Narrative:

I was undergoing a recurrent evaluate with 2 flight instructors in 2 aircraft. I had not flown either of these particular planes before. The right seat instructor was simultaneously being evaled for his skills by the back seat instructor. The plan was to fly the C172 to another airport; then switch to a C182 for type specific work; the return to our field in the C172. During the preflight; the chronometer was found inoperative with no placard. I couldn't find a placard and the chief inspector said 'let's just go.' really an far violation. Just after rotation on takeoff; I noticed the engine RPM exceed the redline by 250 RPM. I commented that the engine RPM was abnormally above redline and was going to go back. The chief instructor said they had just changed the tach and it had the wrong markings and maintenance had forgotten to placard the aircraft. I should have terminated the flight due to 2 violations of far's and grounded the plane; but felt pressured because my company required recurrent had expired and I would have been grounded until everything could be planned again; it had taken 3 months the first time. We switched aircraft to the C182 and in doing the weight and balance found that section was missing from the aircraft manual and there were no other copies in the plane or available. I had the correct weight and balance figured out from home; but an incomplete manual is another far violation. I then found the ELT battery was expired. We were able to operate under an far exception for training with 50 NM; but I think it; though legal; was a poor decision. Later I crossed a hold line at an uncontrolled airport without announcing intentions. There was no traffic and no conflict but it showed a real CRM issue when none of 3 people questioned whether we were going to stop. None of the 4 problems; except perhaps the runway incursion; were an imminent safety issue; but they are definitely the kind of choices you see highlighted in NTSB reports. It also showed the cpr safety issue when 3 crew members; all highly qualified and with many yrs with the company; all accepted decision which directly violated far's. I will never make those choices again nor let anyone persuade me to make them.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PVT PLT UNDERGOING RECURRENT EVAL BROKE NUMEROUS FARS AND HAD A RWY INCURSION; CITING SCHEDULING PRESSURE AS THE MAIN REASON FOR ACCEPTING AND MAKING POOR DECISIONS.

Narrative: I WAS UNDERGOING A RECURRENT EVAL WITH 2 FLT INSTRUCTORS IN 2 ACFT. I HAD NOT FLOWN EITHER OF THESE PARTICULAR PLANES BEFORE. THE R SEAT INSTRUCTOR WAS SIMULTANEOUSLY BEING EVALED FOR HIS SKILLS BY THE BACK SEAT INSTRUCTOR. THE PLAN WAS TO FLY THE C172 TO ANOTHER ARPT; THEN SWITCH TO A C182 FOR TYPE SPECIFIC WORK; THE RETURN TO OUR FIELD IN THE C172. DURING THE PREFLT; THE CHRONOMETER WAS FOUND INOP WITH NO PLACARD. I COULDN'T FIND A PLACARD AND THE CHIEF INSPECTOR SAID 'LET'S JUST GO.' REALLY AN FAR VIOLATION. JUST AFTER ROTATION ON TKOF; I NOTICED THE ENG RPM EXCEED THE REDLINE BY 250 RPM. I COMMENTED THAT THE ENG RPM WAS ABNORMALLY ABOVE REDLINE AND WAS GOING TO GO BACK. THE CHIEF INSTRUCTOR SAID THEY HAD JUST CHANGED THE TACH AND IT HAD THE WRONG MARKINGS AND MAINT HAD FORGOTTEN TO PLACARD THE ACFT. I SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE FLT DUE TO 2 VIOLATIONS OF FAR'S AND GNDED THE PLANE; BUT FELT PRESSURED BECAUSE MY COMPANY REQUIRED RECURRENT HAD EXPIRED AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN GNDED UNTIL EVERYTHING COULD BE PLANNED AGAIN; IT HAD TAKEN 3 MONTHS THE FIRST TIME. WE SWITCHED ACFT TO THE C182 AND IN DOING THE WT AND BAL FOUND THAT SECTION WAS MISSING FROM THE ACFT MANUAL AND THERE WERE NO OTHER COPIES IN THE PLANE OR AVAILABLE. I HAD THE CORRECT WT AND BAL FIGURED OUT FROM HOME; BUT AN INCOMPLETE MANUAL IS ANOTHER FAR VIOLATION. I THEN FOUND THE ELT BATTERY WAS EXPIRED. WE WERE ABLE TO OPERATE UNDER AN FAR EXCEPTION FOR TRAINING WITH 50 NM; BUT I THINK IT; THOUGH LEGAL; WAS A POOR DECISION. LATER I CROSSED A HOLD LINE AT AN UNCTLED ARPT WITHOUT ANNOUNCING INTENTIONS. THERE WAS NO TFC AND NO CONFLICT BUT IT SHOWED A REAL CRM ISSUE WHEN NONE OF 3 PEOPLE QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE GOING TO STOP. NONE OF THE 4 PROBS; EXCEPT PERHAPS THE RWY INCURSION; WERE AN IMMINENT SAFETY ISSUE; BUT THEY ARE DEFINITELY THE KIND OF CHOICES YOU SEE HIGHLIGHTED IN NTSB RPTS. IT ALSO SHOWED THE CPR SAFETY ISSUE WHEN 3 CREW MEMBERS; ALL HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND WITH MANY YRS WITH THE COMPANY; ALL ACCEPTED DECISION WHICH DIRECTLY VIOLATED FAR'S. I WILL NEVER MAKE THOSE CHOICES AGAIN NOR LET ANYONE PERSUADE ME TO MAKE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.