Narrative:

On initial briefing to first officer; specifically mentioned the forecast at elp for blowing dust/limited visibility/strong gusty winds. Informed the 'a' flight attendant and told her to expect a bumpy arrival and anticipate cleaning the cabin early. En route to elp; received updated ATIS and NOTAMS (no change in WX and runway 4/22 closed). With forecast turbulence from 16000 ft to the ground; secured the cabin during initial descent; first officer computed landing data; and captain conducted briefing for VOR 26L company procedures as ATIS visibility was 1 1/4 mi. Specific mention was made of where to expect to see the runway in relation to the wind screen; confirming I selected the outbound 245 degree course after the FAF as well as missed approach procedures as there was a real possibility of their execution. Upon handoff from ZAB to elp approach; controller informed us visibility was 3 mi. Since this was my first flight with the first officer; based on the marginal WX conditions and experience levels; I stated I would fly the approach utilizing the flight director and autoplt. Configured early to get stabilized with autoplt having a difficult time keeping VOR engaged (CDI displaced 1 DOT left and bearing pointer crosschecked). Approaching the FAF; autoplt climbed and airspeed rapidly decreased requiring me to disengage the autoplt and adding power. Passing the FAF; the CDI was displaced 1.5 dots right requiring course correction taking into account proximity to cone of confusion and prevailing winds. Minimums reached prior to missed approach; runway came in sight at anticipated position; runway 26 confirmed with first officer and crosschecked heading indicator for 260 degree heading. Blowing 'sheets of dust' intermittently obscured portions of the runway and would suddenly clear making the runway 26R marking difficult to confirm although the runway 26 was visible. Normal final approach and landing made (autobrake 2 for gusty winds); and landing rollout accomplished uneventfully. At this time; tower informed us that we were on runway 26R; not runway 26L -- the landing runway. Taxied onto taxiway V and subsequently in to the gate. As far as the captain flying or having the first officer flying using company procedures; I feel both have pros and cons. The briefing was thorough but I should have placed more emphasis on where the runways were located in relation to each other; noting runway 26L was the second runway we should see and; with increased emphasis on; not only where we would see the runway but putting more emphasis on runway lighting noting runway 26R had no lighting so we should 'see lights' for our intended runway; which we did not. Conditions that required autoplt disengagement approaching the FAF intensified the workload degrading prompt and enhanced course alignment. Lastly; from the initial view of the forecast WX conditions and subsequent updates; I had a bad 'gut feeling.' looking back; I feel we were approaching the time for someone to step up; exhibit some leadership; and question the need for continued operations. In this regard; I feel remiss. Supplemental information from acn 781807: while descending into el paso; the captain and I discussed the approach; VOR 26L. We had the ATIS and the captain proceeded to brief the approach. His briefing was thorough and well thought out. However; I believe this was our first mistake of many. In his briefing we did not discuss runway 26R and how close it would be to our course and the fact that we might see it first. After his briefing I noted that I should fly the approach; company procedures; because of the visibility of 1 1/4 mi in the ATIS. He agreed. But this led to the next mistake in my opinion. Since I was now flying the approach; I should have rebriefed the approach. But since he had just done it seconds earlier; it seemed redundant. Plus; I wish I had been determined to be the PF at this time. Instead; the plan was to give me the airplane later into the flight. I think we planned on downwind or the last vector to final to have me fly. Descending through approximately 12000 ft MSL; we experienced moderate turbulence and were told to expect that all the way to touchdown. Somewhere on the downwind leg; before being vectored to the final approach course; ATC told us the visibility was now 3 mi. I remember saying; 'well looks like you can shoot it;' or something like that. Dumb thing of me to say. The captain said 'yeah; I'll go ahead and fly it.' I think that was a crucial mistake because we should have stuck with our plan at this point in the flight. Plus; due to my relative inexperience with the airport environment and landing in el paso; I feel the captain would have been the better pilot monitoring in this case. Plus; after hearing the visibility was now at 3 mi I let a false sense of security creep in. As you know; 3 mi to a pilot is forever; but as I was to find out it wasn't really 3 mi