Narrative:

While climbing; I recognized a threat on the TCAS at 6 NM and 200 or 300 ft above our altitude. I figured that it was a VFR cirrus that ATC had previously advised us of. Our rate of climb was modest and I told the first officer to get us climbing. I think I pointed out the threat. The first officer pitched the autoplt up a couple degrees. I made a hand signal of get it climbing; now! A few seconds later we got a 'descend' RA. The first officer followed the RA with my concurrence. Then we got 'monitor vertical speed.' the first officer followed the command. Then we got a 'climb' RA. The first officer followed the command with my monitoring and concurrence. The series of RA's and our compliance put us in a collision path with the cirrus. Fortunately; the cirrus saw us as evidenced by his banking sharply away from us. We saw the cirrus also and banked away the opposite direction...but it was the cirrus actions that made the greater difference and our action that made the lesser difference in avoiding a collision. I reported the RA to ATC. Our maneuvering was not enough to constitute a deviation from our 'climb' clearance and probably went unnoticed by ATC. The short answer is that the actions of the cirrus and the sum of all our ATC clrncs and plting decisions led us to the same point (nearly) at the same point in time. I saw the cirrus with only a couple seconds to react; when I saw the cirrus; it was already obvious that we would not collide. The first officer must have seen the cirrus a half second before I did as he had just started a bank away from it when I saw it. The cirrus must have seen us a couple seconds before we saw it as it was banking aggressively away from us. I think my threat recognition was pretty good. Each time there was a decision; I had two less than optimal choices and chose the one I thought less bad. When I told the first officer to climb; I recognized the cirrus was above us at 6 NM; we were already climbing; and I figured we had enough time to get well above the cirrus; which we did (have enough time had we not had the RA's). When the RA told us to descend; I recognized it was putting us back down in the threat path and chose to comply. When the RA told us to climb; I recognized it was putting us back up to the threat path and chose to comply. (More accurately just did not overrule the PF that was complying.) I figured the risk of not complying with the RA was greater than the risk of complying. We are trained to comply. Also; in the last 2 mi to the cirrus I had lost track of where exactly the cirrus was to us on the TCAS and was just looking out the window for it and monitoring TCAS RA compliance. While I was trying to see the cirrus out the window; monitor the first officer; monitor the RA's; ATC was trying to get my attention to another aircraft; a saab. I think that the saab was 2 mi off the right wing and 1300 ft above. Our assigned altitudes had been changing every few seconds; almost since 5000 ft. We were probably at about 13500 ft at the time of this report. I remembered being cleared to 17000 ft...the first officer remembered this changed to 14000 ft. (After the fact recollections -- we were both straight with altitude and altitude select in at time of event.) if we had maneuvered with more vigor to escape the (perceived) cirrus prior to the RA; would we have had an altitude deviation and a loss of IFR separation with the saab? I don't know. Would there have been a similar issue with a different aircraft if I had said 'descend;' instead of 'climb' initially? I don't know. We made our best decision with what we had to work with. It would be interesting to know more about this. I wrote what I could remember 10 mins after the fact for this report. Human memory is fallible. More light could be shed if the NASA report could include our radio xmissions with center and radar track. The aircraft voice recorders and data recorders could shed more light where memory is fallible; but it is almost certainly too late for that.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR PILOT DESCRIBES A SERIES OF TCAS DESCEND; CLB; AND MONITOR VS RA'S IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME WHILE DEPARTING CLASS B AIRSPACE AT 13;500 FT.

