Narrative:

This report focuses on the current fuel conservation program utilized by our air carrier and I am using as an example a flight that I flew in jul/08 in an airbus 319. The WX was good; the arrival rate into ZZZ1 was not heavy during our scheduled arrival time and the operation of the flight was about as perfect as can be expected in today's world. It took only 14 mins from pushback to takeoff. We got right up to altitude and we landed straight-in to the south which also placed us close to the gate. We were vectored twice; 10-15 degrees right of course; for traffic for about 3 mins each. Release fuel allowed 1.4 for taxi out of ZZZ2; no alternate; no contingency fuel and only 15 mins of hold fuel. Our mandatory reserve was 3.5 and the flight plan showed a shutdown fuel of 5.0. This is outside of safe boundaries in my opinion because it had no margins for the unexpected. For this to go as planned; everything had to work perfectly which is the exception and not the rule. Also; as a flight travels further west; there are fewer locations available to divert into and there are usually greater distances to travel to get to them. I added 1.7 in fuel. This increased our actual ramp weight only 357 pounds over our planned ramp weight. We took a 17 min delay past departure time to get the fuel because we received the release only 20 mins prior to departure time and it took that long to evaluate the fuel; coordination and get it on board. We still arrived 17 mins early at ZZZ1. Our shutdown fuel was 6.7 so a dispatcher or bureaucratic supervisory pilot; far removed from the real world of operations; might argue that if the 1.7 hadn't been added; we would've shut down with our scheduled 5.0 fuel. However; if we had burned all of our 1.4 taxi fuel; which would not be unusual leaving; our shutdown would've been 4.0 which is 500 pounds above our reserve. I would also point out that since the shutdown; fuel was the equivalent of 5.0; the cost of adding the additional fuel was negligible in this case. So; what do I mean by no margins for the unexpected? First; the software utilized for fuel planning has a built-in negative bias. On many rtes it falls apart on the arrival portion of the flight. On our flight we flew the STAR and the flight plan reflected no STAR waypoints instead showing us going direct to ZZZ2 and landing within 10 mins. Our actual time was 13 mins and would've been far worse if we had landed to the north. The flight plan showed us at FL220 over abc with a ground speed of 341 KTS when our actual altitude was 12000 ft; slowing to 250 KIAS. Another example is arriving in ZZZ2 from the south. Typically the flight plan shows us at FL280 over XXXX when we will always be at 15000 ft over XXXX as directed by ATC. A flight cancels and fills up another flight; increasing its payload and; therefore; its fuel burn over what is planned. Insufficient fuel allowed for taxi and no fuel available to xfer down below the takeoff minimum line. Flight is caught in a runway change either departing or arriving. An arrival runway is closed because of a disabled aircraft or other reason. Major vectors off course and/or speed changes for inbound sequencing by ATC; not an unusual occurrence. Forced to depart early from altitude or not allowed up to planned cruise altitude by ATC. WX crumps in spite of the forecast. Pulled off an ILS approach by approach control due to insufficient spacing. Handoff refused by the next ATC sector requiring a 360 degree turn by the current controller. A missed approach or even multiple missed approachs for various reasons. The fueler shorts the fuel load by a couple hundred pounds. Happens all the time. And; finally; ship X has an engine intermix. I have no data available to me on engine fuel flows and I do not know if they burn at the same rate. I doubt very much that the fuel software reflects any differences. All I'm trying to say with all of this is that we're cutting things just a little too skinny with our current fuel philosophy. I recommend a minimum 30 mins of holding fuel on all flts. That would automatically cover many of these contingencies and the added cost would be minimal. It is money well spent for safety and to minimize diversions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CAPT LAMENTS THE LACK OF CONTINGENCY FUEL FOR FLIGHTS WITH NO ALTERNATE REQUIRED.

