Narrative:

We had both cowl anti-ice and wing anti-ice on as we exited the WX and were in the clear when we received a 'right bleed duct' warning and proceeded to start that emergency checklist just as the aft flight attendant called to notify us that there was smoke in the cabin. I immediately decided to head toward the nearest airport which was ZZZ and we continued with the emergency checklist which directed us to the 'manual bleed procedure.' we did the 'select only 1 engine as the bleed source' which directed us; as we thought; to select the 'isolation' to 'open' and the bleed source to 'left' and the bleed valves to 'manual' and the inoperative pack to 'off.' at this point; we checked the ecs page and confirmed the right bleed shutdown with the right bleed indicating 'red' and the right pack on but not operating. We also noted the left pack not operating; which we confirmed by the cabin pressure rising slowly. I asked the flight attendants again how the smoke was and the forward flight attendant said it was 'pretty bad' but 'getting better.' we were now descending toward ZZZ and getting busy with the descent and approach checks and navigation set-up to prevent us from figuring out why we did not have air flow and also did not have enough time to do the smoke removal checklist. Unfortunately; the line of WX we had diverted around southwest of ZZZ was now impacting the field as we approached. We were given vectors to the ILS approach into ZZZ and were set up on final when we noticed a heavy cell starting at the OM; but we had downtown in sight and tower said the visibility at the field was visual; so I elected to swing right around what looked like a possible microburst to re-enter a visual right base to runway Y and was back on profile somewhere between 500-1000 ft and proceeded with an uneventful landing. We had declared an emergency and had crash fire rescue equipment standing by and had them follow us to the gate and check on any passenger that may have inhaled any fumes. Apparently; none had. A 'right bleed duct' warning combined with a slight smell and the flight attendants complaining of smoke in the cabin makes the decision to divert to the nearest airport quite easy. However; the WX did complicate that decision. At the time this was submitted; maintenance was not sure what exactly happened. If it was an air cycle machine failure or bleed leak; that stuff happens. As for us selecting manual bleed left; it appears that may have been why we lost all bleed air; but at the time; getting the aircraft on the ground seemed a greater priority. It appears there is a small typo in the note saying 'it' twice instead of 'if.' the 'if' could also be bold in the checklist. I'm not sure how long it took to get the aircraft on the ground; but as we were about 40 mi away at the time of the occurrence; I think we had the plane on the ground inside of 10 mins. We did exceed 250 KTS (about 280 KTS) below 10000 ft and the final approach was close for a visual; but were never cleared for a visual as we had little time with a potential microburst along with the smoke.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ900 FLT CREW RECEIVES R BLEED DUCT WARNING WITH WING ANTI-ICE ON. WHEN SMOKE IS RPTED IN THE CABIN; THE FLT CREW DIVERTS.

Narrative: WE HAD BOTH COWL ANTI-ICE AND WING ANTI-ICE ON AS WE EXITED THE WX AND WERE IN THE CLR WHEN WE RECEIVED A 'R BLEED DUCT' WARNING AND PROCEEDED TO START THAT EMER CHKLIST JUST AS THE AFT FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO NOTIFY US THAT THERE WAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN. I IMMEDIATELY DECIDED TO HEAD TOWARD THE NEAREST ARPT WHICH WAS ZZZ AND WE CONTINUED WITH THE EMER CHKLIST WHICH DIRECTED US TO THE 'MANUAL BLEED PROC.' WE DID THE 'SELECT ONLY 1 ENG AS THE BLEED SOURCE' WHICH DIRECTED US; AS WE THOUGHT; TO SELECT THE 'ISOLATION' TO 'OPEN' AND THE BLEED SOURCE TO 'L' AND THE BLEED VALVES TO 'MANUAL' AND THE INOP PACK TO 'OFF.' AT THIS POINT; WE CHKED THE ECS PAGE AND CONFIRMED THE R BLEED SHUTDOWN WITH THE R BLEED INDICATING 'RED' AND THE R PACK ON BUT NOT OPERATING. WE ALSO NOTED THE L PACK NOT OPERATING; WHICH WE CONFIRMED BY THE CABIN PRESSURE RISING SLOWLY. I ASKED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AGAIN HOW THE SMOKE WAS AND THE FORWARD FLT ATTENDANT SAID IT WAS 'PRETTY BAD' BUT 'GETTING BETTER.' WE WERE NOW DSNDING TOWARD ZZZ AND GETTING BUSY WITH THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKS AND NAV SET-UP TO PREVENT US FROM FIGURING OUT WHY WE DID NOT HAVE AIR FLOW AND ALSO DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO DO THE SMOKE REMOVAL CHKLIST. UNFORTUNATELY; THE LINE OF WX WE HAD DIVERTED AROUND SW OF ZZZ WAS NOW IMPACTING THE FIELD AS WE APCHED. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO THE ILS APCH INTO ZZZ AND WERE SET UP ON FINAL WHEN WE NOTICED A HVY CELL STARTING AT THE OM; BUT WE HAD DOWNTOWN IN SIGHT AND TWR SAID THE VISIBILITY AT THE FIELD WAS VISUAL; SO I ELECTED TO SWING R AROUND WHAT LOOKED LIKE A POSSIBLE MICROBURST TO RE-ENTER A VISUAL R BASE TO RWY Y AND WAS BACK ON PROFILE SOMEWHERE BTWN 500-1000 FT AND PROCEEDED WITH AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. WE HAD DECLARED AN EMER AND HAD CFR STANDING BY AND HAD THEM FOLLOW US TO THE GATE AND CHK ON ANY PAX THAT MAY HAVE INHALED ANY FUMES. APPARENTLY; NONE HAD. A 'R BLEED DUCT' WARNING COMBINED WITH A SLIGHT SMELL AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS COMPLAINING OF SMOKE IN THE CABIN MAKES THE DECISION TO DIVERT TO THE NEAREST ARPT QUITE EASY. HOWEVER; THE WX DID COMPLICATE THAT DECISION. AT THE TIME THIS WAS SUBMITTED; MAINT WAS NOT SURE WHAT EXACTLY HAPPENED. IF IT WAS AN AIR CYCLE MACHINE FAILURE OR BLEED LEAK; THAT STUFF HAPPENS. AS FOR US SELECTING MANUAL BLEED L; IT APPEARS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN WHY WE LOST ALL BLEED AIR; BUT AT THE TIME; GETTING THE ACFT ON THE GND SEEMED A GREATER PRIORITY. IT APPEARS THERE IS A SMALL TYPO IN THE NOTE SAYING 'IT' TWICE INSTEAD OF 'IF.' THE 'IF' COULD ALSO BE BOLD IN THE CHKLIST. I'M NOT SURE HOW LONG IT TOOK TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND; BUT AS WE WERE ABOUT 40 MI AWAY AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE; I THINK WE HAD THE PLANE ON THE GND INSIDE OF 10 MINS. WE DID EXCEED 250 KTS (ABOUT 280 KTS) BELOW 10000 FT AND THE FINAL APCH WAS CLOSE FOR A VISUAL; BUT WERE NEVER CLRED FOR A VISUAL AS WE HAD LITTLE TIME WITH A POTENTIAL MICROBURST ALONG WITH THE SMOKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.