A maintenance controller describes the events that led to their company's CL600-900 bombardier aircr...

Attributes
ACN	793222
Time
Date	200807
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : sna.tower
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	CRJ 900 (all) Canadair Regional Jet 900
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	other personnel other
ASRS Report	793222
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far
Independent Detector	other other : 1
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : briefing performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft
Primary Problem	Ambiguous

Narrative:

Had aircraft in ZZZ with a refuel valve that would not close. When I got in; I was told that the r-hand refuel valve would not close and bombardier was working on letter for us to ferry the aircraft to ZZZ2 for repairs. The crew had written up the l-hand refuel valve; and what I was told is that the r-hand side was the one that was at fault. It was shown in; OTS; and also documented on the concession support letter from bombardier with issues with the r-hand side. Was told by maintenance that the r-hand side was the problem and the l-hand side was operative. This was working with outstation maintenance. The pilot in-flight; found out in-flight; that the logbook was not correct with his write-up. He notified maintenance in-flight from ZZZ. The crew then found on the ground that the l-hand sov was the one confirmed to be bad and maintenance in ZZZ2 also confirmed it. I was then notified by the crew that the l-hand valve was at fault. This aircraft had ferried in for repairs of the sov; ZZZ2 maintenance then confirmed the l-hand sov to be at fault and changed the component. Mechanic said r-hand; the information I had gotten from the concession support letter said r-hand; the system comments said r-hand. I took the word of all 3 sources and proceeded to ferry the aircraft with r-hand sov inoperative. The problem I guess was taking into account the fact that maintenance has backgnd and knowledge of the aircraft and assumed the crew was not correct in the judgement of saying that the affected valve was. Then; in turn; took the outstation maintenance word for it and the fact they troubleshot the system. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated this was the same pilot inbound and outbound who made the write-up; but who also did not catch the discrepancy with the incorrect refuel valve being stated on their CL600-900 ferry permit until they were airborne.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MAINT CONTROLLER DESCRIBES THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THEIR COMPANY'S CL600-900 BOMBARDIER ACFT BEING RELEASED FOR A FERRY FLIGHT STATING THE RH REFUEL SOV WOULD NOT CLOSE; WHEN IN FACT THE LH SOV WOULD NOT CLOSE.

Narrative: HAD ACFT IN ZZZ WITH A REFUEL VALVE THAT WOULD NOT CLOSE. WHEN I GOT IN; I WAS TOLD THAT THE R-HAND REFUEL VALVE WOULD NOT CLOSE AND BOMBARDIER WAS WORKING ON LETTER FOR US TO FERRY THE ACFT TO ZZZ2 FOR REPAIRS. THE CREW HAD WRITTEN UP THE L-HAND REFUEL VALVE; AND WHAT I WAS TOLD IS THAT THE R-HAND SIDE WAS THE ONE THAT WAS AT FAULT. IT WAS SHOWN IN; OTS; AND ALSO DOCUMENTED ON THE CONCESSION SUPPORT LETTER FROM BOMBARDIER WITH ISSUES WITH THE R-HAND SIDE. WAS TOLD BY MAINT THAT THE R-HAND SIDE WAS THE PROB AND THE L-HAND SIDE WAS OPERATIVE. THIS WAS WORKING WITH OUTSTATION MAINT. THE PLT INFLT; FOUND OUT INFLT; THAT THE LOGBOOK WAS NOT CORRECT WITH HIS WRITE-UP. HE NOTIFIED MAINT INFLT FROM ZZZ. THE CREW THEN FOUND ON THE GND THAT THE L-HAND SOV WAS THE ONE CONFIRMED TO BE BAD AND MAINT IN ZZZ2 ALSO CONFIRMED IT. I WAS THEN NOTIFIED BY THE CREW THAT THE L-HAND VALVE WAS AT FAULT. THIS ACFT HAD FERRIED IN FOR REPAIRS OF THE SOV; ZZZ2 MAINT THEN CONFIRMED THE L-HAND SOV TO BE AT FAULT AND CHANGED THE COMPONENT. MECH SAID R-HAND; THE INFO I HAD GOTTEN FROM THE CONCESSION SUPPORT LETTER SAID R-HAND; THE SYS COMMENTS SAID R-HAND. I TOOK THE WORD OF ALL 3 SOURCES AND PROCEEDED TO FERRY THE ACFT WITH R-HAND SOV INOP. THE PROB I GUESS WAS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT MAINT HAS BACKGND AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACFT AND ASSUMED THE CREW WAS NOT CORRECT IN THE JUDGEMENT OF SAYING THAT THE AFFECTED VALVE WAS. THEN; IN TURN; TOOK THE OUTSTATION MAINT WORD FOR IT AND THE FACT THEY TROUBLESHOT THE SYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THIS WAS THE SAME PILOT INBOUND AND OUTBOUND WHO MADE THE WRITE-UP; BUT WHO ALSO DID NOT CATCH THE DISCREPANCY WITH THE INCORRECT REFUEL VALVE BEING STATED ON THEIR CL600-900 FERRY PERMIT UNTIL THEY WERE AIRBORNE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A maintenance controller describes the events that led to their company's CL600-900 bombardier aircraft being released for a ferry flight stating the rh refuel sov would not close; when in fact the lh sov would not close.