Narrative:

Upon landing at ZZZ on runway xx and exiting on taxiway xx; into the ramp area via Y line toward gate X. The first officer was multi-tasking doing the after landing flow; speaking with ramp control and then company radio. I asked the first officer to shut down engine #2. At which point he was clearing the right side for the pending turn into the gate; he grabbed the #1 fuel lever by mistake. As he turned his head inside to verify the lever; he also started to lower the fuel lever. Upon immediately realizing that he had started to lower the wrong lever; he raised the lever back up. A few seconds later ramp control advised us of a fire/flames coming out of our #1 engine. Although there were no indications of any engine fire in the cockpit; the first officer performed the qrc memory items for tailpipe-fire and shut down the #1 engine. Ramp then confirmed not seeing any further flames out of the #1 engine. As a precaution I requested that crash/fire rescue meet us at the gate. As a side note and as any good pilot will do; we have reviewed the events many times. To this end we can only add some possible contributing factors: 1) a long day for the first officer; that started by a commute at 11 am. Which led to 2 canceled flts and finally getting on his last flight; making for a long fatiguing by XA40 when the event occurred. 2) a long day for the captain that started with a wake up call by the crew desk by 6 am; to be notified for 'a 6 pm trip.' 3) getting to ZZZ1 and then having to wait for our late arriving inbound aircraft. Waited 1 hour. 4) mental stress due to the first officer possibly being furlough again. 5) distraction of multi-tasking 2 radio calls; after landing flow; low light conditions in the cockpit and clearing traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-500 #1 ENG HAD A TAILPIPE FIRE AFTER LNDG WHEN THE FO; MEANING TO SECURE THE #2 ENG; ACCIDENTALLY MOVED THE #1 ENG FUEL CTRL LEVER OFF THEN BACK ON.

Narrative: UPON LNDG AT ZZZ ON RWY XX AND EXITING ON TXWY XX; INTO THE RAMP AREA VIA Y LINE TOWARD GATE X. THE FO WAS MULTI-TASKING DOING THE AFTER LNDG FLOW; SPEAKING WITH RAMP CTL AND THEN COMPANY RADIO. I ASKED THE FO TO SHUT DOWN ENG #2. AT WHICH POINT HE WAS CLRING THE R SIDE FOR THE PENDING TURN INTO THE GATE; HE GRABBED THE #1 FUEL LEVER BY MISTAKE. AS HE TURNED HIS HEAD INSIDE TO VERIFY THE LEVER; HE ALSO STARTED TO LOWER THE FUEL LEVER. UPON IMMEDIATELY REALIZING THAT HE HAD STARTED TO LOWER THE WRONG LEVER; HE RAISED THE LEVER BACK UP. A FEW SECONDS LATER RAMP CTL ADVISED US OF A FIRE/FLAMES COMING OUT OF OUR #1 ENG. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF ANY ENG FIRE IN THE COCKPIT; THE FO PERFORMED THE QRC MEMORY ITEMS FOR TAILPIPE-FIRE AND SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. RAMP THEN CONFIRMED NOT SEEING ANY FURTHER FLAMES OUT OF THE #1 ENG. AS A PRECAUTION I REQUESTED THAT CRASH/FIRE RESCUE MEET US AT THE GATE. AS A SIDE NOTE AND AS ANY GOOD PLT WILL DO; WE HAVE REVIEWED THE EVENTS MANY TIMES. TO THIS END WE CAN ONLY ADD SOME POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) A LONG DAY FOR THE FO; THAT STARTED BY A COMMUTE AT 11 AM. WHICH LED TO 2 CANCELED FLTS AND FINALLY GETTING ON HIS LAST FLT; MAKING FOR A LONG FATIGUING BY XA40 WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED. 2) A LONG DAY FOR THE CAPT THAT STARTED WITH A WAKE UP CALL BY THE CREW DESK BY 6 AM; TO BE NOTIFIED FOR 'A 6 PM TRIP.' 3) GETTING TO ZZZ1 AND THEN HAVING TO WAIT FOR OUR LATE ARRIVING INBOUND ACFT. WAITED 1 HR. 4) MENTAL STRESS DUE TO THE FO POSSIBLY BEING FURLOUGH AGAIN. 5) DISTR OF MULTI-TASKING 2 RADIO CALLS; AFTER LNDG FLOW; LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS IN THE COCKPIT AND CLRING TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.