Narrative:

The flight was uneventful until landing in ZZZ where shortly after a normal approach; touchdown and manually deploying the speed brakes (they were deferred as was the antiskid and the autobrakes) a right main tire blew out. I do not think I put the brakes on early; but may have done so prior to the normal 80 KTS. Deploying the speed brake manually is abnormal. In the future; with the antiskid inoperative; no autobrakes and no automatic speed brakes; I will have the first officer land so I can deploy the speed brakes and he or she can focus on the landing. Shortly after landing there was a 'pop' sound and the aircraft markedly slowed in a bumpy deceleration. We stopped a little to the right of the centerline of runway xx with about 6500 ft remaining. I told the passenger to remain seated at the same time I heard the tower declaring an emergency for us; sending aircraft around; and closing the runway. We called for the emergency response crew to check out our aircraft; got out the QRH; and were preparing for the evacuate/evacuation; if necessary. Meanwhile we had gotten a call from the flight attendants telling us a jumpseater from another carrier wanted to speak to me. When he got on the interphone he said that there was a lot of smoke coming from the wheel well and it did not look normal. I could begin to smell smoke; but was not sure if it was just from the blown out tire or from a fire. Just then the first officer informed me that the fire department had hosed down our wheel well. I was still waiting to hear if we were safe and whether we needed to evacuate/evacuation. We were never given the safe signal; which is the baseball type safe sign; but given a signal which appeared to be an 'ok' sign; made with the thumb and forefinger of both hands. I called on the discrete emergency frequency and got a verbal safe from the emergency crew. I was not sure what this 'ok' signal meant and never got the baseball type safe signal. We never got a wheel well fire indication in the cockpit. The emergency response team said they wanted us to evacuate/evacuation but to wait for the stairs and for us to not use the slides for the evacuate/evacuation. My first officer sent an ACARS message to dispatch and called maintenance to tell them we had blown a tire on landing and we were on the runway. I had wanted my first officer to call station and dispatch; we miscommunicated and he called maintenance instead. I subsequently called operations to ask for a passenger agent supervisor to assist with our 2 unaccompanied minors. We kept the flight attendants informed of the plans as they transpired and also talked to the passenger assuring them all was well and that we would get them off the aircraft as soon as possible. We had elected to start the APU and shut both the engines down since it was so hot out and we wanted to keep the passenger as comfortable as possible while we waited to evacuate/evacuation. The stairs arrived quickly at the forward entry door; which we opened once the stairs were in place. The airplane was getting warm due to the outside temperature; but was not unpleasant. We did not begin to deplane the passenger until the busses arrived to take them to the terminal. All passenger were deplaned; we ran the shutdown checklist and deplaned with our 2 unaccompanied minors and a passenger agent supervisor. I spoke to a flight manager in ZZZ and also to dispatch to answer any remaining questions. Dispatch later called me very upset that I had not called them on the phone; but I had been speaking with the flight manager and later to an assistant chief pilot. I was distraction by this and did not think of calling dispatch. I thought that talking to the flight manager was sufficient. It was not; as I was subsequently informed of by dispatch and answered several questions they had for me. I was able to find our flight attendants and see how they were doing and get feedback from them; to learn about anything they felt we could have done better. The one thing that came up was it appeared that the 'C' flight attendant said she thought that there was a fire in the wheel well and this was not communicated to either me