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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 783897 |
Time | |
Date | 200804 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Weather Elements | Turbulence |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 783897 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Factors | |
Maintenance | contributing factor : schedule pressure contributing factor : briefing contributing factor : manuals performance deficiency : fault isolation performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : testing |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Chart Or Publication Aircraft Maintenance Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
We received release #2; due to plane change. We pulled up maintenance computer display and deferred items for our new aircraft. The release #2 showed that the antiskid system was inoperative per deferral. The dispatcher had taken the appropriate weight penalties into effect for both takeoff and landing weights. ATOG right:T79; R14R; F5; 29.64; MEL X (note: given the gusting winds and potential for windshear; a different runway or flap setting was likely as thunderstorms were causing delays and moving into the area.) when we pulled up maintenance computer display and deferred items for the aircraft after receiving news of the plane change; we saw no record of aircraft refusal. We went down to operations and spoke to operations and maintenance. Operations explained that this airplane was switched to us because it had previously been refused by the captain of flight to ZZZ. Further inquiry found that it had also been refused by captain of flight to ZZZ3; and also by captain of flight to ZZZ2. Yet; nothing showed in the maintenance history. The maintenance supervisor reviewed the status of the airplane with us. He was very good and thorough at his job; and his degree of professionalism is to be commended. Reviewing the maintenance history showed that the #1 transducer had already been replaced due to antiskid problems in apr and a history of antiskid problems and the maintenance controller explained that 1) we had no parts anywhere except YYY; and 2) they were not sure what the problem was. Maybe replacing the transducer there was a wire? The situation would require troubleshooting a wire -- we all know that time estimates on that kind of electronic issue can be difficult to accurately predict. Upon detailed reading of the deferral apr/MEL reference EICAS message 'norm antiskid;' 'alternate antiskid' and the MEL placard we noted that in addition to being removed from CAT ii and weight penalties; additional procedures for performance calculations; item 'flight crew D' stated: maintain automatic brakes selector in 'off' position for all phases of flight. All autobrake functions including rejected takeoff inoperative. In light of all the circumstances -- WX; no antiskid; no autobrakes; maintenance uncertainty as to the exact nature of the problem with the brake system -- I refused the aircraft just as the previous 3 capts had done. Why did the previous capts' refusals not show in the maintenance history available to pilots? Although it is not a weight penalty; should dispatcher be alerted to no autobrakes? Note: when speaking to dispatcher; after the refusal; someone was quick to tell him; to tell the captain; the airplane was being routed to ZZZ1 for maintenance. Pilot pushing? Note: on 4 hours on the ground; maintenance never once tried to find the wire -- all the time was spent trying to give the airplane to new crews. Called the flight operations duty manager who did an excellent job of handling the issue.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A CAPTAIN GIVEN A B757-200 WITH A SECOND MAINT RELEASE; QUESTIONS WHY THE REFUSAL OF THE SAME ACFT BY THREE PREVIOUS CAPTAINS WAS NOT NOTED IN THE MAINT HISTORY AVAILABLE TO PILOTS. FOUL WEATHER; NO ANTI-SKID; NO AUTO-BRAKES; NO RTO FUNCTION. MAINT SHOPPING FOR PILOT TO TAKE ACFT.
Narrative: WE RECEIVED RELEASE #2; DUE TO PLANE CHANGE. WE PULLED UP MAINT COMPUTER DISPLAY AND DEFERRED ITEMS FOR OUR NEW ACFT. THE RELEASE #2 SHOWED THAT THE ANTISKID SYS WAS INOP PER DEFERRAL. THE DISPATCHER HAD TAKEN THE APPROPRIATE WT PENALTIES INTO EFFECT FOR BOTH TKOF AND LNDG WTS. ATOG R:T79; R14R; F5; 29.64; MEL X (NOTE: GIVEN THE GUSTING WINDS AND POTENTIAL FOR WINDSHEAR; A DIFFERENT RWY OR FLAP SETTING WAS LIKELY AS TSTMS WERE CAUSING DELAYS AND MOVING INTO THE AREA.) WHEN WE PULLED UP MAINT COMPUTER DISPLAY AND DEFERRED ITEMS FOR THE ACFT AFTER RECEIVING NEWS OF THE PLANE CHANGE; WE SAW NO RECORD OF ACFT REFUSAL. WE WENT DOWN TO OPS AND SPOKE TO OPS AND MAINT. OPS EXPLAINED THAT THIS AIRPLANE WAS SWITCHED TO US BECAUSE IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REFUSED BY THE CAPT OF FLT TO ZZZ. FURTHER INQUIRY FOUND THAT IT HAD ALSO BEEN REFUSED BY CAPT OF FLT TO ZZZ3; AND ALSO BY CAPT OF FLT TO ZZZ2. YET; NOTHING SHOWED IN THE MAINT HISTORY. THE MAINT SUPVR REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE AIRPLANE WITH US. HE WAS VERY GOOD AND THOROUGH AT HIS JOB; AND HIS DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM IS TO BE COMMENDED. REVIEWING THE MAINT HISTORY SHOWED THAT THE #1 TRANSDUCER HAD ALREADY BEEN REPLACED DUE TO ANTISKID PROBS IN APR AND A HISTORY OF ANTISKID PROBS AND THE MAINT CTLR EXPLAINED THAT 1) WE HAD NO PARTS ANYWHERE EXCEPT YYY; AND 2) THEY WERE NOT SURE WHAT THE PROB WAS. MAYBE REPLACING THE TRANSDUCER THERE WAS A WIRE? THE SITUATION WOULD REQUIRE TROUBLESHOOTING A WIRE -- WE ALL KNOW THAT TIME ESTIMATES ON THAT KIND OF ELECTRONIC ISSUE CAN BE DIFFICULT TO ACCURATELY PREDICT. UPON DETAILED READING OF THE DEFERRAL APR/MEL REF EICAS MESSAGE 'NORM ANTISKID;' 'ALTERNATE ANTISKID' AND THE MEL PLACARD WE NOTED THAT IN ADDITION TO BEING REMOVED FROM CAT II AND WT PENALTIES; ADDITIONAL PROCS FOR PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS; ITEM 'FLT CREW D' STATED: MAINTAIN AUTO BRAKES SELECTOR IN 'OFF' POS FOR ALL PHASES OF FLT. ALL AUTOBRAKE FUNCTIONS INCLUDING RTO INOP. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES -- WX; NO ANTISKID; NO AUTOBRAKES; MAINT UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE EXACT NATURE OF THE PROB WITH THE BRAKE SYS -- I REFUSED THE ACFT JUST AS THE PREVIOUS 3 CAPTS HAD DONE. WHY DID THE PREVIOUS CAPTS' REFUSALS NOT SHOW IN THE MAINT HISTORY AVAILABLE TO PLTS? ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT A WT PENALTY; SHOULD DISPATCHER BE ALERTED TO NO AUTOBRAKES? NOTE: WHEN SPEAKING TO DISPATCHER; AFTER THE REFUSAL; SOMEONE WAS QUICK TO TELL HIM; TO TELL THE CAPT; THE AIRPLANE WAS BEING ROUTED TO ZZZ1 FOR MAINT. PLT PUSHING? NOTE: ON 4 HRS ON THE GND; MAINT NEVER ONCE TRIED TO FIND THE WIRE -- ALL THE TIME WAS SPENT TRYING TO GIVE THE AIRPLANE TO NEW CREWS. CALLED THE FLT OPS DUTY MGR WHO DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF HANDLING THE ISSUE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.