Narrative:

On initial contact with abuja approach; we idented our position as inbound on the 080 degree radial of VOR at approximately 115 NM out. Abuja (which has radar) cleared us to VOR. We requested descent from our cruising altitude (FL240) and started down to an eventual altitude of 5000 ft. While in the descent; we requested permission to come right and intercept the ILS inbound to runway 22. Abuja said to report established on the VOR 037 degree radial (which is the reciprocal of the ILS course of 217 degrees). We reported established and requested further descent. Approach cleared us to 3700 ft. We asked to be cleared for the approach. We never received clearance for the approach. We tracked inbound on the ILS final approach until we were nearly overhead the airport still at 3700 ft (the airport is at 1123 ft). Receiving no further instructions from approach; I felt it was in the best interest of safety to take matters into our own hands; break left for a 360 degree turn to the left in VMC; then re-enter final and land. (Up to this point; despite repeated inquiries; approach had never indicated we were in radar contact or indicated they were prepared to vector us.) we told approach we were coming left to re-enter final. They said no; we must come right. Not knowing if they had us in radar contact; I continued left knowing that terrain; IMC; and possible traffic might be to the right of course. The controller at this point became highly agitated and insisted we roll out on a course of 360 degrees for vectors through the final approach course to the north then back around on a vector to intercept the final approach and land runway 22. We complied with all further instructions and landed without incident on runway 22. We have not the slightest idea of why approach would not tell us whether we were in radar contact or not. Did he know where we were? Why wouldn't he clear us for the approach? Why did he continue to hold us at too high an altitude until we were too close in to execute the ILS approach and land? We never found out; but in the interest of safety; sometimes you just have to use your best judgement; take command of the situation and do what you have to do to get the airplane on the ground. Contributing factors: 1) fatigue; several long days and short nights. Little sleep. 2) language: it was english with local nuances and differences in pronunciation that made it sound like something quite different. 3) WX: we had just sat through a very bad sandstorm and thunderstorm before takeoff. 4) heat and humidity (this is africa). 5) our body clocks are still in the united states of america. 6) just getting over a bad cold. 7) it was a very long day. Why does it matter? With more than 50% of the sales of some aircraft manufacturers going overseas; more flight crews are going to have to adapt to flying in some very strange situations in 'the land of not quite right.' perhaps my feedback will give them a foretaste of what they might expect.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE750 CAPT REPORTS NEVER RECEIVING APPROACH CLEARANCE FROM DNAA ATC AND PENETRATES RESTRICTED AIRSPACE ATTEMPTING TO LAND.

Narrative: ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ABUJA APCH; WE IDENTED OUR POS AS INBOUND ON THE 080 DEG RADIAL OF VOR AT APPROX 115 NM OUT. ABUJA (WHICH HAS RADAR) CLRED US TO VOR. WE REQUESTED DSCNT FROM OUR CRUISING ALT (FL240) AND STARTED DOWN TO AN EVENTUAL ALT OF 5000 FT. WHILE IN THE DSCNT; WE REQUESTED PERMISSION TO COME R AND INTERCEPT THE ILS INBOUND TO RWY 22. ABUJA SAID TO RPT ESTABLISHED ON THE VOR 037 DEG RADIAL (WHICH IS THE RECIPROCAL OF THE ILS COURSE OF 217 DEGS). WE RPTED ESTABLISHED AND REQUESTED FURTHER DSCNT. APCH CLRED US TO 3700 FT. WE ASKED TO BE CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE NEVER RECEIVED CLRNC FOR THE APCH. WE TRACKED INBOUND ON THE ILS FINAL APCH UNTIL WE WERE NEARLY OVERHEAD THE ARPT STILL AT 3700 FT (THE ARPT IS AT 1123 FT). RECEIVING NO FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM APCH; I FELT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY TO TAKE MATTERS INTO OUR OWN HANDS; BREAK L FOR A 360 DEG TURN TO THE L IN VMC; THEN RE-ENTER FINAL AND LAND. (UP TO THIS POINT; DESPITE REPEATED INQUIRIES; APCH HAD NEVER INDICATED WE WERE IN RADAR CONTACT OR INDICATED THEY WERE PREPARED TO VECTOR US.) WE TOLD APCH WE WERE COMING L TO RE-ENTER FINAL. THEY SAID NO; WE MUST COME R. NOT KNOWING IF THEY HAD US IN RADAR CONTACT; I CONTINUED L KNOWING THAT TERRAIN; IMC; AND POSSIBLE TFC MIGHT BE TO THE R OF COURSE. THE CTLR AT THIS POINT BECAME HIGHLY AGITATED AND INSISTED WE ROLL OUT ON A COURSE OF 360 DEGS FOR VECTORS THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO THE N THEN BACK AROUND ON A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH AND LAND RWY 22. WE COMPLIED WITH ALL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON RWY 22. WE HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA OF WHY APCH WOULD NOT TELL US WHETHER WE WERE IN RADAR CONTACT OR NOT. DID HE KNOW WHERE WE WERE? WHY WOULDN'T HE CLR US FOR THE APCH? WHY DID HE CONTINUE TO HOLD US AT TOO HIGH AN ALT UNTIL WE WERE TOO CLOSE IN TO EXECUTE THE ILS APCH AND LAND? WE NEVER FOUND OUT; BUT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY; SOMETIMES YOU JUST HAVE TO USE YOUR BEST JUDGEMENT; TAKE COMMAND OF THE SITUATION AND DO WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO TO GET THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) FATIGUE; SEVERAL LONG DAYS AND SHORT NIGHTS. LITTLE SLEEP. 2) LANGUAGE: IT WAS ENGLISH WITH LCL NUANCES AND DIFFERENCES IN PRONUNCIATION THAT MADE IT SOUND LIKE SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT. 3) WX: WE HAD JUST SAT THROUGH A VERY BAD SANDSTORM AND TSTM BEFORE TKOF. 4) HEAT AND HUMIDITY (THIS IS AFRICA). 5) OUR BODY CLOCKS ARE STILL IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 6) JUST GETTING OVER A BAD COLD. 7) IT WAS A VERY LONG DAY. WHY DOES IT MATTER? WITH MORE THAN 50% OF THE SALES OF SOME ACFT MANUFACTURERS GOING OVERSEAS; MORE FLT CREWS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO ADAPT TO FLYING IN SOME VERY STRANGE SITUATIONS IN 'THE LAND OF NOT QUITE RIGHT.' PERHAPS MY FEEDBACK WILL GIVE THEM A FORETASTE OF WHAT THEY MIGHT EXPECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.