Narrative:

The first officer was flying and had loaded runway 8L into the FMS. On first contact with approach control; we were told to expect runway 27L. As I called for the latest ATIS through the ACARS; the first officer loaded runway 27L into the FMS. On subsequent contact with approach; we were told to expect runway 9R. The ATIS we received had not changed and the controller apologized for the confusion. Before turning downwind; we were redirected to runway 10. The first officer once again loaded the FMS; changed ILS frequencies and called for the approach checklist. I checked the new frequency and received a good identification for runway 10. Still descending on downwind; approach asked if we could see and follow heavy traffic at our 2 O'clock. I saw the aircraft across the cockpit before the first officer picked it up. I decided we would not be able to maintain visual in the morning haze and rising sun; especially tail-on. After turning base and telling approach we could not fly visually; we were vectored to 080 degrees for the ILS prm to runway 10. The first officer armed the autopilot for approach and we waited for a radio frequency change and localizer capture. As we approached what I assumed to be the extended runway centerline (the runway was not visible); I noticed the aircraft did not capture the localizer. The FMS map showed us moving north of the runway 10 final course; but the ILS raw data still showed us south of course. I checked the ILS frequency again and that the autopilot was armed -- both were good. I told the first officer we must have some type of map shift; to keep his original vector toward the localizer course. I noticed we had no glideslope information displayed yet. At this time; approach switched us to tower frequency. Before we could switch over; approach directed an immediate right turn to 180 degrees and a descent to 3000 ft MSL. The new vector was confusing since the raw data still showed us south of the localizer course. As the first officer began the turn and descent; I noticed another aircraft at our left 9 O'clock; probably on the final for runway 9R. I estimated it to be 500 ft above and 0.5 miles left of our position. We received no TCAS warnings. After turning onto our second downwind; I noticed our selected ILS inbound course was 272; not 092. The first officer had changed it earlier and neither of us had caught the error during the approach check. The aircraft had been displaying erroneous localizer information and could not capture the front course. In our effort to brief and set up for our 4TH runway change; we missed a critical item on the approach checklist. Even though I double checked the ILS frequency and received a good identification; I did not see the course change. I will add emphasis to all checklists and responses.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW RECEIVES FOUR RWY ASSIGNMENTS PRIOR TO COMMENCING APPROACH AND FORGETS TO SET CORRECT ILS COURSE. THIS RESULTS IN BREAKOUT FROM ILS PRM.

Narrative: THE FO WAS FLYING AND HAD LOADED RWY 8L INTO THE FMS. ON FIRST CONTACT WITH APPROACH CONTROL; WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 27L. AS I CALLED FOR THE LATEST ATIS THROUGH THE ACARS; THE FO LOADED RWY 27L INTO THE FMS. ON SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH APPROACH; WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 9R. THE ATIS WE RECEIVED HAD NOT CHANGED AND THE CONTROLLER APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION. BEFORE TURNING DOWNWIND; WE WERE REDIRECTED TO RWY 10. THE FO ONCE AGAIN LOADED THE FMS; CHANGED ILS FREQUENCIES AND CALLED FOR THE APPROACH CHECKLIST. I CHECKED THE NEW FREQUENCY AND RECEIVED A GOOD IDENTIFICATION FOR RWY 10. STILL DESCENDING ON DOWNWIND; APPROACH ASKED IF WE COULD SEE AND FOLLOW HEAVY TRAFFIC AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK. I SAW THE AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE COCKPIT BEFORE THE FO PICKED IT UP. I DECIDED WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL IN THE MORNING HAZE AND RISING SUN; ESPECIALLY TAIL-ON. AFTER TURNING BASE AND TELLING APPROACH WE COULD NOT FLY VISUALLY; WE WERE VECTORED TO 080 DEGREES FOR THE ILS PRM TO RWY 10. THE FO ARMED THE AUTOPILOT FOR APPROACH AND WE WAITED FOR A RADIO FREQUENCY CHANGE AND LOCALIZER CAPTURE. AS WE APPROACHED WHAT I ASSUMED TO BE THE EXTENDED RUNWAY CENTERLINE (THE RUNWAY WAS NOT VISIBLE); I NOTICED THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT CAPTURE THE LOCALIZER. THE FMS MAP SHOWED US MOVING NORTH OF THE RWY 10 FINAL COURSE; BUT THE ILS RAW DATA STILL SHOWED US SOUTH OF COURSE. I CHECKED THE ILS FREQUENCY AGAIN AND THAT THE AUTOPILOT WAS ARMED -- BOTH WERE GOOD. I TOLD THE FO WE MUST HAVE SOME TYPE OF MAP SHIFT; TO KEEP HIS ORIGINAL VECTOR TOWARD THE LOCALIZER COURSE. I NOTICED WE HAD NO GLIDESLOPE INFORMATION DISPLAYED YET. AT THIS TIME; APPROACH SWITCHED US TO TOWER FREQUENCY. BEFORE WE COULD SWITCH OVER; APPROACH DIRECTED AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT TURN TO 180 DEGREES AND A DESCENT TO 3000 FT MSL. THE NEW VECTOR WAS CONFUSING SINCE THE RAW DATA STILL SHOWED US SOUTH OF THE LOCALIZER COURSE. AS THE FO BEGAN THE TURN AND DESCENT; I NOTICED ANOTHER AIRCRAFT AT OUR LEFT 9 O'CLOCK; PROBABLY ON THE FINAL FOR RWY 9R. I ESTIMATED IT TO BE 500 FT ABOVE AND 0.5 MILES LEFT OF OUR POSITION. WE RECEIVED NO TCAS WARNINGS. AFTER TURNING ONTO OUR SECOND DOWNWIND; I NOTICED OUR SELECTED ILS INBOUND COURSE WAS 272; NOT 092. THE FO HAD CHANGED IT EARLIER AND NEITHER OF US HAD CAUGHT THE ERROR DURING THE APPROACH CHECK. THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DISPLAYING ERRONEOUS LOCALIZER INFORMATION AND COULD NOT CAPTURE THE FRONT COURSE. IN OUR EFFORT TO BRIEF AND SET UP FOR OUR 4TH RUNWAY CHANGE; WE MISSED A CRITICAL ITEM ON THE APPROACH CHECKLIST. EVEN THOUGH I DOUBLE CHECKED THE ILS FREQUENCY AND RECEIVED A GOOD IDENTIFICATION; I DID NOT SEE THE COURSE CHANGE. I WILL ADD EMPHASIS TO ALL CHECKLISTS AND RESPONSES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.