37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 778376 |
Time | |
Date | 200803 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B777-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | maintenance : technician |
ASRS Report | 778376 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Events | |
Anomaly | maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : 1 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | performance deficiency : testing performance deficiency : unqualified personnel performance deficiency : repair performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : installation |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
A number of us in the shop became aware that there are about 270 new units from teac to replace the older tape units; with digital units. The new units weren't shipped with the correct software; so teac sent 3 individuals from overseas to come and install the software. We witnessed the units being opened on a non approved; non-electro static discharge bench reconfigured and closed up; handed to a mechanic from work center X with the original service tag; to be put into service. There were no maintenance manuals visible and no record of the changes being made; even after the units had been powered by a rogue power source. The individuals doing the changes appeared not even able to speak english. These events all appear to be in violation of FARS. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated they are avionics shop mechanics who noticed the outside vendor; also the manufacturer; had not complied with a service bulletin to upgrade approximately 270 in-flight entertainment units from the older tape units to digital units with the correct software. These same units also provide the cabin safety videos. Besides describing the unsafe and unprofessional maintenance practices of these 3 vendor employees; reporter stated the other major issue was the failure to document any of the maintenance work performed on these entertainment units and failure to reissue new FAA service tags for serviceability. As a result of their raised concerns; his carrier sent all the units back to the vendor to have all the service tags re-issued. But; reporter stated; the speed of the return for all these units back to his carrier's avionics shop with new FAA service tags; raised the question of whether these same units were ever properly serviced; using approved procedures; on approved non-electro static discharge work bench configuration with approved power sources. The only answer to this question was the comment; if the units have an FAA service tag on them; they must be serviceable.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MECHANIC REPORTS ON SEEING APPROX 270 NEW TEAC IN-FLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT UNITS THAT WERE NOT SHIPPED WITH THE CORRECT SOFTWARE BEING OPENED BY NON-APPROVED PROCEDURE; WORKED; AND CLOSED-UP WITHOUT CHANGING SVC TAG.
Narrative: A NUMBER OF US IN THE SHOP BECAME AWARE THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 270 NEW UNITS FROM TEAC TO REPLACE THE OLDER TAPE UNITS; WITH DIGITAL UNITS. THE NEW UNITS WEREN'T SHIPPED WITH THE CORRECT SOFTWARE; SO TEAC SENT 3 INDIVIDUALS FROM OVERSEAS TO COME AND INSTALL THE SOFTWARE. WE WITNESSED THE UNITS BEING OPENED ON A NON APPROVED; NON-ELECTRO STATIC DISCHARGE BENCH RECONFIGURED AND CLOSED UP; HANDED TO A MECH FROM WORK CTR X WITH THE ORIGINAL SVC TAG; TO BE PUT INTO SVC. THERE WERE NO MAINT MANUALS VISIBLE AND NO RECORD OF THE CHANGES BEING MADE; EVEN AFTER THE UNITS HAD BEEN POWERED BY A ROGUE PWR SOURCE. THE INDIVIDUALS DOING THE CHANGES APPEARED NOT EVEN ABLE TO SPEAK ENGLISH. THESE EVENTS ALL APPEAR TO BE IN VIOLATION OF FARS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THEY ARE AVIONICS SHOP MECHANICS WHO NOTICED THE OUTSIDE VENDOR; ALSO THE MANUFACTURER; HAD NOT COMPLIED WITH A SERVICE BULLETIN TO UPGRADE APPROX 270 IN-FLIGHT ENTERTAINMENT UNITS FROM THE OLDER TAPE UNITS TO DIGITAL UNITS WITH THE CORRECT SOFTWARE. THESE SAME UNITS ALSO PROVIDE THE CABIN SAFETY VIDEOS. BESIDES DESCRIBING THE UNSAFE AND UNPROFESSIONAL MAINT PRACTICES OF THESE 3 VENDOR EMPLOYEES; REPORTER STATED THE OTHER MAJOR ISSUE WAS THE FAILURE TO DOCUMENT ANY OF THE MAINT WORK PERFORMED ON THESE ENTERTAINMENT UNITS AND FAILURE TO REISSUE NEW FAA SVC TAGS FOR SERVICEABILITY. AS A RESULT OF THEIR RAISED CONCERNS; HIS CARRIER SENT ALL THE UNITS BACK TO THE VENDOR TO HAVE ALL THE SVC TAGS RE-ISSUED. BUT; REPORTER STATED; THE SPEED OF THE RETURN FOR ALL THESE UNITS BACK TO HIS CARRIER'S AVIONICS SHOP WITH NEW FAA SVC TAGS; RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THESE SAME UNITS WERE EVER PROPERLY SERVICED; USING APPROVED PROCEDURES; ON APPROVED NON-ELECTRO STATIC DISCHARGE WORK BENCH CONFIGURATION WITH APPROVED POWER SOURCES. THE ONLY ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WAS THE COMMENT; IF THE UNITS HAVE AN FAA SVC TAG ON THEM; THEY MUST BE SERVICEABLE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.