Distractions with other pushback traffic causes miscommunication between captain and push back crew ...

Narrative:

After receiving clearance and starting the pushback; the first officer received information from ramp stating to leave enough room for the B757 that was also pushing 2 gates to our left. The first officer passed the information to me and I passed it onto the tug driver; who acknowledged it. The tug driver stopped us short of the normal spot and said that it looked like we had enough room to maneuver so he'll stop us here. I acknowledged that call. We very shortly thereafter started moving forward. I quickly placed my feet on the brakes (they were on the rudder pedals) wondering why he was pulling us forward. I was asking what was happening when he said 'set brakes.' I chose to stop the airplane first; and then set the parking brake. I asked him what had happened and he said that he forgot to tell me to set the brake. I estimate we rolled 1-2 ft after towbar disconnection. There are a number of issues here. First; our procedures don't adequately cover instructions issued after pushback as far as SOP's are concerned. Second; distrs affect all of us; pilots; rampers; everyone. The tug driver was distraction by my call to avoid the other aircraft and also to stop short of where he normally would. The human factors guys will tell you that the 'mental checklist' he uses had a check mark in the 'say set brakes' part of his procedure as soon as he said that he was stopping here as we had enough room; because that was the normal point in the procedure where he said 'set brakes.' no one was hurt; no damage was done; and there was no intention of wrong-doing. But it's easy to see where one omission in an SOP can became a bit scary. I was ready to take action (and was about to) when he noticed the problem and properly made the call to set the parking brake. Neither my first officer nor the rest of my crew were involved in this incident in any other way than as passenger. The first officer was strictly following SOP's and was working the ramp frequency and not monitoring the conversation with the tug driver.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISTRACTIONS WITH OTHER PUSHBACK TRAFFIC CAUSES MISCOMMUNICATION BETWEEN CAPT AND PUSH BACK CREW OF A319. FAILURE TO SET PARKING BRAKE PRIOR TO DISCONNECT ENSUES.

Narrative: AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC AND STARTING THE PUSHBACK; THE FO RECEIVED INFO FROM RAMP STATING TO LEAVE ENOUGH ROOM FOR THE B757 THAT WAS ALSO PUSHING 2 GATES TO OUR L. THE FO PASSED THE INFO TO ME AND I PASSED IT ONTO THE TUG DRIVER; WHO ACKNOWLEDGED IT. THE TUG DRIVER STOPPED US SHORT OF THE NORMAL SPOT AND SAID THAT IT LOOKED LIKE WE HAD ENOUGH ROOM TO MANEUVER SO HE'LL STOP US HERE. I ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CALL. WE VERY SHORTLY THEREAFTER STARTED MOVING FORWARD. I QUICKLY PLACED MY FEET ON THE BRAKES (THEY WERE ON THE RUDDER PEDALS) WONDERING WHY HE WAS PULLING US FORWARD. I WAS ASKING WHAT WAS HAPPENING WHEN HE SAID 'SET BRAKES.' I CHOSE TO STOP THE AIRPLANE FIRST; AND THEN SET THE PARKING BRAKE. I ASKED HIM WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HE SAID THAT HE FORGOT TO TELL ME TO SET THE BRAKE. I ESTIMATE WE ROLLED 1-2 FT AFTER TOWBAR DISCONNECTION. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES HERE. FIRST; OUR PROCS DON'T ADEQUATELY COVER INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED AFTER PUSHBACK AS FAR AS SOP'S ARE CONCERNED. SECOND; DISTRS AFFECT ALL OF US; PLTS; RAMPERS; EVERYONE. THE TUG DRIVER WAS DISTR BY MY CALL TO AVOID THE OTHER ACFT AND ALSO TO STOP SHORT OF WHERE HE NORMALLY WOULD. THE HUMAN FACTORS GUYS WILL TELL YOU THAT THE 'MENTAL CHKLIST' HE USES HAD A CHK MARK IN THE 'SAY SET BRAKES' PART OF HIS PROC AS SOON AS HE SAID THAT HE WAS STOPPING HERE AS WE HAD ENOUGH ROOM; BECAUSE THAT WAS THE NORMAL POINT IN THE PROC WHERE HE SAID 'SET BRAKES.' NO ONE WAS HURT; NO DAMAGE WAS DONE; AND THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF WRONG-DOING. BUT IT'S EASY TO SEE WHERE ONE OMISSION IN AN SOP CAN BECAME A BIT SCARY. I WAS READY TO TAKE ACTION (AND WAS ABOUT TO) WHEN HE NOTICED THE PROB AND PROPERLY MADE THE CALL TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE. NEITHER MY FO NOR THE REST OF MY CREW WERE INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT IN ANY OTHER WAY THAN AS PAX. THE FO WAS STRICTLY FOLLOWING SOP'S AND WAS WORKING THE RAMP FREQ AND NOT MONITORING THE CONVERSATION WITH THE TUG DRIVER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	791918
Time
Date	200806
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A319
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : pushback
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 3000
ASRS Report	791918
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	other personnel other
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies other anomaly
Independent Detector	other other : 2
Resolutory Action	flight crew : regained aircraft control
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Company Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Ambiguous

Distractions with other pushback traffic causes miscommunication between captain and push back crew of A319. Failure to set parking brake prior to disconnect ensues.