Narrative:

Received clearance prior to taxi. Departure included use of airways; rather than the published SID; for which I had prepared. In my haste to depart; I reviewed the chart and made mental notes about the route. I had concerns regarding building severe thunderstorms north of the airport. The departure clearance appeared to take me that direction. Departed under IFR flight plan in VMC from abq airport. Initial climb out was normal; and approach assigned me 11000 ft for the initial climb. The MEA for the assigned victor airway was 9000 ft; there was some communication back and forth regarding that altitude and I was assigned and accepted the clearance to climb to 13000 ft. My initial vector was to the north. I requested vectors direct tcc; but was informed that they would have to wait until I reached 13000 ft. Departure control then assigned me 'turn right direct to nelge intersection on course...it's on the santa flight engineer 232 degree radial' and immediately shipped me to ZAB controller. I tuned and checked in. When I heard him say '232;' I automatically tuned 232 in the main VOR receiver; when I should have tuned 052. This resulted in momentary; but acute loss of situational awareness; because in my confusion I incorrectly assumed I was heading in the wrong direction (aircraft in positive control at all time). I began a turn to the right; but then realized that there was something incorrect about the situation and rolled out; however; I had turned through the radial and drifted right of course. I had the terrain in sight and was well above by this time (about 12000 ft) and the looming thunderstorm ahead of me to the north was causing me alarm and making me quite concerned that I needed a turn to the east as quickly as possible. Requested vectors direct tcc VORTAC and was cleared direct upon reaching 13000 ft. I decided that I was safe and took a moment to take stock and review the situation and get back on course. Too late. Then was queried whether or not I had terrain in sight. I replied in the affirmative. I was then cleared direct tcc and the flight proceeded and concluded normally. I should have: 1) asked for clarification of the departure procedure as assigned. 2) asked for clarification or assistance when it became apparent that I did not have a firm grasp on my navigation orientation. 3) I should have done a more thorough job of setting up my navigation instruments before departing. I had only prepared 1 radio receiver with preset frequencys. I could have had the next radial tuned in ahead of time in navigation #2. 4) I should have asked whether or not the thunderstorms were being taken into consideration when assigning me northerly vectors. 5) had better situational awareness in general. The problem was caused by my lack of mental preparation before departure; my haste and concern with the thunderstorm's proximity; which overrode my previous calm mind as well as my lack of familiarity with the airport and departure environment; resulting in my confusion and lack of situational awareness. Additionally; I did not adequately communication my situation to the controllers. There was; I believe; a general lack of effective communication between controllers and pilot. I was not sure what they wanted me to do and I don't think they understood what I was asking for. I will do those things which are under my control to do in the future; especially considering the frequency of CFIT incidents and FAA's concern about same. I will review CFIT information; including web-based training and re-fly the scenario in a flight simulator to reinforce lessons learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PILOT BECOMES CONFUSED DEPARTING ABQ TO THE NORTH WHEN GIVEN DIRECT NELGE ON THE SAF 232 DEGREE RADIAL.