Narrative: THIS RPT FOCUSES ON THE CURRENT FUEL CONSERVATION PROGRAM UTILIZED BY OUR ACR AND I AM USING AS AN EXAMPLE A FLT THAT I FLEW IN JUL/08 IN AN AIRBUS 319. THE WX WAS GOOD; THE ARR RATE INTO ZZZ1 WAS NOT HVY DURING OUR SCHEDULED ARR TIME AND THE OP OF THE FLT WAS ABOUT AS PERFECT AS CAN BE EXPECTED IN TODAY'S WORLD. IT TOOK ONLY 14 MINS FROM PUSHBACK TO TKOF. WE GOT RIGHT UP TO ALT AND WE LANDED STRAIGHT-IN TO THE S WHICH ALSO PLACED US CLOSE TO THE GATE. WE WERE VECTORED TWICE; 10-15 DEGS R OF COURSE; FOR TFC FOR ABOUT 3 MINS EACH. RELEASE FUEL ALLOWED 1.4 FOR TAXI OUT OF ZZZ2; NO ALTERNATE; NO CONTINGENCY FUEL AND ONLY 15 MINS OF HOLD FUEL. OUR MANDATORY RESERVE WAS 3.5 AND THE FLT PLAN SHOWED A SHUTDOWN FUEL OF 5.0. THIS IS OUTSIDE OF SAFE BOUNDARIES IN MY OPINION BECAUSE IT HAD NO MARGINS FOR THE UNEXPECTED. FOR THIS TO GO AS PLANNED; EVERYTHING HAD TO WORK PERFECTLY WHICH IS THE EXCEPTION AND NOT THE RULE. ALSO; AS A FLT TRAVELS FURTHER W; THERE ARE FEWER LOCATIONS AVAILABLE TO DIVERT INTO AND THERE ARE USUALLY GREATER DISTANCES TO TRAVEL TO GET TO THEM. I ADDED 1.7 IN FUEL. THIS INCREASED OUR ACTUAL RAMP WT ONLY 357 LBS OVER OUR PLANNED RAMP WT. WE TOOK A 17 MIN DELAY PAST DEP TIME TO GET THE FUEL BECAUSE WE RECEIVED THE RELEASE ONLY 20 MINS PRIOR TO DEP TIME AND IT TOOK THAT LONG TO EVALUATE THE FUEL; COORD AND GET IT ON BOARD. WE STILL ARRIVED 17 MINS EARLY AT ZZZ1. OUR SHUTDOWN FUEL WAS 6.7 SO A DISPATCHER OR BUREAUCRATIC SUPERVISORY PLT; FAR REMOVED FROM THE REAL WORLD OF OPS; MIGHT ARGUE THAT IF THE 1.7 HADN'T BEEN ADDED; WE WOULD'VE SHUT DOWN WITH OUR SCHEDULED 5.0 FUEL. HOWEVER; IF WE HAD BURNED ALL OF OUR 1.4 TAXI FUEL; WHICH WOULD NOT BE UNUSUAL LEAVING; OUR SHUTDOWN WOULD'VE BEEN 4.0 WHICH IS 500 LBS ABOVE OUR RESERVE. I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT SINCE THE SHUTDOWN; FUEL WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF 5.0; THE COST OF ADDING THE ADDITIONAL FUEL WAS NEGLIGIBLE IN THIS CASE. SO; WHAT DO I MEAN BY NO MARGINS FOR THE UNEXPECTED? FIRST; THE SOFTWARE UTILIZED FOR FUEL PLANNING HAS A BUILT-IN NEGATIVE BIAS. ON MANY RTES IT FALLS APART ON THE ARR PORTION OF THE FLT. ON OUR FLT WE FLEW THE STAR AND THE FLT PLAN REFLECTED NO STAR WAYPOINTS INSTEAD SHOWING US GOING DIRECT TO ZZZ2 AND LNDG WITHIN 10 MINS. OUR ACTUAL TIME WAS 13 MINS AND WOULD'VE BEEN FAR WORSE IF WE HAD LANDED TO THE N. THE FLT PLAN SHOWED US AT FL220 OVER ABC WITH A GND SPD OF 341 KTS WHEN OUR ACTUAL ALT WAS 12000 FT; SLOWING TO 250 KIAS. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS ARRIVING IN ZZZ2 FROM THE S. TYPICALLY THE FLT PLAN SHOWS US AT FL280 OVER XXXX WHEN WE WILL ALWAYS BE AT 15000 FT OVER XXXX AS DIRECTED BY ATC. A FLT CANCELS AND FILLS UP ANOTHER FLT; INCREASING ITS PAYLOAD AND; THEREFORE; ITS FUEL BURN OVER WHAT IS PLANNED. INSUFFICIENT FUEL ALLOWED FOR TAXI AND NO FUEL AVAILABLE TO XFER DOWN BELOW THE TKOF MINIMUM LINE. FLT IS CAUGHT IN A RWY CHANGE EITHER DEPARTING OR ARRIVING. AN ARR RWY IS CLOSED BECAUSE OF A DISABLED ACFT OR OTHER REASON. MAJOR VECTORS OFF COURSE AND/OR SPD CHANGES FOR INBOUND SEQUENCING BY ATC; NOT AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE. FORCED TO DEPART EARLY FROM ALT OR NOT ALLOWED UP TO PLANNED CRUISE ALT BY ATC. WX CRUMPS IN SPITE OF THE FORECAST. PULLED OFF AN ILS APCH BY APCH CTL DUE TO INSUFFICIENT SPACING. HDOF REFUSED BY THE NEXT ATC SECTOR REQUIRING A 360 DEG TURN BY THE CURRENT CTLR. A MISSED APCH OR EVEN MULTIPLE MISSED APCHS FOR VARIOUS REASONS. THE FUELER SHORTS THE FUEL LOAD BY A COUPLE HUNDRED LBS. HAPPENS ALL THE TIME. AND; FINALLY; SHIP X HAS AN ENG INTERMIX. I HAVE NO DATA AVAILABLE TO ME ON ENG FUEL FLOWS AND I DO NOT KNOW IF THEY BURN AT THE SAME RATE. I DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT THE FUEL SOFTWARE REFLECTS ANY DIFFERENCES. ALL I'M TRYING TO SAY WITH ALL OF THIS IS THAT WE'RE CUTTING THINGS JUST A LITTLE TOO SKINNY WITH OUR CURRENT FUEL PHILOSOPHY. I RECOMMEND A MINIMUM 30 MINS OF HOLDING FUEL ON ALL FLTS. THAT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY COVER MANY OF THESE CONTINGENCIES AND THE ADDED COST WOULD BE MINIMAL. IT IS MONEY WELL SPENT FOR SAFETY AND TO MINIMIZE DIVERSIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.