or to the 'a' flight attendant. The 'a' flight attendant said he would have blown the slides had he known this. It was shortly after I was told by the jumpseater that we had smoke that my first officer told me we had been sprayed. It seemed forever to get the safe verbal message from the emergency crew. I was not aware that there had been an actual fire till it was all over. Once we had everyone off the plane the firemen all told me they were very grateful that I had not blown the slides. I am grateful that we got everyone off safely and have learned a tremendous amount from this unfortunate event. Better communication. Better procedures not dispatching an aircraft into a hot field with inoperative speed brakes; autobrakes and antiskid. The emergency response team needs to be clear in its signals and communication. Flight operations could assist the pilots to make sure that dispatch is satisfied. The flight attendants could communicate with the pilots and each other more effectively. Supplemental information from acn 791030: the fire crew had seen us land and was on the roll before we even had a chance to call on the radio. Neither I nor the captain actually declared an emergency since the tower and fire trucks were already in action. Callback conversation with reporter acn 791317 revealed the following information: the captain reported the crash fire rescue equipment crews were already on the field conducting training when the event occurred. This facilitated their rapid response. She stressed the conflicting messages from differing sources and the way those conflicts made decision making regarding initiating an emergency evacuation more complex. She also stressed the lack of crash fire rescue equipment initiated communication to keep the flight crew informed. All information had to be solicited by the flight crew rather than being proactively directed to them on a timely basis.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHED TO A HIGH ALT; HOT ARPT WITH INOPERATIVE AUTOBRAKES; ANTISKID AND AUTOSPEEDBRAKES; B737-300 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES BLOWN TIRES ON RIGHT MAIN GEAR UPON LNDG.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL LNDG IN ZZZ WHERE SHORTLY AFTER A NORMAL APCH; TOUCHDOWN AND MANUALLY DEPLOYING THE SPD BRAKES (THEY WERE DEFERRED AS WAS THE ANTISKID AND THE AUTOBRAKES) A R MAIN TIRE BLEW OUT. I DO NOT THINK I PUT THE BRAKES ON EARLY; BUT MAY HAVE DONE SO PRIOR TO THE NORMAL 80 KTS. DEPLOYING THE SPD BRAKE MANUALLY IS ABNORMAL. IN THE FUTURE; WITH THE ANTISKID INOP; NO AUTOBRAKES AND NO AUTO SPD BRAKES; I WILL HAVE THE FO LAND SO I CAN DEPLOY THE SPD BRAKES AND HE OR SHE CAN FOCUS ON THE LNDG. SHORTLY AFTER LNDG THERE WAS A 'POP' SOUND AND THE ACFT MARKEDLY SLOWED IN A BUMPY DECELERATION. WE STOPPED A LITTLE TO THE R OF THE CTRLINE OF RWY XX WITH ABOUT 6500 FT REMAINING. I TOLD THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED AT THE SAME TIME I HEARD THE TWR DECLARING AN EMER FOR US; SENDING ACFT AROUND; AND CLOSING THE RWY. WE CALLED FOR THE EMER RESPONSE CREW TO CHK OUT OUR ACFT; GOT OUT THE QRH; AND WERE PREPARING FOR THE EVAC; IF NECESSARY. MEANWHILE WE HAD GOTTEN A CALL FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS TELLING US A JUMPSEATER FROM ANOTHER CARRIER WANTED TO SPEAK TO ME. WHEN HE GOT ON THE INTERPHONE HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF SMOKE COMING FROM THE WHEEL WELL AND IT DID NOT LOOK NORMAL. I COULD BEGIN TO SMELL SMOKE; BUT WAS NOT SURE IF IT WAS JUST FROM THE BLOWN OUT TIRE OR FROM A FIRE. JUST THEN THE FO INFORMED ME THAT THE FIRE DEPT HAD HOSED DOWN OUR WHEEL WELL. I WAS STILL WAITING TO HEAR IF WE WERE SAFE AND WHETHER WE NEEDED TO EVAC. WE WERE NEVER GIVEN THE SAFE SIGNAL; WHICH IS THE BASEBALL TYPE SAFE SIGN; BUT GIVEN A SIGNAL WHICH APPEARED TO BE AN 'OK' SIGN; MADE WITH THE THUMB AND FOREFINGER OF BOTH HANDS. I CALLED ON THE DISCRETE EMER FREQ AND GOT A VERBAL SAFE FROM THE EMER CREW. I WAS NOT SURE WHAT THIS 'OK' SIGNAL MEANT AND NEVER GOT THE BASEBALL TYPE SAFE SIGNAL. WE NEVER GOT A WHEEL WELL FIRE INDICATION IN THE COCKPIT. THE EMER RESPONSE TEAM SAID THEY WANTED US TO EVAC BUT TO