Narrative:

The incident being reported occurred during a part 91 flight from srq. We were on an IFR flight plan and I was not the PF. I was the first officer for the flight. After the passenger were loaded; the captain started the engines and advised me he was ready for taxi. I then called sarasota ground control requesting taxi clearance to the active runway 32 for departure. Ground control came back with instructions to; 'taxi to runway 32 via a; hold short of 22.' I responded; 'taxi to 32 hold short of 22 on a.' I then reached for the airport diagram due to my unfamiliarity with the srq airfield. The captain informed he was familiar with the airport; that it was not necessary to look up where taxiway a was located and that he knew where we were going. Once we were established on taxiway a; the captain called for the after start; taxi; and before takeoff checklists. As I read the checklist the captain confirmed the appropriate condition as required. While doing this; I was busy reading off the appropriate items and was not focusing my attention outside of the aircraft. A call then came from srq ground control stating; 'hawker; you are going to hold short of runway 22 correct? Stop! Stop!' as this call was made; I lifted my eyes and realized we had passed the hold short line where both I and the captain stepped on the brakes. The aircraft came to a quick stop halfway across the hold short line and halfway behind it. Meanwhile a pilatus was on its departure roll on runway 22 and had just lifted off. I looked up and realized the pilatus was only 100-200 ft in the air. The captain then turned to me and asked if we were told to hold short of runway 22 where I told him yes; those were the instructions. The incident was caused by a lack of communication between the captain and myself; the PNF. When the initial call was made to hold short; I unfortunately assumed the captain had heard this and understood it. Further complicating matters was the fact that the captain was familiar with the airport and I took this for granted. Never assume anything. A breakdown in CRM had occurred. Another contributing factor was the lack of attention both pilots had while performing the checklists. My eyes were down reading and the captain was busy taxiing while executing the checklist. While 1 pilot's eyes were inside; the other pilot's eyes must be outside. No blame is to go on either pilot alone; rather both were at fault for not first controling the airplane and making sure no traffic were on the runway we were crossing. A thanks must go out to the srq ground control for their quick and alert xmissions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HS125 FLT CREW FAILED TO STOP PRIOR TO THE HOLD-SHORT LINE AS INSTRUCTED.

Narrative: THE INCIDENT BEING RPTED OCCURRED DURING A PART 91 FLT FROM SRQ. WE WERE ON AN IFR FLT PLAN AND I WAS NOT THE PF. I WAS THE FO FOR THE FLT. AFTER THE PAX WERE LOADED; THE CAPT STARTED THE ENGS AND ADVISED ME HE WAS READY FOR TAXI. I THEN CALLED SARASOTA GND CTL REQUESTING TAXI CLRNC TO THE ACTIVE RWY 32 FOR DEP. GND CTL CAME BACK WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO; 'TAXI TO RWY 32 VIA A; HOLD SHORT OF 22.' I RESPONDED; 'TAXI TO 32 HOLD SHORT OF 22 ON A.' I THEN REACHED FOR THE ARPT DIAGRAM DUE TO MY UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE SRQ AIRFIELD. THE CAPT INFORMED HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT; THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO LOOK UP WHERE TXWY A WAS LOCATED AND THAT HE KNEW WHERE WE WERE GOING. ONCE WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON TXWY A; THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE AFTER START; TAXI; AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLISTS. AS I READ THE CHKLIST THE CAPT CONFIRMED THE APPROPRIATE CONDITION AS REQUIRED. WHILE DOING THIS; I WAS BUSY READING OFF THE APPROPRIATE ITEMS AND WAS NOT FOCUSING MY ATTN OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT. A CALL THEN CAME FROM SRQ GND CTL STATING; 'HAWKER; YOU ARE GOING TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 CORRECT? STOP! STOP!' AS THIS CALL WAS MADE; I LIFTED MY EYES AND REALIZED WE HAD PASSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHERE BOTH I AND THE CAPT STEPPED ON THE BRAKES. THE ACFT CAME TO A QUICK STOP HALFWAY ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND HALFWAY BEHIND IT. MEANWHILE A PILATUS WAS ON ITS DEP ROLL ON RWY 22 AND HAD JUST LIFTED OFF. I LOOKED UP AND REALIZED THE PILATUS WAS ONLY 100-200 FT IN THE AIR. THE CAPT THEN TURNED TO ME AND ASKED IF WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 22 WHERE I TOLD HIM YES; THOSE WERE THE INSTRUCTIONS. THE INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A LACK OF COM BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF; THE PNF. WHEN THE INITIAL CALL WAS MADE TO HOLD SHORT; I UNFORTUNATELY ASSUMED THE CAPT HAD HEARD THIS AND UNDERSTOOD IT. FURTHER COMPLICATING MATTERS WAS THE FACT THAT THE CAPT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT AND I TOOK THIS FOR GRANTED. NEVER ASSUME ANYTHING. A BREAKDOWN IN CRM HAD OCCURRED. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE LACK OF ATTN BOTH PLTS HAD WHILE PERFORMING THE CHKLISTS. MY EYES WERE DOWN READING AND THE CAPT WAS BUSY TAXIING WHILE EXECUTING THE CHKLIST. WHILE 1 PLT'S EYES WERE INSIDE; THE OTHER PLT'S EYES MUST BE OUTSIDE. NO BLAME IS TO GO ON EITHER PLT ALONE; RATHER BOTH WERE AT FAULT FOR NOT FIRST CTLING THE AIRPLANE AND MAKING SURE NO TFC WERE ON THE RWY WE WERE XING. A THANKS MUST GO OUT TO THE SRQ GND CTL FOR THEIR QUICK AND ALERT XMISSIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.