visibility and flying into a dust-/sandstorm is much different than breaking out under a low overcast. Before continuing; please note that I take full responsibility for my actions/inactions that led to this error and it will not be my intention to impugn the captain in any way. I am trying to be honest and helpful so that this doesn't happen again. Now; we were given a vector to intercept the final course. The localizer captured the course but it was holding us a steady DOT and a half to the right of course. The turbulence was moderate and the airspace fluctuated quite a bit. While leveling off at 5400 ft MSL before the VOR; the airplane got too slow and pitched up to maintain altitude. We both noticed and the captain rightly clicked off the autoplt and added significant power to get the proper pitch and speed. This was our biggest mistake. By not maintaining speed; we were forced to click off the autoplt. I think by having the autoplt helping us would have reduced our chances of making this mistake. After the VOR we changed our courses to 245 degrees and the captain hand flew the aircraft to the MDA. At this point the VOR properly showed us to the left of course and I feel that by trying to correct too much to the right to get on course; we lost a little situational awareness. As I write this; I'm convinced that I became fixated on the course and focused on it too much. The captain flew the aircraft great under the circumstances. The turbulence was still moderate with large speed fluctuations. It was a lot of work and he had to concentrate a lot inside the aircraft. He never busted MDA and we were on course but still in a slight intercept angle to the right that got us there. When we reached the FAF we called 'the' runway in sight. It was the only runway in sight. And there was no way the visibility was 3 mi. Runway 26L was not in sight; nor the tower; nor the end of runway 26R. The captain descended smoothly for the runway and was in a great 'slot' to land the entire way. When I looked at the runway numbers; they were obscured with dust and sand. It really looked like rivers of sand flowing over the runway. Runway 26R would come and go with sand covering the paint completely or partially the whole time. I can honestly say I do not remember seeing the 'right' and that is my fault as the pilot monitoring for not positively identing the runway and runway environment. Being in such a good position to land and having 'the' runway be right where it was supposed to be on the approach lulled me into thinking it was correct. We were the proper DME away the runway was the proper course; etc. I made the mistake of 'pressing the field.' it just seemed right. The landing was very smooth; autobrakes 2 was used; and the aircraft was slowed to slow taxi speed well before we turned off onto taxiway V. The clean-up and taxi in was without incident. While I started getting the plane ready for the next flight; the captain made phone calls to the necessary people. I honestly think that by sticking with company procedures this would not have happened. Due to my relative lack of experience into el paso; I'm certain the captain would have done a better job as the pilot monitoring. Again; please do not let this reflect on the captain in a negative light. But as many pilots do; he (as the captain) thought he was better suited to fly under those WX conditions. This is another classic example of the captain flying while the first officer doesn't do a good enough job as pilot monitoring. We needed to brief the approach more thoroughly to include a major discussion about runway 26R. When the visibility was called 3 mi on downwind; I let myself relax. If that call had not been made we would have stuck with company procedures; and there was no way when we touched down the visibility was even close to 3 mi. A poorly flown aircraft led to the need to disconnect the autoplt and it was not used from the FAF to touchdown. I think it could have helped us. For whatever reason; runway 22 was closed. In that visibility; an ILS would have been the choice. I think the fact that this was my first VOR 26L IAP into el paso and I was not familiar enough with the airport; led us to make this mistake. Since it was my first; I should have studied the approach more thoroughly. Plus; it was my first flight into a real sandstorm. It was much different than I thought. The visibility was not good at all and perhaps a go around was in order. In hindsight; it definitely was. If you really study the approach and the runway layouts; we fell for the trap. This approach really does set you up perfectly for either runway. A large note on the plate would help. As in seattle; a caution from the tower or in the ATIS about the proximity of the runways would have helped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLT CREW REPORTS LANDING ON RWY 26R AT ELP DURING DUST STORM AFTER FLYING VOR 26L AND BEING CLEARED TO LAND ON RWY 26L.

