Narrative:

During a go around from low altitude; maximum flap speed limit was exceeded. Supplemental information from acn 783800: we had briefed for runway xx. When assigned runway 22L; I was not concerned; given the experience of the first officer; favorable WX and familiarity with ZZZ. I called the flight attendants since the touchdown time would be sooner than I had given them. We set up for and briefed the approach. I was distraction by not being able to find the copy of the ATIS we had printed out so I could doublechk the surface wind. The ACARS would not generate an ATIS and I checked the wind on the radio ATIS. We were on a base turn at 5000 ft; 11 mi from the field. We reported the field in sight and were given a heading for the visual intercept. We were high; and I commented to the first officer that we were at 5000 ft and now 10 mi from final; still on base leg. The first officer was slowing and called gear down; joining final at 190 KIAS; flaps 5 degrees. The approach was very doable; but we were still high and slightly fast. I had mistuned the tower frequency; and after 2 attempts retuned and received landing clearance with relief from the hold short restr. At about 1600 ft; we were still high; 180 KIAS; flaps 15 degrees. I told the first officer he would need speed brakes to slow for final flaps. He made a comment about not being comfortable with that; but slowly pulled the speed brakes. We achieved 160 KIAS and final flaps at 1000 ft but were still slightly high and needed to slow. I told him that I would help him with and be responsible for the speed brakes; and pulled them; in an attempt to help. In retrospect; this was a bad idea; as he did not pull up to slow; maintained pitch and began to develop a high sink rate. We received a sink rate ground proximity warning with 1 white and 3 red on the VASI. At about 600 ft; still too fast and unstable; I stowed the speed brakes and called for a go around. The first officer responded correctly with pitch and power; flaps 20 degrees; positive rate; gear up. Moving the flap handle; I noted that the flaps had automatically moved to 25 degrees. The tower had requested a left turn to 140 degrees and climb to 3000 ft. I set these and told the first officer to turn. We were climbing and accelerating normally; but I was primarily eyes outside for traffic. I asked the first officer to turn several times; and as he finally did; we were accelerating quickly at about 1700 ft and I told him several times to pull the nose up. Discussing the event later; he reported fighting the autothrottles and being concerned about being slow. We had missed the 'set speed' step and the throttles were seeking approach speed. I was concerned about our acceleration and a flap overspeed. We finally got cleaned up at 240 KIAS and 3000 ft and were turned in for another visual; now to runway xx. The first officer called it in sight and I told him to slow with the speed brakes because we were fast and would be high. I thought he was still engrossed in the go around. I took the airplane and landed uneventfully on runway xx to avoid a second go around. After parking at the gate; we called maintenance to report a flap overspeed. I was not certain of the degree of overspeed and maintenance said they would download the data. A log entry was made simply stating a flap overspeed during go around. In retrospect; I was slightly distraction and did not monitor closely enough the first officer's initial descent to the runway. I was probably too subtle and should have simply said you are high and fast; instead of you are at 5000 ft and 10 mi. I have had to frequently use the spoilers with the gear and flaps at 25 degrees and even 30 degrees to deal with slam-dunks. He is an experienced first officer; but he was not comfortable with this and I should not have pushed him. I did not monitor closely enough the mechanics of the go around; and will need to do this; missing a step which caused way more confusion than it should have. I should have taken the aircraft sooner; especially when he did not respond quickly to pulling up the nose. I should have had the possibility of the runway xxl hold/short in the briefing; instead of assuming the normal runway. I take the flap overspeed problem very seriously and have worked hard to avoid having one; given the difficulties it generates to passenger and cost to the company. Flight data later revealed a 7 KIAS overspeed at flaps 30 degrees; with no maintenance required; so I consider myself lucky. I later discussed with the first officer being truly prepared for a go around on every approach. I also fully appreciate that I am fully responsible and need to take the aircraft or intervene more forcefully in a situation such as this. I am also aware of the potential problem of a go around with a land/hold short restr and should not have allowed any continuation on final with anything less than a very normal profile.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW REPORTS FLAP OVERSPEED AFTER CLOSE-IN VISUAL RESULTS IN UNSTABILIZED APPROACH AND GAR.

