Narrative:

Preflight and taxi out were normal. All checklist/briefings complied with. During engine start; I elected to go ahead and start both engines; since my expected taxi time was less than 5 mins. However; after we started our taxi; we received an expected departure time from las ground of approximately 12 mins. During taxi out; all takeoff items were reviewed and the taxi checklist was completed. When our departure time arrived; we completed the below-the-line portion of the checklist and were cleared into position and hold on runway 19L. I estimate that we were in position for about 2 mins. When we received takeoff clearance; I acknowledged the clearance and the first officer released the brakes; and brought the thrust levers up to the stabilized position; and then advanced them to the briefed flex position; and called 'flex.' as I assumed control of the thrust levers; and scanned the engine instruments; I observed that the engines were not indicating the same thrust limits. Engine #2 parameters appeared to be at flex power; but engine #1 indications and thrust appeared to be at toga. I checked the thrust levers in their proper takeoff detent; and then again observed the engine indications; which had not changed. On engine #1; the target thrust setting (white doughnut) was sitting on the amber tick mark (for toga) while on engine #2; the doughnut was at the left of the amber maximum setting mark. Both engines had spooled up to their target thrust setting marks. As I was trying to understand what I was looking at; and figure out what was wrong; we then received an ECAM caution chime. There was not a lot of time to try to diagnose the problem; and when the caution chime sounded; I elected to reject the takeoff. I called rejecting and assumed control of the aircraft. I reduced the thrust levers back to idle; and since we were still below the autobrake activation speed (ie; a low speed abort); I applied manual braking and allowed the aircraft to go down to the next intersection. Actually; tower requested us to go by the first intersection and exit at the next one. We informed the passenger and flight attendants that everything was normal; but that we had some incorrect instrument values on the engines and that we would be returning to the gate to have everything checked out. Maintenance was called; and they ran through their checks; but found nothing in the database. They reset all the FMGS computers and we re-boarded the passenger; refueled the aircraft and proceeded to complete the flight uneventfully.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CONFLICTING TKOF THRUST PARAMETERS BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT ENGINES OF A320 RESULTS IN REJECTED TKOF AND MAINT INSPECTION.

Narrative: PREFLT AND TAXI OUT WERE NORMAL. ALL CHKLIST/BRIEFINGS COMPLIED WITH. DURING ENG START; I ELECTED TO GO AHEAD AND START BOTH ENGS; SINCE MY EXPECTED TAXI TIME WAS LESS THAN 5 MINS. HOWEVER; AFTER WE STARTED OUR TAXI; WE RECEIVED AN EXPECTED DEP TIME FROM LAS GND OF APPROX 12 MINS. DURING TAXI OUT; ALL TKOF ITEMS WERE REVIEWED AND THE TAXI CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. WHEN OUR DEP TIME ARRIVED; WE COMPLETED THE BELOW-THE-LINE PORTION OF THE CHKLIST AND WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 19L. I ESTIMATE THAT WE WERE IN POS FOR ABOUT 2 MINS. WHEN WE RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC; I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND THE FO RELEASED THE BRAKES; AND BROUGHT THE THRUST LEVERS UP TO THE STABILIZED POS; AND THEN ADVANCED THEM TO THE BRIEFED FLEX POS; AND CALLED 'FLEX.' AS I ASSUMED CTL OF THE THRUST LEVERS; AND SCANNED THE ENG INSTS; I OBSERVED THAT THE ENGS WERE NOT INDICATING THE SAME THRUST LIMITS. ENG #2 PARAMETERS APPEARED TO BE AT FLEX PWR; BUT ENG #1 INDICATIONS AND THRUST APPEARED TO BE AT TOGA. I CHKED THE THRUST LEVERS IN THEIR PROPER TKOF DETENT; AND THEN AGAIN OBSERVED THE ENG INDICATIONS; WHICH HAD NOT CHANGED. ON ENG #1; THE TARGET THRUST SETTING (WHITE DOUGHNUT) WAS SITTING ON THE AMBER TICK MARK (FOR TOGA) WHILE ON ENG #2; THE DOUGHNUT WAS AT THE L OF THE AMBER MAX SETTING MARK. BOTH ENGS HAD SPOOLED UP TO THEIR TARGET THRUST SETTING MARKS. AS I WAS TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT I WAS LOOKING AT; AND FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS WRONG; WE THEN RECEIVED AN ECAM CAUTION CHIME. THERE WAS NOT A LOT OF TIME TO TRY TO DIAGNOSE THE PROB; AND WHEN THE CAUTION CHIME SOUNDED; I ELECTED TO REJECT THE TKOF. I CALLED REJECTING AND ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT. I REDUCED THE THRUST LEVERS BACK TO IDLE; AND SINCE WE WERE STILL BELOW THE AUTOBRAKE ACTIVATION SPD (IE; A LOW SPD ABORT); I APPLIED MANUAL BRAKING AND ALLOWED THE ACFT TO GO DOWN TO THE NEXT INTXN. ACTUALLY; TWR REQUESTED US TO GO BY THE FIRST INTXN AND EXIT AT THE NEXT ONE. WE INFORMED THE PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS THAT EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL; BUT THAT WE HAD SOME INCORRECT INST VALUES ON THE ENGS AND THAT WE WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE GATE TO HAVE EVERYTHING CHKED OUT. MAINT WAS CALLED; AND THEY RAN THROUGH THEIR CHKS; BUT FOUND NOTHING IN THE DATABASE. THEY RESET ALL THE FMGS COMPUTERS AND WE RE-BOARDED THE PAX; REFUELED THE ACFT AND PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE FLT UNEVENTFULLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.