Narrative: ON INITIAL BRIEFING TO FO; SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE FORECAST AT ELP FOR BLOWING DUST/LIMITED VISIBILITY/STRONG GUSTY WINDS. INFORMED THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT AND TOLD HER TO EXPECT A BUMPY ARR AND ANTICIPATE CLEANING THE CABIN EARLY. ENRTE TO ELP; RECEIVED UPDATED ATIS AND NOTAMS (NO CHANGE IN WX AND RWY 4/22 CLOSED). WITH FORECAST TURB FROM 16000 FT TO THE GND; SECURED THE CABIN DURING INITIAL DSCNT; FO COMPUTED LNDG DATA; AND CAPT CONDUCTED BRIEFING FOR VOR 26L COMPANY PROCS AS ATIS VISIBILITY WAS 1 1/4 MI. SPECIFIC MENTION WAS MADE OF WHERE TO EXPECT TO SEE THE RWY IN RELATION TO THE WIND SCREEN; CONFIRMING I SELECTED THE OUTBOUND 245 DEG COURSE AFTER THE FAF AS WELL AS MISSED APCH PROCS AS THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF THEIR EXECUTION. UPON HDOF FROM ZAB TO ELP APCH; CTLR INFORMED US VISIBILITY WAS 3 MI. SINCE THIS WAS MY FIRST FLT WITH THE FO; BASED ON THE MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS AND EXPERIENCE LEVELS; I STATED I WOULD FLY THE APCH UTILIZING THE FLT DIRECTOR AND AUTOPLT. CONFIGURED EARLY TO GET STABILIZED WITH AUTOPLT HAVING A DIFFICULT TIME KEEPING VOR ENGAGED (CDI DISPLACED 1 DOT L AND BEARING POINTER XCHKED). APCHING THE FAF; AUTOPLT CLBED AND AIRSPD RAPIDLY DECREASED REQUIRING ME TO DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AND ADDING PWR. PASSING THE FAF; THE CDI WAS DISPLACED 1.5 DOTS R REQUIRING COURSE CORRECTION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PROX TO CONE OF CONFUSION AND PREVAILING WINDS. MINIMUMS REACHED PRIOR TO MISSED APCH; RWY CAME IN SIGHT AT ANTICIPATED POS; RWY 26 CONFIRMED WITH FO AND XCHKED HDG INDICATOR FOR 260 DEG HDG. BLOWING 'SHEETS OF DUST' INTERMITTENTLY OBSCURED PORTIONS OF THE RWY AND WOULD SUDDENLY CLR MAKING THE RWY 26R MARKING DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM ALTHOUGH THE RWY 26 WAS VISIBLE. NORMAL FINAL APCH AND LNDG MADE (AUTOBRAKE 2 FOR GUSTY WINDS); AND LNDG ROLLOUT ACCOMPLISHED UNEVENTFULLY. AT THIS TIME; TWR INFORMED US THAT WE WERE ON RWY 26R; NOT RWY 26L -- THE LNDG RWY. TAXIED ONTO TXWY V AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN TO THE GATE. AS FAR AS THE CAPT FLYING OR HAVING THE FO FLYING USING COMPANY PROCS; I FEEL BOTH HAVE PROS AND CONS. THE BRIEFING WAS THOROUGH BUT I SHOULD HAVE PLACED MORE EMPHASIS ON WHERE THE RWYS WERE LOCATED IN RELATION TO EACH OTHER; NOTING RWY 26L WAS THE SECOND RWY WE SHOULD SEE AND; WITH INCREASED EMPHASIS ON; NOT ONLY WHERE WE WOULD SEE THE RWY BUT PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON RWY LIGHTING NOTING RWY 26R HAD NO LIGHTING SO WE SHOULD 'SEE LIGHTS' FOR OUR INTENDED RWY; WHICH WE DID NOT. CONDITIONS THAT REQUIRED AUTOPLT DISENGAGEMENT APCHING THE FAF INTENSIFIED THE WORKLOAD DEGRADING PROMPT AND ENHANCED COURSE ALIGNMENT. LASTLY; FROM THE INITIAL VIEW OF THE FORECAST WX CONDITIONS AND SUBSEQUENT UPDATES; I HAD A BAD 'GUT FEELING.' LOOKING BACK; I FEEL WE WERE APCHING THE TIME FOR SOMEONE TO STEP UP; EXHIBIT SOME LEADERSHIP; AND QUESTION THE NEED FOR CONTINUED OPS. IN THIS REGARD; I FEEL REMISS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 781807: WHILE DSNDING INTO EL PASO; THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THE APCH; VOR 26L. WE HAD THE ATIS AND THE CAPT PROCEEDED TO BRIEF THE APCH. HIS BRIEFING WAS THOROUGH