Narrative:

Flight was scheduled to fly from sna. Preflight preparations and briefings were accomplished in a timely manner. As PF; I was particularly thorough in briefing the departure procedure due to the complex nature of the sna departure profile. After all checklists were completed; we pushed back 5 mins early. Pushback and engine start were uneventful. After engine start; sna ground control informed us we had a wheels-up time of XA25. After receiving clearance to taxi to runway 19R; we accomplished all pre-takeoff procedures and checklists. Upon reaching runway 19R and switching to the tower controller; I advised the flight attendants to prepare for takeoff. Shortly thereafter; we were told by the tower controller to taxi into position and hold. As we were doing this; the tower controller cleared us for takeoff; noting the next arrival to runway 19R was on a downwind leg. Captain taxied the aircraft into position; stopped; set the parking brake; and xferred aircraft control to me. I acknowledged receiving aircraft control; ran the engines up to 1.10 EPR; and while holding the brakes manually; released the parking brake. I further ran the engines up to toga power; and upon reaching toga power released the brakes. Due to the lightness of the aircraft (approximately 116000 pounds); acceleration was rapid. After rotation; initial aircraft attitude was approximately 20-25 degrees nose-up. The entire departure profile was flown accurately and smoothly. After cleaning up and completing the after takeoff checklist; we were given further climb clearance by socal. After a brief conversation; captain then informed me and socal departure that we would have to divert into ZZZ because of an injury suffered by one of our flight attendants. I leveled the aircraft off at 11000 ft and complied with a turn as instructed by ATC. At this point; our ACARS unit displayed a 'no communication' message; which handicapped our efforts to communication with dispatch and ZZZ operations. It should be noted that captain did an outstanding job prioritizing his duties in effecting our divert into ZZZ. After accomplishing a landing brief and completing the appropriate checklists; we were given clearance to land. After landing; xferring aircraft control; and accomplishing our after landing flows; we parked. After shutdown; we were met at the gate by the paramedics and the in-flight supervisor. Supplemental information from acn 788958: I debriefed the remaining flight attendants and learned that they all did hear the prepare PA announcement; had what they thought was a reasonable amount of time to get into their seats and confirmed that there were quite a number of open seats in the back to jump into if it became necessary. I talked with the aft flight attendant about her flying partner missing for the takeoff. What was that like? She hoped that she must have made it into a seat or sat down on the floor. Additionally; she did not want to call the cockpit for sterile cockpit protocol and fear of causing an abort. It would seem that the high frequency; high workload flying that the airbus fleet does; has somewhat (for me anyway) desensitized the experience of flying quick turns and unusual procedures like the sna 10-7C. Early on; I would have thoroughly briefed my first officer; the flight attendants and passenger; now it seems excessive. With the unusually high number of hours per month we are all now subject to; part of the coping mechanism is to cut out many perceived unnecessary and redundant behaviors. This might be some sort of 'energy conservation' we adapt to; in order to get ourselves through month after month. Although fatigue (sleep) was not a factor (we showed up for work well rested) we may want to look at the insidious effects the type of flying is having on our crews. Is it possible that the flight attendant knew she had to get into her jumpseat; but the timeliness and urgency had been diminished by these factors and resulted in an injury?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ACFT DEPARTED SNA USING THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROCEDURE. A FLT ATT DID NOT GET SEATED AND WAS HURT DURING TKOF. THE FLT DIVERTED TO NEARBY ARPT.

