Narrative:

My day started with only 4 hours of sleep the night before. We had been delayed due to maintenance and ATC did not arrive to our layover until XA15 local. It took time for me to fall asleep which occurred around XB15; awoken for a bathroom break at XB40; then back to sleep until XF00. Once I woke up my mind started to race thinking about everything that is going on with the company and my day/life in general. I was unable to fall back asleep. The night before at home I had only received 6 hours of sleep; so now I was setting myself up for a 12 hour 30 mins duty day with 4 legs and only 10 hours sleep total in 2 days. On our 3RD leg dfw to den I told captain that I was going to be unable to complete the last leg den to mci. He commented that he too was tired and we decided to send the crew desk an acar's message indicating that we would be fatigued upon arrival in den and would not go any further. We sent the message approximately 1 hour 30 mins out from our scheduled arrival time in den to give company the chance to re-crew the flight. En route to den WX had built both on the arrival and around the airport. Thunderstorms required a hold. First hold assigned was the intersection hymns on the quail 5 arrival. This hold placed us too close to a cell so we requested holding over laa and was granted the request. 30 mins expected hold. We were released from holding and told to proceed direct quail; quail 5. At this point the arrival was being closed in on both sides of the course by thunderstorms and this route was not going to work. We advised ATC and was told to now proceed to hbu and the larks 5 arrival. Our new routing put our landing fuel at 3.6. Proceeding to den was not looking like a viable option as cells were to the south (cos divert) and to the north (cys divert). Going to den and having a miss would have boxed us in an unsafe position. We continued on the hbu clearance expecting not to have to fly all the way to hbu; thus having more fuel upon arrival in den. In mins ATC advised den was closed due to WX and holding was going to occur. We decided to divert to cos. On the ground safely at cos we attempted to coordinate with the local company station to help in handling our passenger. Company had set up a gas and go. We were told that we could not have a gate and operations expected us to fuel up and continue to den. We; on the other hand were tired and told the crew desk and dispatch that we would not be flying to den that night and to arrange buses for our passenger to get them to den. There was pressure felt on our part from the company to 'complete' the mission and fly to den. Pressure came from the part of: 1) company position stating that we could not park at a gate and unload our passenger. They said they were not allowed to operate the jet bridges for company aircraft. (A lie we later found out because we ended parking at gate 7 that night.) they wanted us to gas and go to den. 2) after telling cos operations multiple times that we were not continuing on to den they refused to begin the process of assisting our passenger until operations called them. This delayed the disembarking of our passenger by at least 45 additional mins. 3) again; after telling operations that we were not going to den they sent out a fuel truck anyways. I had the fueling process stopped before a hook up as we require either an airstairs or jetbridge hook up during fueling. Yes; we can fuel without the above requirements as well by having the flight attendants at their stations; but it made no sense to reduce the safety of our passenger and ourselves when it was not necessary. Why would we need gas if we were not continuing to den that night? 