Narrative: DURING A GAR FROM LOW ALT; MAX FLAP SPD LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 783800: WE HAD BRIEFED FOR RWY XX. WHEN ASSIGNED RWY 22L; I WAS NOT CONCERNED; GIVEN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE FO; FAVORABLE WX AND FAMILIARITY WITH ZZZ. I CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS SINCE THE TOUCHDOWN TIME WOULD BE SOONER THAN I HAD GIVEN THEM. WE SET UP FOR AND BRIEFED THE APCH. I WAS DISTR BY NOT BEING ABLE TO FIND THE COPY OF THE ATIS WE HAD PRINTED OUT SO I COULD DOUBLECHK THE SURFACE WIND. THE ACARS WOULD NOT GENERATE AN ATIS AND I CHKED THE WIND ON THE RADIO ATIS. WE WERE ON A BASE TURN AT 5000 FT; 11 MI FROM THE FIELD. WE RPTED THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND WERE GIVEN A HDG FOR THE VISUAL INTERCEPT. WE WERE HIGH; AND I COMMENTED TO THE FO THAT WE WERE AT 5000 FT AND NOW 10 MI FROM FINAL; STILL ON BASE LEG. THE FO WAS SLOWING AND CALLED GEAR DOWN; JOINING FINAL AT 190 KIAS; FLAPS 5 DEGS. THE APCH WAS VERY DOABLE; BUT WE WERE STILL HIGH AND SLIGHTLY FAST. I HAD MISTUNED THE TWR FREQ; AND AFTER 2 ATTEMPTS RETUNED AND RECEIVED LNDG CLRNC WITH RELIEF FROM THE HOLD SHORT RESTR. AT ABOUT 1600 FT; WE WERE STILL HIGH; 180 KIAS; FLAPS 15 DEGS. I TOLD THE FO HE WOULD NEED SPD BRAKES TO SLOW FOR FINAL FLAPS. HE MADE A COMMENT ABOUT NOT BEING COMFORTABLE WITH THAT; BUT SLOWLY PULLED THE SPD BRAKES. WE ACHIEVED 160 KIAS AND FINAL FLAPS AT 1000 FT BUT WERE STILL SLIGHTLY HIGH AND NEEDED TO SLOW. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD HELP HIM WITH AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SPD BRAKES; AND PULLED THEM; IN AN ATTEMPT TO HELP. IN RETROSPECT; THIS WAS A BAD IDEA; AS HE DID NOT PULL UP TO SLOW; MAINTAINED PITCH AND BEGAN TO DEVELOP A HIGH SINK RATE. WE RECEIVED A SINK RATE GND PROX WARNING WITH 1 WHITE AND 3 RED ON THE VASI. AT ABOUT 600 FT; STILL TOO FAST AND UNSTABLE; I STOWED THE SPD BRAKES AND CALLED FOR A GAR. THE FO RESPONDED CORRECTLY WITH PITCH AND PWR; FLAPS 20 DEGS; POSITIVE RATE; GEAR UP. MOVING THE FLAP HANDLE; I NOTED THAT THE FLAPS HAD AUTOMATICALLY MOVED TO 25 DEGS. THE TWR HAD REQUESTED A L TURN TO 140 DEGS AND CLB TO 3000 FT. I SET THESE AND TOLD THE FO TO TURN. WE WERE CLBING AND ACCELERATING NORMALLY; BUT I WAS PRIMARILY EYES OUTSIDE FOR TFC. I ASKED THE FO TO TURN SEVERAL TIMES; AND AS HE FINALLY DID; WE WERE ACCELERATING QUICKLY AT ABOUT 1700 FT AND I TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES TO PULL THE NOSE UP. DISCUSSING THE EVENT LATER; HE RPTED FIGHTING THE AUTOTHROTTLES AND BEING CONCERNED ABOUT BEING SLOW. WE HAD MISSED THE 'SET SPD' STEP AND THE THROTTLES WERE SEEKING APCH SPD. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT OUR ACCELERATION AND A FLAP OVERSPEED. WE FINALLY GOT CLEANED UP AT 240 KIAS AND 3000 FT AND WERE TURNED IN FOR ANOTHER VISUAL; NOW TO RWY XX. THE FO CALLED IT IN SIGHT AND I TOLD HIM TO SLOW WITH THE SPD BRAKES BECAUSE WE WERE FAST AND WOULD BE HIGH. I THOUGHT HE WAS STILL ENGROSSED IN THE GAR. I TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY XX TO AVOID A SECOND GAR. AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE; WE CALLED MAINT TO RPT A FLAP OVERSPEED. I WAS NOT CERTAIN OF THE DEGREE OF OVERSPEED AND MAINT SAID THEY WOULD DOWNLOAD THE DATA. A LOG ENTRY WAS MADE SIMPLY STATING A FLAP OVERSPEED DURING GAR. IN RETROSPECT; I WAS SLIGHTLY DISTR AND DID NOT MONITOR CLOSELY ENOUGH THE FO'S INITIAL DSCNT TO THE RWY. I WAS PROBABLY TOO SUBTLE AND SHOULD HAVE SIMPLY SAID YOU ARE HIGH AND FAST; INSTEAD OF YOU ARE AT 5000 FT AND 10 MI. I HAVE HAD TO FREQUENTLY USE THE SPOILERS WITH THE GEAR AND FLAPS AT 25 DEGS AND EVEN 30 DEGS TO DEAL WITH SLAM-DUNKS. HE IS AN EXPERIENCED FO; BUT HE WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THIS AND I SHOULD NOT HAVE PUSHED HIM. I DID NOT MONITOR CLOSELY ENOUGH THE MECHS OF THE GAR; AND WILL NEED TO DO THIS; MISSING A STEP WHICH CAUSED WAY MORE CONFUSION THAN IT SHOULD HAVE. I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE ACFT SOONER; ESPECIALLY WHEN HE DID NOT RESPOND QUICKLY TO PULLING UP THE NOSE. I SHOULD HAVE HAD THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RWY XXL HOLD/SHORT IN THE BRIEFING; INSTEAD OF ASSUMING THE NORMAL RWY. I TAKE THE FLAP OVERSPEED PROB VERY SERIOUSLY AND HAVE WORKED HARD TO AVOID HAVING ONE; GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES IT GENERATES TO PAX AND COST TO THE COMPANY. FLT DATA LATER REVEALED A 7 KIAS OVERSPEED AT FLAPS 30 DEGS; WITH NO MAINT REQUIRED; SO I CONSIDER MYSELF LUCKY. I LATER DISCUSSED WITH THE FO BEING TRULY PREPARED FOR A GAR ON EVERY APCH. I ALSO FULLY APPRECIATE THAT I AM FULLY RESPONSIBLE AND NEED TO TAKE THE ACFT OR INTERVENE MORE FORCEFULLY IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THIS. I AM ALSO AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL PROB OF A GAR WITH A LAND/HOLD SHORT RESTR AND SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED ANY CONTINUATION ON FINAL WITH ANYTHING LESS THAN A VERY NORMAL PROFILE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.