Narrative:

During flight en route to ZZZ; a clearance was issued to my flight to hold at abc intersection as published with 10 mi legs at FL290 with efc time of XA05Z; due to thunderstorms in the area. Prior to these instructions we had been cleared to xyz VOR; so I reprogrammed the FMS for abc intersection. I began looking for the published hold on the commercial charts; and I xferred the controls to the first officer. He acknowledged the xfer of controls. While I was looking for the inbound radial; he began to program the FMS for the hold. After he had made the inputs; we reviewed the hold. This is where the mistake was made. The first officer accidentally put in 10 min legs instead of 10 mi legs. I misread the information partly due to the placement of the inputs on the FMS hold page; but primarily from my distraction with the length of the efc time; which immediately indicated that we would be unable to complete the flight as planned. At this point; another sequence in the chain developed as I was determining; long range cruise fuel burns; for a new decision fuel. The first officer interrupted me to give me his take on the new decision fuel. I should have realized he was not 'flying' the airplane at this point; while he was going through the flight plan. I then resumed planning for a diversion for fuel when the time came for it. Simultaneously; I was running the radar to ensure that the cumulus below was not going to build up and into our flight path. As I was finishing up current plans for a fuel stop in ZZZ1 I notice the FMS map display did not look right. At this moment center; queried us on our leg length; then stated we were 25 mi from abc. Center reclred us to the intersection. There was no conflict with any other aircraft. I then restated to the first officer that he had the controls. He emphatically acknowledged this. As the PIC; this incident was my fault in that I did not recognize that the first officer had input the incorrect hold; and that I did not properly monitor his actions as the PF. On my part; I failed to accomplish the above actions due to a high workload; and an anxiousness to just get through the day. I believe that the first officer's failure to maintain situational awareness was due to him being eager to prove himself to me; that he knew his stuff. With no disrespect to him; this eagerness to prove oneself to the captain is a common thread with first officer's that are products of the very expensive and/or bridge program flight schools. It is also possible that the first officer was distraction by wanting to observe my methods for dealing with the situation. Again; though as the PIC; it was my responsibility; and I will try to objectively look at how I run my flight deck to ascertain if it is negatively affecting my first officer's performance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CAPT TRANSFERRED FLYING TO THE FO AS HE PLANNED FOR A FUEL STOP AND AS THE ACFT ENTERED HOLDING. THE FO EXTENDED THE HOLDING LEG TOO FAR.

Narrative: DURING FLT ENRTE TO ZZZ; A CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO MY FLT TO HOLD AT ABC INTXN AS PUBLISHED WITH 10 MI LEGS AT FL290 WITH EFC TIME OF XA05Z; DUE TO TSTMS IN THE AREA. PRIOR TO THESE INSTRUCTIONS WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO XYZ VOR; SO I REPROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR ABC INTXN. I BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE PUBLISHED HOLD ON THE COMMERCIAL CHARTS; AND I XFERRED THE CTLS TO THE FO. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE XFER OF CTLS. WHILE I WAS LOOKING FOR THE INBOUND RADIAL; HE BEGAN TO PROGRAM THE FMS FOR THE HOLD. AFTER HE HAD MADE THE INPUTS; WE REVIEWED THE HOLD. THIS IS WHERE THE MISTAKE WAS MADE. THE FO ACCIDENTALLY PUT IN 10 MIN LEGS INSTEAD OF 10 MI LEGS. I MISREAD THE INFO PARTLY DUE TO THE PLACEMENT OF THE INPUTS ON THE FMS HOLD PAGE; BUT PRIMARILY FROM MY DISTR WITH THE LENGTH OF THE EFC TIME; WHICH IMMEDIATELY INDICATED THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE FLT AS PLANNED. AT THIS POINT; ANOTHER SEQUENCE IN THE CHAIN DEVELOPED AS I WAS DETERMINING; LONG RANGE CRUISE FUEL BURNS; FOR A NEW DECISION FUEL. THE FO INTERRUPTED ME TO GIVE ME HIS TAKE ON THE NEW DECISION FUEL. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED HE WAS NOT 'FLYING' THE AIRPLANE AT THIS POINT; WHILE HE WAS GOING THROUGH THE FLT PLAN. I THEN RESUMED PLANNING FOR A DIVERSION FOR FUEL WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR IT. SIMULTANEOUSLY; I WAS RUNNING THE RADAR TO ENSURE THAT THE CUMULUS BELOW WAS NOT GOING TO BUILD UP AND INTO OUR FLT PATH. AS I WAS FINISHING UP CURRENT PLANS FOR A FUEL STOP IN ZZZ1 I NOTICE THE FMS MAP DISPLAY DID NOT LOOK RIGHT. AT THIS MOMENT CTR; QUERIED US ON OUR LEG LENGTH; THEN STATED WE WERE 25 MI FROM ABC. CTR RECLRED US TO THE INTXN. THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER ACFT. I THEN RESTATED TO THE FO THAT HE HAD THE CTLS. HE EMPHATICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. AS THE PIC; THIS INCIDENT WAS MY FAULT IN THAT I DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE FO HAD INPUT THE INCORRECT HOLD; AND THAT I DID NOT PROPERLY MONITOR HIS ACTIONS AS THE PF. ON MY PART; I FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ABOVE ACTIONS DUE TO A HIGH WORKLOAD; AND AN ANXIOUSNESS TO JUST GET THROUGH THE DAY. I BELIEVE THAT THE FO'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS DUE TO HIM BEING EAGER TO PROVE HIMSELF TO ME; THAT HE KNEW HIS STUFF. WITH NO DISRESPECT TO HIM; THIS EAGERNESS TO PROVE ONESELF TO THE CAPT IS A COMMON THREAD WITH FO'S THAT ARE PRODUCTS OF THE VERY EXPENSIVE AND/OR BRIDGE PROGRAM FLT SCHOOLS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE FO WAS DISTR BY WANTING TO OBSERVE MY METHODS FOR DEALING WITH THE SIT. AGAIN; THOUGH AS THE PIC; IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY; AND I WILL TRY TO OBJECTIVELY LOOK AT HOW I RUN MY FLT DECK TO ASCERTAIN IF IT IS NEGATIVELY AFFECTING MY FO'S PERFORMANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.