4) even after sending an acar's message that we would be too fatigued to fly the den to mci trip (which was acknowledged by the crew desk as we received an acar's message back to call them upon landing in den) and after my captain called our crew desk on the ground in cos to tell them that we were not going to fly anymore that night; my captain was patched through to the duty manager to explain our position. Why should a fodm (duty manager) have to be involved when a crew says they are too tired to fly anymore? Granted; it sounded like the fodm was not trying to pilot push; but just the fact that the crew desk says; 'well; you have to talk to the fodm;' statement has the intimidation enough within it. 5) monetary consideration. No; this did not enter into our equation to call in fatigue; but I can guarantee it does for many line pilots. When we call in fatigued we lose the pay we would have received on the non-flown portion. Losing 5 hours of pay is a big hit to our pay checks and I'm sure there are flts flying that should not because of this consideration. Should it be happening? No. Does it? Yes reality is sometimes scarier than fiction. Unfortunately; the result of fatigue many times is contributed to the scheduling practices at company. With all the stresses of the past 7 yrs since 9/11; the flight schedules that have us working long days; little continuity in sleep patterns; pilot pushing by maintenance; few days off; the loss of marriages; the loss of loved ones; lack of support by management; poor layover properties; pilot pushing by the crew desk; the list goes on and on; it is a wonder we have not had a hull loss. I just finished training a week ago. It is interesting to see that the company has idented many areas that create fatigue among our crews; yet the company spends thousands of dollars a yr lobbying to keep the rest recommendations from the NTSB from being implemented. The problems have been idented; solutions are available; the next step is to implement them. I took away from my training class that the company will not hassle the crew member when they feel too tired to fly. In fact; my initial impression was the company would support our decision. Yesterday was a clear indication by the lack of help and pushback from the crew desk that nothing has changed here. Please feel free to call me with any questions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-500 REPORT DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC AND GENERIC FORMS OF PLT FATIGUE EXACERBATED BY COMPANY SCHEDULING PRACTICES AND ENDORSED BY REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

Narrative: MY DAY STARTED WITH ONLY 4 HRS OF SLEEP THE NIGHT BEFORE. WE HAD BEEN DELAYED DUE TO MAINT AND ATC DID NOT ARRIVE TO OUR LAYOVER UNTIL XA15 LCL. IT TOOK TIME FOR ME TO FALL ASLEEP WHICH OCCURRED AROUND XB15; AWOKEN FOR A BATHROOM BREAK AT XB40; THEN BACK TO SLEEP UNTIL XF00. ONCE I WOKE UP MY MIND STARTED TO RACE THINKING ABOUT EVERYTHING THAT IS GOING ON WITH THE COMPANY AND MY DAY/LIFE IN GENERAL. I WAS UNABLE TO FALL BACK ASLEEP. THE NIGHT BEFORE AT HOME I HAD ONLY RECEIVED 6 HRS OF SLEEP; SO NOW I WAS SETTING MYSELF UP FOR A 12 HR 30 MINS DUTY DAY WITH 4 LEGS AND ONLY 10 HRS SLEEP TOTAL IN 2 DAYS. ON OUR 3RD LEG DFW TO DEN I TOLD CAPT THAT I WAS GOING TO BE UNABLE TO COMPLETE THE LAST LEG DEN TO MCI. HE COMMENTED THAT HE TOO WAS TIRED AND WE DECIDED TO SEND THE CREW DESK AN ACAR'S MESSAGE INDICATING THAT WE WOULD BE FATIGUED UPON ARR IN DEN AND WOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER. WE SENT THE MESSAGE APPROX 1 HR 30 MINS OUT FROM OUR SCHEDULED ARR TIME IN DEN TO GIVE COMPANY THE CHANCE TO RE-CREW THE FLT. ENRTE TO DEN WX HAD BUILT BOTH ON THE ARR AND AROUND THE ARPT. TSTMS REQUIRED A HOLD. FIRST HOLD ASSIGNED WAS THE INTXN HYMNS ON THE QUAIL 5 ARR. THIS HOLD PLACED US TOO CLOSE TO A CELL SO WE REQUESTED HOLDING OVER LAA AND WAS GRANTED THE REQUEST. 30 MINS EXPECTED HOLD. WE WERE RELEASED FROM HOLDING AND TOLD TO PROCEED DIRECT QUAIL; QUAIL 5. AT THIS POINT THE ARR WAS BEING CLOSED IN ON BOTH SIDES OF THE COURSE BY TSTMS AND THIS RTE WAS NOT GOING TO WORK. WE ADVISED ATC AND WAS TOLD TO NOW PROCEED TO HBU AND THE LARKS 5 ARR. OUR NEW RTING PUT OUR LNDG FUEL AT 3.6. PROCEEDING TO DEN WAS NOT LOOKING LIKE A VIABLE OPTION AS CELLS WERE TO THE S (COS DIVERT) AND TO THE N (CYS DIVERT). GOING TO DEN AND HAVING A MISS WOULD HAVE BOXED US IN AN UNSAFE POS. WE CONTINUED ON THE HBU CLRNC EXPECTING NOT TO HAVE TO FLY ALL THE WAY TO HBU; THUS HAVING MORE FUEL UPON ARR IN DEN. IN MINS ATC ADVISED DEN WAS CLOSED DUE TO WX AND HOLDING WAS GOING TO OCCUR. WE DECIDED TO DIVERT TO COS. ON THE GND SAFELY AT COS WE ATTEMPTED TO