Narrative:

I was the PF. I had a stabilized approach and landing. I knew they were using the 14's; but I overlooked that runway 18 was also being used. I neglected to brief my runway exit point specifically; I just mentioned that we would exit to the right. Upon rollout; I saw runway 18 and applied the brakes as the autobrakes were off with 9500 ft of runway and good VMC WX. I asked the captain; as I was slowing down to make the runway intersection; it he wanted the runway; he said 'sure' and we xferred controls. Upon the entry onto runway 18; which was an active runway; but not being used by any aircraft on final or takeoff; tower kindly reminded us that runway 18 was an active runway and that we needed clearance to enter it. I usually query tower if runway is available for taxi; but it got me today. I do feel that if I was more informative on my approach briefing declaring a specific taxiway to turn off with a possibility of a runway exit; I feel that we as a crew would not have committed this runway incursion. Also; if I read the ATIS more thoroughly and saw that runway 18 was an active runway; I know that I would probably just roll through the active and take the next available taxiway. There was no need to take runway 18 for performance reasons as we landed well within the touchdown zone. The need was felt to be since we were running approximately 10 mins late with a short turnaround that a shorter taxi to the ramp and gate would be good. But I know that the above stated reason would never have happened with a proper runway exit brief and better situational awareness. Supplemental information from acn 792264: an immediate exit was made onto the parallel taxiway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLT CREW RPTS TURNING ONTO RWY 18 WITHOUT CLRNC AFTER LNDG RWY 14R AT OMA.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF. I HAD A STABILIZED APCH AND LNDG. I KNEW THEY WERE USING THE 14'S; BUT I OVERLOOKED THAT RWY 18 WAS ALSO BEING USED. I NEGLECTED TO BRIEF MY RWY EXIT POINT SPECIFICALLY; I JUST MENTIONED THAT WE WOULD EXIT TO THE R. UPON ROLLOUT; I SAW RWY 18 AND APPLIED THE BRAKES AS THE AUTOBRAKES WERE OFF WITH 9500 FT OF RWY AND GOOD VMC WX. I ASKED THE CAPT; AS I WAS SLOWING DOWN TO MAKE THE RWY INTXN; IT HE WANTED THE RWY; HE SAID 'SURE' AND WE XFERRED CTLS. UPON THE ENTRY ONTO RWY 18; WHICH WAS AN ACTIVE RWY; BUT NOT BEING USED BY ANY ACFT ON FINAL OR TKOF; TWR KINDLY REMINDED US THAT RWY 18 WAS AN ACTIVE RWY AND THAT WE NEEDED CLRNC TO ENTER IT. I USUALLY QUERY TWR IF RWY IS AVAILABLE FOR TAXI; BUT IT GOT ME TODAY. I DO FEEL THAT IF I WAS MORE INFORMATIVE ON MY APCH BRIEFING DECLARING A SPECIFIC TXWY TO TURN OFF WITH A POSSIBILITY OF A RWY EXIT; I FEEL THAT WE AS A CREW WOULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED THIS RWY INCURSION. ALSO; IF I READ THE ATIS MORE THOROUGHLY AND SAW THAT RWY 18 WAS AN ACTIVE RWY; I KNOW THAT I WOULD PROBABLY JUST ROLL THROUGH THE ACTIVE AND TAKE THE NEXT AVAILABLE TXWY. THERE WAS NO NEED TO TAKE RWY 18 FOR PERFORMANCE REASONS AS WE LANDED WELL WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. THE NEED WAS FELT TO BE SINCE WE WERE RUNNING APPROX 10 MINS LATE WITH A SHORT TURNAROUND THAT A SHORTER TAXI TO THE RAMP AND GATE WOULD BE GOOD. BUT I KNOW THAT THE ABOVE STATED REASON WOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED WITH A PROPER RWY EXIT BRIEF AND BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 792264: AN IMMEDIATE EXIT WAS MADE ONTO THE PARALLEL TXWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.