THE RATHER STRONG WIND; THE TOUCHDOWN SPD WOULD BE WITHIN REASON AND I WOULDN'T REQUIRE THE CRASH/FIRE/RESCUE TO BE SCRAMBLED; DUE TO HOT BRAKES. THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME THAT THIS HAS OCCURRED IN MY CAREER AND BOTH TIMES THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.