Narrative: WHILE CLBING; I RECOGNIZED A THREAT ON THE TCAS AT 6 NM AND 200 OR 300 FT ABOVE OUR ALT. I FIGURED THAT IT WAS A VFR CIRRUS THAT ATC HAD PREVIOUSLY ADVISED US OF. OUR RATE OF CLB WAS MODEST AND I TOLD THE FO TO GET US CLBING. I THINK I POINTED OUT THE THREAT. THE FO PITCHED THE AUTOPLT UP A COUPLE DEGS. I MADE A HAND SIGNAL OF GET IT CLBING; NOW! A FEW SECONDS LATER WE GOT A 'DSND' RA. THE FO FOLLOWED THE RA WITH MY CONCURRENCE. THEN WE GOT 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' THE FO FOLLOWED THE COMMAND. THEN WE GOT A 'CLB' RA. THE FO FOLLOWED THE COMMAND WITH MY MONITORING AND CONCURRENCE. THE SERIES OF RA'S AND OUR COMPLIANCE PUT US IN A COLLISION PATH WITH THE CIRRUS. FORTUNATELY; THE CIRRUS SAW US AS EVIDENCED BY HIS BANKING SHARPLY AWAY FROM US. WE SAW THE CIRRUS ALSO AND BANKED AWAY THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION...BUT IT WAS THE CIRRUS ACTIONS THAT MADE THE GREATER DIFFERENCE AND OUR ACTION THAT MADE THE LESSER DIFFERENCE IN AVOIDING A COLLISION. I RPTED THE RA TO ATC. OUR MANEUVERING WAS NOT ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE A DEV FROM OUR 'CLB' CLRNC AND PROBABLY WENT UNNOTICED BY ATC. THE SHORT ANSWER IS THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE CIRRUS AND THE SUM OF ALL OUR ATC CLRNCS AND PLTING DECISIONS LED US TO THE SAME POINT (NEARLY) AT THE SAME POINT IN TIME. I SAW THE CIRRUS WITH ONLY A COUPLE SECONDS TO REACT; WHEN I SAW THE CIRRUS; IT WAS ALREADY OBVIOUS THAT WE WOULD NOT COLLIDE. THE FO MUST HAVE SEEN THE CIRRUS A HALF SECOND BEFORE I DID AS HE HAD JUST STARTED A BANK AWAY FROM IT WHEN I SAW IT. THE CIRRUS MUST HAVE SEEN US A COUPLE SECONDS BEFORE WE SAW IT AS IT WAS BANKING AGGRESSIVELY AWAY FROM US. I THINK MY THREAT RECOGNITION WAS PRETTY GOOD. EACH TIME THERE WAS A DECISION; I HAD TWO LESS THAN OPTIMAL CHOICES AND CHOSE THE ONE I THOUGHT LESS BAD. WHEN I TOLD THE FO TO CLB; I RECOGNIZED THE CIRRUS WAS ABOVE US AT 6 NM; WE WERE ALREADY CLBING; AND I FIGURED WE HAD ENOUGH TIME TO GET WELL ABOVE THE CIRRUS; WHICH WE DID (HAVE ENOUGH TIME HAD WE NOT HAD THE RA'S). WHEN THE RA TOLD US TO DSND; I RECOGNIZED IT WAS PUTTING US BACK DOWN IN THE THREAT PATH AND CHOSE TO COMPLY. WHEN THE RA TOLD US TO CLB; I RECOGNIZED IT WAS PUTTING US BACK UP TO THE THREAT PATH AND CHOSE TO COMPLY. (MORE ACCURATELY JUST DID NOT OVERRULE THE PF THAT WAS COMPLYING.) I FIGURED THE RISK OF NOT COMPLYING WITH THE RA WAS GREATER THAN THE RISK OF COMPLYING. WE ARE TRAINED TO COMPLY. ALSO; IN THE LAST 2 MI TO THE CIRRUS I HAD LOST TRACK OF WHERE EXACTLY THE CIRRUS WAS TO US ON THE TCAS AND WAS JUST LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW FOR IT AND MONITORING TCAS RA COMPLIANCE. WHILE I WAS TRYING TO SEE THE CIRRUS OUT THE WINDOW; MONITOR THE FO; MONITOR THE RA'S; ATC WAS TRYING TO GET MY ATTN TO ANOTHER ACFT; A SAAB. I THINK THAT THE SAAB WAS 2 MI OFF THE R WING AND 1300 FT ABOVE. OUR ASSIGNED ALTS HAD BEEN CHANGING EVERY FEW SECONDS; ALMOST SINCE 5000 FT. WE WERE PROBABLY AT ABOUT 13500 FT AT THE TIME OF THIS RPT. I REMEMBERED BEING CLRED TO 17000 FT...THE FO REMEMBERED THIS CHANGED TO 14000 FT. (AFTER THE FACT RECOLLECTIONS -- WE WERE BOTH STRAIGHT WITH ALT AND ALT SELECT IN AT TIME OF EVENT.) IF WE HAD MANEUVERED WITH MORE VIGOR TO ESCAPE THE (PERCEIVED) CIRRUS PRIOR TO THE RA; WOULD WE HAVE HAD AN ALTDEV AND A LOSS OF IFR SEPARATION WITH THE SAAB? I DON'T KNOW. WOULD THERE HAVE BEEN A SIMILAR ISSUE WITH A DIFFERENT ACFT IF I HAD SAID 'DSND;' INSTEAD OF 'CLB' INITIALLY? I DON'T KNOW. WE MADE OUR BEST DECISION WITH WHAT WE HAD TO WORK WITH. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS. I WROTE WHAT I COULD REMEMBER 10 MINS AFTER THE FACT FOR THIS RPT. HUMAN MEMORY IS FALLIBLE. MORE LIGHT COULD BE SHED IF THE NASA RPT COULD INCLUDE OUR RADIO XMISSIONS WITH CTR AND RADAR TRACK. THE ACFT VOICE RECORDERS AND DATA RECORDERS COULD SHED MORE LIGHT WHERE MEMORY IS FALLIBLE; BUT IT IS ALMOST CERTAINLY TOO LATE FOR THAT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.