Narrative: RECEIVED CLRNC PRIOR TO TAXI. DEP INCLUDED USE OF AIRWAYS; RATHER THAN THE PUBLISHED SID; FOR WHICH I HAD PREPARED. IN MY HASTE TO DEPART; I REVIEWED THE CHART AND MADE MENTAL NOTES ABOUT THE RTE. I HAD CONCERNS REGARDING BUILDING SEVERE TSTMS N OF THE ARPT. THE DEP CLRNC APPEARED TO TAKE ME THAT DIRECTION. DEPARTED UNDER IFR FLT PLAN IN VMC FROM ABQ ARPT. INITIAL CLBOUT WAS NORMAL; AND APCH ASSIGNED ME 11000 FT FOR THE INITIAL CLB. THE MEA FOR THE ASSIGNED VICTOR AIRWAY WAS 9000 FT; THERE WAS SOME COM BACK AND FORTH REGARDING THAT ALT AND I WAS ASSIGNED AND ACCEPTED THE CLRNC TO CLB TO 13000 FT. MY INITIAL VECTOR WAS TO THE N. I REQUESTED VECTORS DIRECT TCC; BUT WAS INFORMED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL I REACHED 13000 FT. DEP CTL THEN ASSIGNED ME 'TURN R DIRECT TO NELGE INTXN ON COURSE...IT'S ON THE SANTA FE 232 DEG RADIAL' AND IMMEDIATELY SHIPPED ME TO ZAB CTLR. I TUNED AND CHKED IN. WHEN I HEARD HIM SAY '232;' I AUTOMATICALLY TUNED 232 IN THE MAIN VOR RECEIVER; WHEN I SHOULD HAVE TUNED 052. THIS RESULTED IN MOMENTARY; BUT ACUTE LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; BECAUSE IN MY CONFUSION I INCORRECTLY ASSUMED I WAS HEADING IN THE WRONG DIRECTION (ACFT IN POSITIVE CTL AT ALL TIME). I BEGAN A TURN TO THE R; BUT THEN REALIZED THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING INCORRECT ABOUT THE SITUATION AND ROLLED OUT; HOWEVER; I HAD TURNED THROUGH THE RADIAL AND DRIFTED R OF COURSE. I HAD THE TERRAIN IN SIGHT AND WAS WELL ABOVE BY THIS TIME (ABOUT 12000 FT) AND THE LOOMING TSTM AHEAD OF ME TO THE N WAS CAUSING ME ALARM AND MAKING ME QUITE CONCERNED THAT I NEEDED A TURN TO THE E AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. REQUESTED VECTORS DIRECT TCC VORTAC AND WAS CLRED DIRECT UPON REACHING 13000 FT. I DECIDED THAT I WAS SAFE AND TOOK A MOMENT TO TAKE STOCK AND REVIEW THE SITUATION AND GET BACK ON COURSE. TOO LATE. THEN WAS QUERIED WHETHER OR NOT I HAD TERRAIN IN SIGHT. I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. I WAS THEN CLRED DIRECT TCC AND THE FLT PROCEEDED AND CONCLUDED NORMALLY. I SHOULD HAVE: 1) ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE DEP PROC AS ASSIGNED. 2) ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OR ASSISTANCE WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT I DID NOT HAVE A FIRM GRASP ON MY NAV ORIENTATION. 3) I SHOULD HAVE DONE A MORE THOROUGH JOB OF SETTING UP MY NAV INSTS BEFORE DEPARTING. I HAD ONLY PREPARED 1 RADIO RECEIVER WITH PRESET FREQS. I COULD HAVE HAD THE NEXT RADIAL TUNED IN AHEAD OF TIME IN NAV #2. 4) I SHOULD HAVE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THE TSTMS WERE BEING TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN ASSIGNING ME NORTHERLY VECTORS. 5) HAD BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN GENERAL. THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY MY LACK OF MENTAL PREPARATION BEFORE DEP; MY HASTE AND CONCERN WITH THE TSTM'S PROX; WHICH OVERRODE MY PREVIOUS CALM MIND AS WELL AS MY LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT AND DEP ENVIRONMENT; RESULTING IN MY CONFUSION AND LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. ADDITIONALLY; I DID NOT ADEQUATELY COM MY SITUATION TO THE CTLRS. THERE WAS; I BELIEVE; A GENERAL LACK OF EFFECTIVE COM BTWN CTLRS AND PLT. I WAS NOT SURE WHAT THEY WANTED ME TO DO AND I DON'T THINK THEY UNDERSTOOD WHAT I WAS ASKING FOR. I WILL DO THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE UNDER MY CTL TO DO IN THE FUTURE; ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE FREQ OF CFIT INCIDENTS AND FAA'S CONCERN ABOUT SAME. I WILL REVIEW CFIT INFO; INCLUDING WEB-BASED TRAINING AND RE-FLY THE SCENARIO IN A FLT SIMULATOR TO REINFORCE LESSONS LEARNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.