Narrative: FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO FLY FROM SNA. PREFLT PREPARATIONS AND BRIEFINGS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN A TIMELY MANNER. AS PF; I WAS PARTICULARLY THOROUGH IN BRIEFING THE DEP PROC DUE TO THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE SNA DEP PROFILE. AFTER ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED; WE PUSHED BACK 5 MINS EARLY. PUSHBACK AND ENG START WERE UNEVENTFUL. AFTER ENG START; SNA GND CTL INFORMED US WE HAD A WHEELS-UP TIME OF XA25. AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC TO TAXI TO RWY 19R; WE ACCOMPLISHED ALL PRE-TKOF PROCS AND CHKLISTS. UPON REACHING RWY 19R AND SWITCHING TO THE TWR CTLR; I ADVISED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO PREPARE FOR TKOF. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE WERE TOLD BY THE TWR CTLR TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. AS WE WERE DOING THIS; THE TWR CTLR CLRED US FOR TKOF; NOTING THE NEXT ARR TO RWY 19R WAS ON A DOWNWIND LEG. CAPT TAXIED THE ACFT INTO POS; STOPPED; SET THE PARKING BRAKE; AND XFERRED ACFT CTL TO ME. I ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIVING ACFT CTL; RAN THE ENGS UP TO 1.10 EPR; AND WHILE HOLDING THE BRAKES MANUALLY; RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE. I FURTHER RAN THE ENGS UP TO TOGA PWR; AND UPON REACHING TOGA PWR RELEASED THE BRAKES. DUE TO THE LIGHTNESS OF THE ACFT (APPROX 116000 LBS); ACCELERATION WAS RAPID. AFTER ROTATION; INITIAL ACFT ATTITUDE WAS APPROX 20-25 DEGS NOSE-UP. THE ENTIRE DEP PROFILE WAS FLOWN ACCURATELY AND SMOOTHLY. AFTER CLEANING UP AND COMPLETING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST; WE WERE GIVEN FURTHER CLB CLRNC BY SOCAL. AFTER A BRIEF CONVERSATION; CAPT THEN INFORMED ME AND SOCAL DEP THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DIVERT INTO ZZZ BECAUSE OF AN INJURY SUFFERED BY ONE OF OUR FLT ATTENDANTS. I LEVELED THE ACFT OFF AT 11000 FT AND COMPLIED WITH A TURN AS INSTRUCTED BY ATC. AT THIS POINT; OUR ACARS UNIT DISPLAYED A 'NO COM' MESSAGE; WHICH HANDICAPPED OUR EFFORTS TO COM WITH DISPATCH AND ZZZ OPS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT CAPT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB PRIORITIZING HIS DUTIES IN EFFECTING OUR DIVERT INTO ZZZ. AFTER ACCOMPLISHING A LNDG BRIEF AND COMPLETING THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS; WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO LAND. AFTER LNDG; XFERRING ACFT CTL; AND ACCOMPLISHING OUR AFTER LNDG FLOWS; WE PARKED. AFTER SHUTDOWN; WE WERE MET AT THE GATE BY THE PARAMEDICS AND THE INFLT SUPVR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 788958: I DEBRIEFED THE REMAINING FLT ATTENDANTS AND LEARNED THAT THEY ALL DID HEAR THE PREPARE PA ANNOUNCEMENT; HAD WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO GET INTO THEIR SEATS AND CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE QUITE A NUMBER OF OPEN SEATS IN THE BACK TO JUMP INTO IF IT BECAME NECESSARY. I TALKED WITH THE AFT FLT ATTENDANT ABOUT HER FLYING PARTNER MISSING FOR THE TKOF. WHAT WAS THAT LIKE? SHE HOPED THAT SHE MUST HAVE MADE IT INTO A SEAT OR SAT DOWN ON THE FLOOR. ADDITIONALLY; SHE DID NOT WANT TO CALL THE COCKPIT FOR STERILE COCKPIT PROTOCOL AND FEAR OF CAUSING AN ABORT. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE HIGH FREQ; HIGH WORKLOAD FLYING THAT THE AIRBUS FLEET DOES; HAS SOMEWHAT (FOR ME ANYWAY) DESENSITIZED THE EXPERIENCE OF FLYING QUICK TURNS AND UNUSUAL PROCS LIKE THE SNA 10-7C. EARLY ON; I WOULD HAVE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED MY FO; THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX; NOW IT SEEMS EXCESSIVE. WITH THE UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF HRS PER MONTH WE ARE ALL NOW SUBJECT TO; PART OF THE COPING MECHANISM IS TO CUT OUT MANY PERCEIVED UNNECESSARY AND REDUNDANT BEHAVIORS. THIS MIGHT BE SOME SORT OF 'ENERGY CONSERVATION' WE ADAPT TO; IN ORDER TO GET OURSELVES THROUGH MONTH AFTER MONTH. ALTHOUGH FATIGUE (SLEEP) WAS NOT A FACTOR (WE SHOWED UP FOR WORK WELL RESTED) WE MAY WANT TO LOOK AT THE INSIDIOUS EFFECTS THE TYPE OF FLYING IS HAVING ON OUR CREWS. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE FLT ATTENDANT KNEW SHE HAD TO GET INTO HER JUMPSEAT; BUT THE TIMELINESS AND URGENCY HAD BEEN DIMINISHED BY THESE FACTORS AND RESULTED IN AN INJURY?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.