WAIT FOR THE STAIRS AND FOR US TO NOT USE THE SLIDES FOR THE EVAC. MY FO SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH AND CALLED MAINT TO TELL THEM WE HAD BLOWN A TIRE ON LNDG AND WE WERE ON THE RWY. I HAD WANTED MY FO TO CALL STATION AND DISPATCH; WE MISCOMMUNICATED AND HE CALLED MAINT INSTEAD. I SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED OPS TO ASK FOR A PAX AGENT SUPVR TO ASSIST WITH OUR 2 UNACCOMPANIED MINORS. WE KEPT THE FLT ATTENDANTS INFORMED OF THE PLANS AS THEY TRANSPIRED AND ALSO TALKED TO THE PAX ASSURING THEM ALL WAS WELL AND THAT WE WOULD GET THEM OFF THE ACFT ASAP. WE HAD ELECTED TO START THE APU AND SHUT BOTH THE ENGS DOWN SINCE IT WAS SO HOT OUT AND WE WANTED TO KEEP THE PAX AS COMFORTABLE AS POSSIBLE WHILE WE WAITED TO EVAC. THE STAIRS ARRIVED QUICKLY AT THE FORWARD ENTRY DOOR; WHICH WE OPENED ONCE THE STAIRS WERE IN PLACE. THE AIRPLANE WAS GETTING WARM DUE TO THE OUTSIDE TEMP; BUT WAS NOT UNPLEASANT. WE DID NOT BEGIN TO DEPLANE THE PAX UNTIL THE BUSSES ARRIVED TO TAKE THEM TO THE TERMINAL. ALL PAX WERE DEPLANED; WE RAN THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST AND DEPLANED WITH OUR 2 UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AND A PAX AGENT SUPVR. I SPOKE TO A FLT MGR IN ZZZ AND ALSO TO DISPATCH TO ANSWER ANY REMAINING QUESTIONS. DISPATCH LATER CALLED ME VERY UPSET THAT I HAD NOT CALLED THEM ON THE PHONE; BUT I HAD BEEN SPEAKING WITH THE FLT MGR AND LATER TO AN ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT. I WAS DISTR BY THIS AND DID NOT THINK OF CALLING DISPATCH. I THOUGHT THAT TALKING TO THE FLT MGR WAS SUFFICIENT. IT WAS NOT; AS I WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED OF BY DISPATCH AND ANSWERED SEVERAL QUESTIONS THEY HAD FOR ME. I WAS ABLE TO FIND OUR FLT ATTENDANTS AND SEE HOW THEY WERE DOING AND GET FEEDBACK FROM THEM; TO LEARN ABOUT ANYTHING THEY FELT WE COULD HAVE DONE BETTER. THE ONE THING THAT CAME UP WAS IT APPEARED THAT THE 'C' FLT ATTENDANT SAID SHE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A FIRE IN THE WHEEL WELL AND THIS WAS NOT COMMUNICATED TO EITHER ME OR TO THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT. THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT SAID HE WOULD HAVE BLOWN THE SLIDES HAD HE KNOWN THIS. IT WAS SHORTLY AFTER I WAS TOLD BY THE JUMPSEATER THAT WE HAD SMOKE THAT MY FO TOLD ME WE HAD BEEN SPRAYED. IT SEEMED FOREVER TO GET THE SAFE VERBAL MESSAGE FROM THE EMER CREW. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN ACTUAL FIRE TILL IT WAS ALL OVER. ONCE WE HAD EVERYONE OFF THE PLANE THE FIREMEN ALL TOLD ME THEY WERE VERY GRATEFUL THAT I HAD NOT BLOWN THE SLIDES. I AM GRATEFUL THAT WE GOT EVERYONE OFF SAFELY AND HAVE LEARNED A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT FROM THIS UNFORTUNATE EVENT. BETTER COM. BETTER PROCS NOT DISPATCHING AN ACFT INTO A HOT FIELD WITH INOP SPD BRAKES; AUTOBRAKES AND ANTISKID. THE EMER RESPONSE TEAM NEEDS TO BE CLR IN ITS SIGNALS AND COM. FLT OPS COULD ASSIST THE PLTS TO MAKE SURE THAT DISPATCH IS SATISFIED. THE FLT ATTENDANTS COULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE PLTS AND EACH OTHER MORE EFFECTIVELY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 791030: THE FIRE CREW HAD SEEN US LAND AND WAS ON THE ROLL BEFORE WE EVEN HAD A CHANCE TO CALL ON THE RADIO. NEITHER I NOR THE CAPT ACTUALLY DECLARED AN EMER SINCE THE TWR AND FIRE TRUCKS WERE ALREADY IN ACTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 791317 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPTAIN REPORTED THE CFR CREWS WERE ALREADY ON THE FIELD CONDUCTING TRAINING WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED. THIS FACILITATED THEIR RAPID RESPONSE. SHE STRESSED THE CONFLICTING MESSAGES FROM DIFFERING SOURCES AND THE WAY THOSE CONFLICTS MADE DECISION MAKING REGARDING INITIATING AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION MORE COMPLEX. SHE ALSO STRESSED THE LACK OF CFR INITIATED COMMUNICATION TO KEEP THE FLT CREW INFORMED. ALL INFORMATION HAD TO BE SOLICITED BY THE FLT CREW RATHER THAN BEING PROACTIVELY DIRECTED TO THEM ON A TIMELY BASIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.