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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 784016 |
Time | |
Date | 200804 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lex.airport |
State Reference | KY |
Altitude | msl single value : 26000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zid.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 4000 flight time type : 550 |
ASRS Report | 784016 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 270 flight time total : 17000 flight time type : 12000 |
ASRS Report | 784015 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence other non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas warning other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | aircraft : equipment problem dissipated |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
During an initial descent; approximately FL260; we received an EICAS message 'right reverser unlocked.' the captain (PNF) simply hit the reverser levers down and the message went away. During the next descent at approximately FL240; the message came on again and even with the captain's attempts; the message would not go out. We were at idle for the descent and I did not notice any buffeting. I stated; 'I have the aircraft and radios; run the memory items.' the response was; 'it is amber; not red; and it is just a switch set too sensitive.' understanding the confusion of an amber caution instead of a red emergency EICAS message -- and the aircraft at idle; in descent; with ample airspeed and not buffeting -- I figured the memory items would be completed when the captain grabbed the QRH. They were not. The captain avoided all CRM. I pointed out the double-boxed items with the captain's response being that the message is amber and the air carrier needs to get their act together. After a second time of noting the double boxed items; I performed the memory items myself. The captain read (to himself -- I was left out of the loop) the 'yes and no' for flight improvement response questions; but due to the fact that I was left out; I did not understand and I had to once again direct my attention and query the captain to get the correct explanation. After leveling off; we had full thrust lever use. We landed without incident; only without the use of the right thrust reverser. CRM from the captain was completely non-existent. The captain thought that he knew the system -- to the extent that the double-boxed memory items were being ignored -- giving me concern; in the safe operation of an aircraft; that the captain will rely on and override a younger; newer; less assertive first officer.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FAILURE OF CRM COMPOUNDS FLT CREW ISSUES RESULTING FROM INFLT THRUST REVERSER UNLOCKED EICAS MESSAGES.
Narrative: DURING AN INITIAL DSCNT; APPROX FL260; WE RECEIVED AN EICAS MESSAGE 'R REVERSER UNLOCKED.' THE CAPT (PNF) SIMPLY HIT THE REVERSER LEVERS DOWN AND THE MESSAGE WENT AWAY. DURING THE NEXT DSCNT AT APPROX FL240; THE MESSAGE CAME ON AGAIN AND EVEN WITH THE CAPT'S ATTEMPTS; THE MESSAGE WOULD NOT GO OUT. WE WERE AT IDLE FOR THE DSCNT AND I DID NOT NOTICE ANY BUFFETING. I STATED; 'I HAVE THE ACFT AND RADIOS; RUN THE MEMORY ITEMS.' THE RESPONSE WAS; 'IT IS AMBER; NOT RED; AND IT IS JUST A SWITCH SET TOO SENSITIVE.' UNDERSTANDING THE CONFUSION OF AN AMBER CAUTION INSTEAD OF A RED EMER EICAS MESSAGE -- AND THE ACFT AT IDLE; IN DSCNT; WITH AMPLE AIRSPD AND NOT BUFFETING -- I FIGURED THE MEMORY ITEMS WOULD BE COMPLETED WHEN THE CAPT GRABBED THE QRH. THEY WERE NOT. THE CAPT AVOIDED ALL CRM. I POINTED OUT THE DOUBLE-BOXED ITEMS WITH THE CAPT'S RESPONSE BEING THAT THE MESSAGE IS AMBER AND THE ACR NEEDS TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER. AFTER A SECOND TIME OF NOTING THE DOUBLE BOXED ITEMS; I PERFORMED THE MEMORY ITEMS MYSELF. THE CAPT READ (TO HIMSELF -- I WAS LEFT OUT OF THE LOOP) THE 'YES AND NO' FOR FLT IMPROVEMENT RESPONSE QUESTIONS; BUT DUE TO THE FACT THAT I WAS LEFT OUT; I DID NOT UNDERSTAND AND I HAD TO ONCE AGAIN DIRECT MY ATTN AND QUERY THE CAPT TO GET THE CORRECT EXPLANATION. AFTER LEVELING OFF; WE HAD FULL THRUST LEVER USE. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT; ONLY WITHOUT THE USE OF THE R THRUST REVERSER. CRM FROM THE CAPT WAS COMPLETELY NON-EXISTENT. THE CAPT THOUGHT THAT HE KNEW THE SYS -- TO THE EXTENT THAT THE DOUBLE-BOXED MEMORY ITEMS WERE BEING IGNORED -- GIVING ME CONCERN; IN THE SAFE OP OF AN ACFT; THAT THE CAPT WILL RELY ON AND OVERRIDE A YOUNGER; NEWER; LESS ASSERTIVE FO.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.