Narrative:

In ZZZ2; my relief pilot found a hydraulic leak that exceeded dispatch limits by 2-4 times the dispatch limit of 30 drops per min. The flight was canceled and we were asked by maintenance to ferry the flight back across the atlantic. I said no. When I called scheduling to see what the plan was for us; they told me I had to talk to maintenance first. I was xferred to a call with 4 maintenance management on the line who proceeded to explain to me how the hydraulic system worked and why they 'imagined' the gasket would hold up for 1 more full cycle of the gear so that their request for us to ferry was entirely reasonable. I have never in over 20 yrs as a captain had a team of maintenance leaders from headquarters call me on a conference call to explain the system to me so I would understand why they 'imagined' the seal on the landing gear actuator would last another cycle. I had no other way to understand the reason for their required -- required because scheduling would not talk to me until I talked again to maintenance -- conference call other than intimidation. Alerted my union and this safety report about intimidation and use of teams of management to explain system to qualified captain and ask multiple times for me to take an airplane I had already refused. Management must accept there is in our fom such a thing as captain's authority/authorized; and it must not be interfered. It seemed to me there was a flow chart that is letting them know exactly what they can say and cannot say to strong arm us into flying broken airplanes; and it seemed they had 4 management on the line to document what was said.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF WDB REPORTS ACR ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE THE FLT CREW TO ACCEPT AN ACFT FOR A TRANSATLANTIC FERRY FLT THAT THEY HAD REFUSED DUE TO A HYDRAULIC LEAK EXCEEDING MAINT MANUAL LIMITS.

Narrative: IN ZZZ2; MY RELIEF PLT FOUND A HYD LEAK THAT EXCEEDED DISPATCH LIMITS BY 2-4 TIMES THE DISPATCH LIMIT OF 30 DROPS PER MIN. THE FLT WAS CANCELED AND WE WERE ASKED BY MAINT TO FERRY THE FLT BACK ACROSS THE ATLANTIC. I SAID NO. WHEN I CALLED SCHEDULING TO SEE WHAT THE PLAN WAS FOR US; THEY TOLD ME I HAD TO TALK TO MAINT FIRST. I WAS XFERRED TO A CALL WITH 4 MAINT MGMNT ON THE LINE WHO PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN TO ME HOW THE HYD SYS WORKED AND WHY THEY 'IMAGINED' THE GASKET WOULD HOLD UP FOR 1 MORE FULL CYCLE OF THE GEAR SO THAT THEIR REQUEST FOR US TO FERRY WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE. I HAVE NEVER IN OVER 20 YRS AS A CAPT HAD A TEAM OF MAINT LEADERS FROM HEADQUARTERS CALL ME ON A CONFERENCE CALL TO EXPLAIN THE SYS TO ME SO I WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY THEY 'IMAGINED' THE SEAL ON THE LNDG GEAR ACTUATOR WOULD LAST ANOTHER CYCLE. I HAD NO OTHER WAY TO UNDERSTAND THE REASON FOR THEIR REQUIRED -- REQUIRED BECAUSE SCHEDULING WOULD NOT TALK TO ME UNTIL I TALKED AGAIN TO MAINT -- CONFERENCE CALL OTHER THAN INTIMIDATION. ALERTED MY UNION AND THIS SAFETY RPT ABOUT INTIMIDATION AND USE OF TEAMS OF MGMNT TO EXPLAIN SYS TO QUALIFIED CAPT AND ASK MULTIPLE TIMES FOR ME TO TAKE AN AIRPLANE I HAD ALREADY REFUSED. MGMNT MUST ACCEPT THERE IS IN OUR FOM SUCH A THING AS CAPT'S AUTH; AND IT MUST NOT BE INTERFERED. IT SEEMED TO ME THERE WAS A FLOW CHART THAT IS LETTING THEM KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY CAN SAY AND CANNOT SAY TO STRONG ARM US INTO FLYING BROKEN AIRPLANES; AND IT SEEMED THEY HAD 4 MGMNT ON THE LINE TO DOCUMENT WHAT WAS SAID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.