Narrative:

We were running 1 hour 15 mins late with an arrival into rno. It was a very smooth flight with clear skies. I gave the flight attendants an early 10000 ft chime passing 14000 ft. There was scattered to broken stratus clouds in the rno area. As we descended out of one layer; there was a cumulus build-up directly in front of us at about 12000 ft. I had enough time to give a quick PA to everyone that we were about to enter some bumpy clouds and to remain seated. What we experienced was the worst 10 seconds of turbulence that I have experienced. The flight attendant called up a few seconds later to say that they had really been thrown about badly in the back galley. They were sitting in the back galley without their seatbelts on. We landed about 7 mins later. No passenger were hurt; but the flight attendants were bruised with one not able to finish the trip the next day due to a sore shoulder. On descent into rno; the pilots are supposed to notify the flight attendants 5-10 mins prior to descent so that they can begin preparing the cabin for landing so that they can be seated prior to descending through FL180. I forgot to make the notification prior to descent into rno. It didn't even cross my mind. I remembered at 14000 ft and gave them the early 10000 ft chime. Since it was such a smooth flight; I didn't call back to say that we were already in the descent. I have talked to several flight attendants; including a flight attendant trainer; who have told me that they almost never receive an actual call from the pilots -- that they receive an early chime instead. Due to practice on the line; many if not most flight attendants associate the 10000 ft chime when going into rno with passing FL180 to somewhere below if it is supposed to be a smooth flight. It seems to me that this is a situation where there is written guidance to do a procedure in a fairly specific way; but in reality crews have created their own version of how to do this. I also think that flight attendants as a whole; help propagate this practice by not giving pilots feedback on what they expect or want to hear. It is primarily their safety that is at the core of these procedures; so why aren't they more involved in seeing that the procedures are being followed? Maybe this entire procedure; from both the pilots' and flight attendants' perspective; needs to be more thoroughly reviewed. Why is it not being followed by the crews on the line the way flight operations intends it to be?

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR PILOT REPORTS SEVERE TURB DSNDING INTO RNO. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE TOLD LATE ABOUT DSCNT AND ONE WAS INJURED BECAUSE SEATBELTS WERE NOT ON.

Narrative: WE WERE RUNNING 1 HR 15 MINS LATE WITH AN ARR INTO RNO. IT WAS A VERY SMOOTH FLT WITH CLR SKIES. I GAVE THE FLT ATTENDANTS AN EARLY 10000 FT CHIME PASSING 14000 FT. THERE WAS SCATTERED TO BROKEN STRATUS CLOUDS IN THE RNO AREA. AS WE DSNDED OUT OF ONE LAYER; THERE WAS A CUMULUS BUILD-UP DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF US AT ABOUT 12000 FT. I HAD ENOUGH TIME TO GIVE A QUICK PA TO EVERYONE THAT WE WERE ABOUT TO ENTER SOME BUMPY CLOUDS AND TO REMAIN SEATED. WHAT WE EXPERIENCED WAS THE WORST 10 SECONDS OF TURB THAT I HAVE EXPERIENCED. THE FLT ATTENDANT CALLED UP A FEW SECONDS LATER TO SAY THAT THEY HAD REALLY BEEN THROWN ABOUT BADLY IN THE BACK GALLEY. THEY WERE SITTING IN THE BACK GALLEY WITHOUT THEIR SEATBELTS ON. WE LANDED ABOUT 7 MINS LATER. NO PAX WERE HURT; BUT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE BRUISED WITH ONE NOT ABLE TO FINISH THE TRIP THE NEXT DAY DUE TO A SORE SHOULDER. ON DSCNT INTO RNO; THE PLTS ARE SUPPOSED TO NOTIFY THE FLT ATTENDANTS 5-10 MINS PRIOR TO DSCNT SO THAT THEY CAN BEGIN PREPARING THE CABIN FOR LNDG SO THAT THEY CAN BE SEATED PRIOR TO DSNDING THROUGH FL180. I FORGOT TO MAKE THE NOTIFICATION PRIOR TO DSCNT INTO RNO. IT DIDN'T EVEN CROSS MY MIND. I REMEMBERED AT 14000 FT AND GAVE THEM THE EARLY 10000 FT CHIME. SINCE IT WAS SUCH A SMOOTH FLT; I DIDN'T CALL BACK TO SAY THAT WE WERE ALREADY IN THE DSCNT. I HAVE TALKED TO SEVERAL FLT ATTENDANTS; INCLUDING A FLT ATTENDANT TRAINER; WHO HAVE TOLD ME THAT THEY ALMOST NEVER RECEIVE AN ACTUAL CALL FROM THE PLTS -- THAT THEY RECEIVE AN EARLY CHIME INSTEAD. DUE TO PRACTICE ON THE LINE; MANY IF NOT MOST FLT ATTENDANTS ASSOCIATE THE 10000 FT CHIME WHEN GOING INTO RNO WITH PASSING FL180 TO SOMEWHERE BELOW IF IT IS SUPPOSED TO BE A SMOOTH FLT. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE THERE IS WRITTEN GUIDANCE TO DO A PROC IN A FAIRLY SPECIFIC WAY; BUT IN REALITY CREWS HAVE CREATED THEIR OWN VERSION OF HOW TO DO THIS. I ALSO THINK THAT FLT ATTENDANTS AS A WHOLE; HELP PROPAGATE THIS PRACTICE BY NOT GIVING PLTS FEEDBACK ON WHAT THEY EXPECT OR WANT TO HEAR. IT IS PRIMARILY THEIR SAFETY THAT IS AT THE CORE OF THESE PROCS; SO WHY AREN'T THEY MORE INVOLVED IN SEEING THAT THE PROCS ARE BEING FOLLOWED? MAYBE THIS ENTIRE PROC; FROM BOTH THE PLTS' AND FLT ATTENDANTS' PERSPECTIVE; NEEDS TO BE MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED. WHY IS IT NOT BEING FOLLOWED BY THE CREWS ON THE LINE THE WAY FLT OPS INTENDS IT TO BE?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.