AND WELL THOUGHT OUT. HOWEVER; I BELIEVE THIS WAS OUR FIRST MISTAKE OF MANY. IN HIS BRIEFING WE DID NOT DISCUSS RWY 26R AND HOW CLOSE IT WOULD BE TO OUR COURSE AND THE FACT THAT WE MIGHT SEE IT FIRST. AFTER HIS BRIEFING I NOTED THAT I SHOULD FLY THE APCH; COMPANY PROCS; BECAUSE OF THE VISIBILITY OF 1 1/4 MI IN THE ATIS. HE AGREED. BUT THIS LED TO THE NEXT MISTAKE IN MY OPINION. SINCE I WAS NOW FLYING THE APCH; I SHOULD HAVE REBRIEFED THE APCH. BUT SINCE HE HAD JUST DONE IT SECONDS EARLIER; IT SEEMED REDUNDANT. PLUS; I WISH I HAD BEEN DETERMINED TO BE THE PF AT THIS TIME. INSTEAD; THE PLAN WAS TO GIVE ME THE AIRPLANE LATER INTO THE FLT. I THINK WE PLANNED ON DOWNWIND OR THE LAST VECTOR TO FINAL TO HAVE ME FLY. DSNDING THROUGH APPROX 12000 FT MSL; WE EXPERIENCED MODERATE TURB AND WERE TOLD TO EXPECT THAT ALL THE WAY TO TOUCHDOWN. SOMEWHERE ON THE DOWNWIND LEG; BEFORE BEING VECTORED TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE; ATC TOLD US THE VISIBILITY WAS NOW 3 MI. I REMEMBER SAYING; 'WELL LOOKS LIKE YOU CAN SHOOT IT;' OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT. DUMB THING OF ME TO SAY. THE CAPT SAID 'YEAH; I'LL GO AHEAD AND FLY IT.' I THINK THAT WAS A CRUCIAL MISTAKE BECAUSE WE SHOULD HAVE STUCK WITH OUR PLAN AT THIS POINT IN THE FLT. PLUS; DUE TO MY RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE WITH THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT AND LNDG IN EL PASO; I FEEL THE CAPT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE BETTER PLT MONITORING IN THIS CASE. PLUS; AFTER HEARING THE VISIBILITY WAS NOW AT 3 MI I LET A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY CREEP IN. AS YOU KNOW; 3 MI TO A PLT IS FOREVER; BUT AS I WAS TO FIND OUT IT WASN'T REALLY 3 MI VISIBILITY AND FLYING INTO A DUST-/SANDSTORM IS MUCH DIFFERENT THAN BREAKING OUT UNDER A LOW OVCST. BEFORE CONTINUING; PLEASE NOTE THAT I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ACTIONS/INACTIONS THAT LED TO THIS ERROR AND IT WILL NOT BE MY INTENTION TO IMPUGN THE CAPT IN ANY WAY. I AM TRYING TO BE HONEST AND HELPFUL SO THAT THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN AGAIN. NOW; WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL COURSE. THE LOC CAPTURED THE COURSE BUT IT WAS HOLDING US A STEADY DOT AND A HALF TO THE R OF COURSE. THE TURB WAS MODERATE AND THE AIRSPACE FLUCTUATED QUITE A BIT. WHILE LEVELING OFF AT 5400 FT MSL BEFORE THE VOR; THE AIRPLANE GOT TOO SLOW AND PITCHED UP TO MAINTAIN ALT. WE BOTH NOTICED AND THE CAPT RIGHTLY CLICKED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND ADDED SIGNIFICANT PWR TO GET THE PROPER PITCH AND SPD. THIS WAS OUR BIGGEST MISTAKE. BY NOT MAINTAINING SPD; WE WERE FORCED TO CLICK OFF THE AUTOPLT. I THINK BY HAVING THE AUTOPLT HELPING US WOULD HAVE REDUCED OUR CHANCES OF MAKING THIS MISTAKE. AFTER THE VOR WE CHANGED OUR COURSES TO 245 DEGS AND THE CAPT HAND FLEW THE ACFT TO THE MDA. AT THIS POINT THE VOR PROPERLY SHOWED US TO THE L OF COURSE AND I FEEL THAT BY TRYING TO CORRECT TOO MUCH TO THE R TO GET ON COURSE; WE LOST A LITTLE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. AS I WRITE THIS; I'M CONVINCED THAT I BECAME FIXATED ON THE COURSE AND FOCUSED ON IT TOO MUCH. THE CAPT FLEW THE ACFT GREAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TURB WAS STILL MODERATE WITH LARGE SPD FLUCTUATIONS. IT WAS A LOT OF WORK AND HE HAD TO