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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 795008 |
Time | |
Date | 200807 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 235 flight time type : 2600 |
ASRS Report | 795008 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 174 flight time type : 7000 |
ASRS Report | 795012 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ground encounters : animal non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
I was the PNF. WX was near perfect with light winds and VFR conditions. We were put into position and hold behind a departing company aircraft. Another company aircraft was on a 2-3 mi final when we were cleared for takeoff. All parameters were normal and all callouts were made. After the 80 KTS callout and before V1 at 125 KTS; the captain aborted the takeoff. I saw no reason for the abort and did not know why we were aborting at the time. I told the tower that we were aborting and they had us clear the runway. After clearing the runway I asked the captain the reason for the abort and after prompting found out that he decided to abort due to a bird strike. We pulled off the runway and worked with ATC and ran the abort checklist in the QRH. The captain briefly set the parking brake (2 seconds maximum) as I started to run the checklist; which states not to set the parking brake. We used the performance computer to find out our cooling time. We had the fire trucks come out due to hot brakes. One tire did melt the fuse plugs and thus went flat. After the cooling time was reached we were towed back to the gate. Communication was lacking here; my scan as the PNF was more inside than outside on the takeoff roll. Thus; I did not see the birds or know why the captain had decided to abort. Being out of the loop concerned me. A high speed abort is something not to take lightly. Not knowing why we aborted made it difficult for me initially to be a fully active crew member during this event (communications to ATC; checklist; etc). Supplemental information from acn 795012: I was the PF during takeoff. WX was clear; 10+ mi; and winds 230 degrees at 4 ks. At about 100-110 KTS during the takeoff roll; I observed some birds in our flight path. I heard an impact as several of the birds passed on the left side of the aircraft. I believed that we could have ingested them in the #1 engine and elected to reject the takeoff. I performed the memory items for a rejected takeoff; but assumed that my first officer had seen and heard the same things I had and understood what was happening. I failed to properly communication with him my intentions while I brought the airplane down to a speed at which we could clear the runway. Tower instructed us to clear the runway without delay as there was an aircraft on short final. We cleared the runway and completed the rejected takeoff checklist in the QRH. I initially set the parking brake; but only for about 2 seconds as my first officer read me the checklist which told us not to set the brake. We computed the brake energy at 24.1 with a 112000 pound airplane and brakes applied at 125 KTS. The performance computer directed us to remain clear of the gate for at least 53 mins and to notify the fire department; which we did. While we sat there; the fire department notified us that one of our tires had gone flat. After getting clearance from the fire department; who measured brake temperatures at 250 degrees and 150 degrees on the left and right respectively; we were towed back to the gate where we deplaned our customers. I should have done a better job of communicating the situation to my first officer and gotten him in the loop earlier. Once he was completely informed about our situation; he provided some invaluable insight and suggestions that contributed to the safe outcome of this event.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 CAPT ELECTS TO REJECT TKOF AT HIGH SPEED AFTER BIRD STRIKES.
Narrative: I WAS THE PNF. WX WAS NEAR PERFECT WITH LIGHT WINDS AND VFR CONDITIONS. WE WERE PUT INTO POS AND HOLD BEHIND A DEPARTING COMPANY ACFT. ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WAS ON A 2-3 MI FINAL WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. ALL PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL AND ALL CALLOUTS WERE MADE. AFTER THE 80 KTS CALLOUT AND BEFORE V1 AT 125 KTS; THE CAPT ABORTED THE TKOF. I SAW NO REASON FOR THE ABORT AND DID NOT KNOW WHY WE WERE ABORTING AT THE TIME. I TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABORTING AND THEY HAD US CLR THE RWY. AFTER CLRING THE RWY I ASKED THE CAPT THE REASON FOR THE ABORT AND AFTER PROMPTING FOUND OUT THAT HE DECIDED TO ABORT DUE TO A BIRD STRIKE. WE PULLED OFF THE RWY AND WORKED WITH ATC AND RAN THE ABORT CHKLIST IN THE QRH. THE CAPT BRIEFLY SET THE PARKING BRAKE (2 SECONDS MAX) AS I STARTED TO RUN THE CHKLIST; WHICH STATES NOT TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE. WE USED THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER TO FIND OUT OUR COOLING TIME. WE HAD THE FIRE TRUCKS COME OUT DUE TO HOT BRAKES. ONE TIRE DID MELT THE FUSE PLUGS AND THUS WENT FLAT. AFTER THE COOLING TIME WAS REACHED WE WERE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE. COM WAS LACKING HERE; MY SCAN AS THE PNF WAS MORE INSIDE THAN OUTSIDE ON THE TKOF ROLL. THUS; I DID NOT SEE THE BIRDS OR KNOW WHY THE CAPT HAD DECIDED TO ABORT. BEING OUT OF THE LOOP CONCERNED ME. A HIGH SPD ABORT IS SOMETHING NOT TO TAKE LIGHTLY. NOT KNOWING WHY WE ABORTED MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME INITIALLY TO BE A FULLY ACTIVE CREW MEMBER DURING THIS EVENT (COMS TO ATC; CHKLIST; ETC). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 795012: I WAS THE PF DURING TKOF. WX WAS CLR; 10+ MI; AND WINDS 230 DEGS AT 4 KS. AT ABOUT 100-110 KTS DURING THE TKOF ROLL; I OBSERVED SOME BIRDS IN OUR FLT PATH. I HEARD AN IMPACT AS SEVERAL OF THE BIRDS PASSED ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT. I BELIEVED THAT WE COULD HAVE INGESTED THEM IN THE #1 ENG AND ELECTED TO REJECT THE TKOF. I PERFORMED THE MEMORY ITEMS FOR A REJECTED TKOF; BUT ASSUMED THAT MY FO HAD SEEN AND HEARD THE SAME THINGS I HAD AND UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS HAPPENING. I FAILED TO PROPERLY COM WITH HIM MY INTENTIONS WHILE I BROUGHT THE AIRPLANE DOWN TO A SPD AT WHICH WE COULD CLR THE RWY. TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CLR THE RWY WITHOUT DELAY AS THERE WAS AN ACFT ON SHORT FINAL. WE CLRED THE RWY AND COMPLETED THE REJECTED TKOF CHKLIST IN THE QRH. I INITIALLY SET THE PARKING BRAKE; BUT ONLY FOR ABOUT 2 SECONDS AS MY FO READ ME THE CHKLIST WHICH TOLD US NOT TO SET THE BRAKE. WE COMPUTED THE BRAKE ENERGY AT 24.1 WITH A 112000 LB AIRPLANE AND BRAKES APPLIED AT 125 KTS. THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER DIRECTED US TO REMAIN CLR OF THE GATE FOR AT LEAST 53 MINS AND TO NOTIFY THE FIRE DEPT; WHICH WE DID. WHILE WE SAT THERE; THE FIRE DEPT NOTIFIED US THAT ONE OF OUR TIRES HAD GONE FLAT. AFTER GETTING CLRNC FROM THE FIRE DEPT; WHO MEASURED BRAKE TEMPS AT 250 DEGS AND 150 DEGS ON THE L AND R RESPECTIVELY; WE WERE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE WHERE WE DEPLANED OUR CUSTOMERS. I SHOULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF COMMUNICATING THE SITUATION TO MY FO AND GOTTEN HIM IN THE LOOP EARLIER. ONCE HE WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED ABOUT OUR SIT; HE PROVIDED SOME INVALUABLE INSIGHT AND SUGGESTIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE SAFE OUTCOME OF THIS EVENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.