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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 790323 |
Time | |
Date | 200806 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ord.airport |
State Reference | IL |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach controller : departure |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller military : 3 controller radar : 23 controller time certified in position1 : 10 |
ASRS Report | 790323 |
Events | |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA |
Primary Problem | FAA |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : c90.tracon |
Narrative:
When a 'no ord 2 SID' aircraft departs ord; and that aircraft will depart toward mdw and dpa airports; the operations at mdw and dpa are not protected. The flm/tmc advises the side line and foul line flm/controller in charge. They may or may not give a call sign to the foul line. Operations at mdw and/or dpa are not suspended until the 'no ord 2 SID' aircraft departs. It is simply assumed that separation will not be lost or worse. Most of the 'no ord 2 SID' aircraft are heavy type aircraft. Regardless of how slim the possibility of a mishap; there is still a possibility of exactly that happening. There is a real need to protect the user and the controllers; and the FAA is not doing so. When a 'no ord 2 SID' aircraft departs on an ord plan X or 9's confign; a traffic is protected with the help of a procedure that issues these aircraft a 330 degree heading and the north satellite/east departure/north departure position being notified with a call sign. Perfect! Proposed solution: establish a procedure for all 'no ord 2 SID' aircraft that depart ord.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C90 CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ORD 2 SID PROC WITH REGARD TO SEPARATION FROM DPA AND MDW TFC; SUGGESTING NEW PROC BE DEVISED.
Narrative: WHEN A 'NO ORD 2 SID' ACFT DEPARTS ORD; AND THAT ACFT WILL DEPART TOWARD MDW AND DPA ARPTS; THE OPS AT MDW AND DPA ARE NOT PROTECTED. THE FLM/TMC ADVISES THE SIDE LINE AND FOUL LINE FLM/CIC. THEY MAY OR MAY NOT GIVE A CALL SIGN TO THE FOUL LINE. OPS AT MDW AND/OR DPA ARE NOT SUSPENDED UNTIL THE 'NO ORD 2 SID' ACFT DEPARTS. IT IS SIMPLY ASSUMED THAT SEPARATION WILL NOT BE LOST OR WORSE. MOST OF THE 'NO ORD 2 SID' ACFT ARE HVY TYPE ACFT. REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIM THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISHAP; THERE IS STILL A POSSIBILITY OF EXACTLY THAT HAPPENING. THERE IS A REAL NEED TO PROTECT THE USER AND THE CTLRS; AND THE FAA IS NOT DOING SO. WHEN A 'NO ORD 2 SID' ACFT DEPARTS ON AN ORD PLAN X OR 9'S CONFIGN; A TFC IS PROTECTED WITH THE HELP OF A PROC THAT ISSUES THESE ACFT A 330 DEG HDG AND THE N SATELLITE/E DEP/N DEP POS BEING NOTIFIED WITH A CALL SIGN. PERFECT! PROPOSED SOLUTION: ESTABLISH A PROC FOR ALL 'NO ORD 2 SID' ACFT THAT DEPART ORD.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.