COORDINATE WITH THE LCL COMPANY STATION TO HELP IN HANDLING OUR PAX. COMPANY HAD SET UP A GAS AND GO. WE WERE TOLD THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE A GATE AND OPS EXPECTED US TO FUEL UP AND CONTINUE TO DEN. WE; ON THE OTHER HAND WERE TIRED AND TOLD THE CREW DESK AND DISPATCH THAT WE WOULD NOT BE FLYING TO DEN THAT NIGHT AND TO ARRANGE BUSES FOR OUR PAX TO GET THEM TO DEN. THERE WAS PRESSURE FELT ON OUR PART FROM THE COMPANY TO 'COMPLETE' THE MISSION AND FLY TO DEN. PRESSURE CAME FROM THE PART OF: 1) COMPANY POS STATING THAT WE COULD NOT PARK AT A GATE AND UNLOAD OUR PAX. THEY SAID THEY WERE NOT ALLOWED TO OPERATE THE JET BRIDGES FOR COMPANY ACFT. (A LIE WE LATER FOUND OUT BECAUSE WE ENDED PARKING AT GATE 7 THAT NIGHT.) THEY WANTED US TO GAS AND GO TO DEN. 2) AFTER TELLING COS OPS MULTIPLE TIMES THAT WE WERE NOT CONTINUING ON TO DEN THEY REFUSED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF ASSISTING OUR PAX UNTIL OPS CALLED THEM. THIS DELAYED THE DISEMBARKING OF OUR PAX BY AT LEAST 45 ADDITIONAL MINS. 3) AGAIN; AFTER TELLING OPS THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO DEN THEY SENT OUT A FUEL TRUCK ANYWAYS. I HAD THE FUELING PROCESS STOPPED BEFORE A HOOK UP AS WE REQUIRE EITHER AN AIRSTAIRS OR JETBRIDGE HOOK UP DURING FUELING. YES; WE CAN FUEL WITHOUT THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS AS WELL BY HAVING THE FLT ATTENDANTS AT THEIR STATIONS; BUT IT MADE NO SENSE TO REDUCE THE SAFETY OF OUR PAX AND OURSELVES WHEN IT WAS NOT NECESSARY. WHY WOULD WE NEED GAS IF WE WERE NOT CONTINUING TO DEN THAT NIGHT? 4) EVEN AFTER SENDING AN ACAR'S MESSAGE THAT WE WOULD BE TOO FATIGUED TO FLY THE DEN TO MCI TRIP (WHICH WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE CREW DESK AS WE RECEIVED AN ACAR'S MESSAGE BACK TO CALL THEM UPON LNDG IN DEN) AND AFTER MY CAPT CALLED OUR CREW DESK ON THE GND IN COS TO TELL THEM THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO FLY ANYMORE THAT NIGHT; MY CAPT WAS PATCHED THROUGH TO THE DUTY MGR TO EXPLAIN OUR POS. WHY SHOULD A FODM (DUTY MGR) HAVE TO BE INVOLVED WHEN A CREW SAYS THEY ARE TOO TIRED TO FLY ANYMORE? GRANTED; IT SOUNDED LIKE THE FODM WAS NOT TRYING TO PLT PUSH; BUT JUST THE FACT THAT THE CREW DESK SAYS; 'WELL; YOU HAVE TO TALK TO THE FODM;' STATEMENT HAS THE INTIMIDATION ENOUGH WITHIN IT. 5) MONETARY CONSIDERATION. NO; THIS DID NOT ENTER INTO OUR EQUATION TO CALL IN FATIGUE; BUT I CAN GUARANTEE IT DOES FOR MANY LINE PLTS. WHEN WE CALL IN FATIGUED WE LOSE THE PAY WE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED ON THE NON-FLOWN PORTION. LOSING 5 HRS OF PAY IS A BIG HIT TO OUR PAY CHKS AND I'M SURE THERE ARE FLTS FLYING THAT SHOULD NOT BECAUSE OF THIS CONSIDERATION. SHOULD IT BE HAPPENING? NO. DOES IT? YES REALITY IS SOMETIMES SCARIER THAN FICTION. UNFORTUNATELY; THE RESULT OF FATIGUE MANY TIMES IS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SCHEDULING PRACTICES AT COMPANY. WITH ALL THE STRESSES OF THE PAST 7 YRS SINCE 9/11; THE FLT SCHEDULES THAT HAVE US WORKING LONG DAYS; LITTLE CONTINUITY IN SLEEP PATTERNS; PLT PUSHING BY MAINT; FEW DAYS OFF; THE LOSS OF MARRIAGES; THE LOSS OF LOVED ONES; LACK OF SUPPORT BY MGMNT; POOR LAYOVER PROPERTIES; PLT PUSHING BY THE CREW DESK; THE LIST GOES ON AND ON; IT IS A WONDER WE HAVE NOT HAD A HULL LOSS. I JUST FINISHED TRAINING A WK AGO. IT IS INTERESTING TO SEE THAT THE COMPANY HAS IDENTED MANY AREAS THAT CREATE FATIGUE AMONG OUR CREWS; YET THE COMPANY SPENDS THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS A YR LOBBYING TO KEEP THE REST RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NTSB FROM BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE PROBS HAVE BEEN IDENTED; SOLUTIONS ARE AVAILABLE; THE NEXT STEP IS TO IMPLEMENT THEM. I TOOK AWAY FROM MY TRAINING CLASS THAT THE COMPANY WILL NOT HASSLE THE CREW MEMBER WHEN THEY FEEL TOO TIRED TO FLY. IN FACT; MY INITIAL IMPRESSION WAS THE COMPANY WOULD SUPPORT OUR DECISION. YESTERDAY WAS A CLR INDICATION BY THE LACK OF HELP AND PUSHBACK FROM THE CREW DESK THAT NOTHING HAS CHANGED HERE. PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CALL ME WITH ANY QUESTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.