Narrative:

Cockpit crew arrived at airplane after original scheduled departure time due to crew rest requirements. Upon arriving at the aircraft; the airplane was already boarded with passenger and flight attendant crew. The APU was running and supplying electric to the airplane. There was no gpu hooked up to the aircraft. Upon review of the logbook; we discovered that there was a form stating APU fire detection inoperative (warning horn) MEL item. Also under the maintenance action required; the 'other' check box was marked with the statement; 'qualified ground man when APU is running.' I looked up the MEL item and read; 'APU is continuously monitored by qualified person in the cockpit and on the ground.' the first officer remained on the flight deck and I went outside the aircraft to monitor the APU outside and look to see if there was a qualified person monitoring the APU. The tug operator was sitting in the tug waiting to push. I asked him if he was aware of the status of the APU. He was not. I asked if he could call the general manager. He said he was the general manager. I asked if he started the APU. He stated that another man that was qualified started the APU. I requested that he call the man to the aircraft. When the other man arrived; I asked if he was aware of the APU status. He was not. I asked him what procedure he was taught to do when starting the APU. He stated that he was to look to see if the APU was placarded inoperative. If it was not; he could start the APU. There was no inoperative sticker on the APU switch; there was an inoperative sticker on the engine/APU/cargo fire test button on the center pedestal; as per the MEL. I discussed the issue with him and instructed him to observe the APU until we shut it down prior to taxi. It appears that he was not properly or sufficiently trained. It is my recommendation that when training station personnel to operate the APU that they are also taught procedures to do a fire test; check the logbook placards for appropriate items and have a checklist that is mandatory to use to start the APU. Had there been an APU fire; it could have gone undetected for a long period of time with passenger on the airplane and no qualified person in the cockpit to shut down the APU and use the fire bottle.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 CREW ARRIVED AT THEIR ACFT LOADED WITH PAX AND A MEL'ED APU RUNNING WITH NO FIRE WARNING CAPABILITY; THE REQUIREMENT FOR GND CREW MONITORING IT FOR POSSIBLE FIRE WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH.

Narrative: COCKPIT CREW ARRIVED AT AIRPLANE AFTER ORIGINAL SCHEDULED DEP TIME DUE TO CREW REST REQUIREMENTS. UPON ARRIVING AT THE ACFT; THE AIRPLANE WAS ALREADY BOARDED WITH PAX AND FLT ATTENDANT CREW. THE APU WAS RUNNING AND SUPPLYING ELECTRIC TO THE AIRPLANE. THERE WAS NO GPU HOOKED UP TO THE ACFT. UPON REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK; WE DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS A FORM STATING APU FIRE DETECTION INOP (WARNING HORN) MEL ITEM. ALSO UNDER THE MAINT ACTION REQUIRED; THE 'OTHER' CHK BOX WAS MARKED WITH THE STATEMENT; 'QUALIFIED GND MAN WHEN APU IS RUNNING.' I LOOKED UP THE MEL ITEM AND READ; 'APU IS CONTINUOUSLY MONITORED BY QUALIFIED PERSON IN THE COCKPIT AND ON THE GND.' THE FO REMAINED ON THE FLT DECK AND I WENT OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO MONITOR THE APU OUTSIDE AND LOOK TO SEE IF THERE WAS A QUALIFIED PERSON MONITORING THE APU. THE TUG OPERATOR WAS SITTING IN THE TUG WAITING TO PUSH. I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATUS OF THE APU. HE WAS NOT. I ASKED IF HE COULD CALL THE GENERAL MGR. HE SAID HE WAS THE GENERAL MANAGER. I ASKED IF HE STARTED THE APU. HE STATED THAT ANOTHER MAN THAT WAS QUALIFIED STARTED THE APU. I REQUESTED THAT HE CALL THE MAN TO THE ACFT. WHEN THE OTHER MAN ARRIVED; I ASKED IF HE WAS AWARE OF THE APU STATUS. HE WAS NOT. I ASKED HIM WHAT PROC HE WAS TAUGHT TO DO WHEN STARTING THE APU. HE STATED THAT HE WAS TO LOOK TO SEE IF THE APU WAS PLACARDED INOP. IF IT WAS NOT; HE COULD START THE APU. THERE WAS NO INOP STICKER ON THE APU SWITCH; THERE WAS AN INOP STICKER ON THE ENG/APU/CARGO FIRE TEST BUTTON ON THE CTR PEDESTAL; AS PER THE MEL. I DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH HIM AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO OBSERVE THE APU UNTIL WE SHUT IT DOWN PRIOR TO TAXI. IT APPEARS THAT HE WAS NOT PROPERLY OR SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED. IT IS MY RECOMMENDATION THAT WHEN TRAINING STATION PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE APU THAT THEY ARE ALSO TAUGHT PROCS TO DO A FIRE TEST; CHK THE LOGBOOK PLACARDS FOR APPROPRIATE ITEMS AND HAVE A CHKLIST THAT IS MANDATORY TO USE TO START THE APU. HAD THERE BEEN AN APU FIRE; IT COULD HAVE GONE UNDETECTED FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME WITH PAX ON THE AIRPLANE AND NO QUALIFIED PERSON IN THE COCKPIT TO SHUT DOWN THE APU AND USE THE FIRE BOTTLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.