CONCENTRATE A LOT INSIDE THE ACFT. HE NEVER BUSTED MDA AND WE WERE ON COURSE BUT STILL IN A SLIGHT INTERCEPT ANGLE TO THE R THAT GOT US THERE. WHEN WE REACHED THE FAF WE CALLED 'THE' RWY IN SIGHT. IT WAS THE ONLY RWY IN SIGHT. AND THERE WAS NO WAY THE VISIBILITY WAS 3 MI. RWY 26L WAS NOT IN SIGHT; NOR THE TWR; NOR THE END OF RWY 26R. THE CAPT DSNDED SMOOTHLY FOR THE RWY AND WAS IN A GREAT 'SLOT' TO LAND THE ENTIRE WAY. WHEN I LOOKED AT THE RWY NUMBERS; THEY WERE OBSCURED WITH DUST AND SAND. IT REALLY LOOKED LIKE RIVERS OF SAND FLOWING OVER THE RWY. RWY 26R WOULD COME AND GO WITH SAND COVERING THE PAINT COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY THE WHOLE TIME. I CAN HONESTLY SAY I DO NOT REMEMBER SEEING THE 'R' AND THAT IS MY FAULT AS THE PLT MONITORING FOR NOT POSITIVELY IDENTING THE RWY AND RWY ENVIRONMENT. BEING IN SUCH A GOOD POS TO LAND AND HAVING 'THE' RWY BE RIGHT WHERE IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ON THE APCH LULLED ME INTO THINKING IT WAS CORRECT. WE WERE THE PROPER DME AWAY THE RWY WAS THE PROPER COURSE; ETC. I MADE THE MISTAKE OF 'PRESSING THE FIELD.' IT JUST SEEMED RIGHT. THE LNDG WAS VERY SMOOTH; AUTOBRAKES 2 WAS USED; AND THE ACFT WAS SLOWED TO SLOW TAXI SPD WELL BEFORE WE TURNED OFF ONTO TXWY V. THE CLEAN-UP AND TAXI IN WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. WHILE I STARTED GETTING THE PLANE READY FOR THE NEXT FLT; THE CAPT MADE PHONE CALLS TO THE NECESSARY PEOPLE. I HONESTLY THINK THAT BY STICKING WITH COMPANY PROCS THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. DUE TO MY RELATIVE LACK OF EXPERIENCE INTO EL PASO; I'M CERTAIN THE CAPT WOULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB AS THE PLT MONITORING. AGAIN; PLEASE DO NOT LET THIS REFLECT ON THE CAPT IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT. BUT AS MANY PLTS DO; HE (AS THE CAPT) THOUGHT HE WAS BETTER SUITED TO FLY UNDER THOSE WX CONDITIONS. THIS IS ANOTHER CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE CAPT FLYING WHILE THE FO DOESN'T DO A GOOD ENOUGH JOB AS PLT MONITORING. WE NEEDED TO BRIEF THE APCH MORE THOROUGHLY TO INCLUDE A MAJOR DISCUSSION ABOUT RWY 26R. WHEN THE VISIBILITY WAS CALLED 3 MI ON DOWNWIND; I LET MYSELF RELAX. IF THAT CALL HAD NOT BEEN MADE WE WOULD HAVE STUCK WITH COMPANY PROCS; AND THERE WAS NO WAY WHEN WE TOUCHED DOWN THE VISIBILITY WAS EVEN CLOSE TO 3 MI. A POORLY FLOWN ACFT LED TO THE NEED TO DISCONNECT THE AUTOPLT AND IT WAS NOT USED FROM THE FAF TO TOUCHDOWN. I THINK IT COULD HAVE HELPED US. FOR WHATEVER REASON; RWY 22 WAS CLOSED. IN THAT VISIBILITY; AN ILS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE CHOICE. I THINK THE FACT THAT THIS WAS MY FIRST VOR 26L IAP INTO EL PASO AND I WAS NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH THE ARPT; LED US TO MAKE THIS MISTAKE. SINCE IT WAS MY FIRST; I SHOULD HAVE STUDIED THE APCH MORE THOROUGHLY. PLUS; IT WAS MY FIRST FLT INTO A REAL SANDSTORM. IT WAS MUCH DIFFERENT THAN I THOUGHT. THE VISIBILITY WAS NOT GOOD AT ALL AND PERHAPS A GAR WAS IN ORDER. IN HINDSIGHT; IT DEFINITELY WAS. IF YOU REALLY STUDY THE APCH AND THE RWY LAYOUTS; WE FELL FOR THE TRAP. THIS APCH REALLY DOES SET YOU UP PERFECTLY FOR EITHER RWY. A LARGE NOTE ON THE PLATE WOULD HELP. AS IN SEATTLE; A CAUTION FROM THE TWR OR IN THE ATIS ABOUT THE PROX OF THE RWYS WOULD HAVE HELPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.