Narrative:

All 3 flts were operated with same aircraft. It has been brought to my attention that a seemingly innocuous; brief; ECAM message that I observed during the engine start sequences for those flts was more serious than I had presumed. I recall that after the #1 engine start an ECAM message briefly appeared and then disappeared before I could read what it was. This is not an uncommon occurrence in the airbus with starts and power swaps; etc. After engine starting was complete; the status page was normal and no further action was taken. In ZZZ1; on engine start a similar sequence of events occurred: a brief ECAM appeared and then went away with a clear status page and no inoperative system. This again repeated itself in ZZZ. This time; we were able to see a portion of the ECAM that briefly displayed; 'flight control elev' was observed. Since it cleared itself and could not be recalled; as it had done before; no further action or maintenance notification was undertaken. During the crew change in ZZZ2; a casual mention was made of a spurious ECAM message we had received and then disappeared on our previous flts; to the oncoming crew. My crew then went to the hotel for layover. Apparently; the full text of the ECAM was 'flight control elev servo fault.' it is my understanding that the outbound crew experienced a similar situation and then notified maintenance. The aircraft was removed from service and the outbound flight canceled. I am writing this as soon as possible to reinforce to myself; and raise awareness to others; that strict adherence to proper ECAM procedures and maintenance notification is extremely important. There should be no shortcuts or assumptions made with 'bothersome' ecams; no matter how short in duration. Complacency with the electrical/computer quirks of the airbus is an insidious trap to fall into after many yrs of flying it; but by no means an excuse to ignore long established SOP's and the airworthiness of your aircraft. In the future; I will re-double my efforts to ensure that every ECAM message is taken into consideration and proper resolution with maintenance is accomplished. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter discovered after the fact that the next flight crew called maintenance to check the problem. Maintenance discovered that an accelerometer on one elevator servo was going bad. Had this accelerometer failed completely the ECAM message would have remained visible. Had this failure occurred in flight it may have also caused faults in one second and one elac but no degradation in flight control laws.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CAPT REPORTS BRIEF ECAM MESSAGE DURING THREE CONSECUTIVE ENGINE STARTS THAT CANNOT BE READ OR RECALLED. LATER ANALYSIS REVEALS THAT MESSAGE READS 'FLT CNTRL ELEV SERVO FAULT.

Narrative: ALL 3 FLTS WERE OPERATED WITH SAME ACFT. IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT A SEEMINGLY INNOCUOUS; BRIEF; ECAM MESSAGE THAT I OBSERVED DURING THE ENG START SEQUENCES FOR THOSE FLTS WAS MORE SERIOUS THAN I HAD PRESUMED. I RECALL THAT AFTER THE #1 ENG START AN ECAM MESSAGE BRIEFLY APPEARED AND THEN DISAPPEARED BEFORE I COULD READ WHAT IT WAS. THIS IS NOT AN UNCOMMON OCCURRENCE IN THE AIRBUS WITH STARTS AND PWR SWAPS; ETC. AFTER ENG STARTING WAS COMPLETE; THE STATUS PAGE WAS NORMAL AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN. IN ZZZ1; ON ENG START A SIMILAR SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OCCURRED: A BRIEF ECAM APPEARED AND THEN WENT AWAY WITH A CLR STATUS PAGE AND NO INOP SYS. THIS AGAIN REPEATED ITSELF IN ZZZ. THIS TIME; WE WERE ABLE TO SEE A PORTION OF THE ECAM THAT BRIEFLY DISPLAYED; 'FLT CTL ELEV' WAS OBSERVED. SINCE IT CLRED ITSELF AND COULD NOT BE RECALLED; AS IT HAD DONE BEFORE; NO FURTHER ACTION OR MAINT NOTIFICATION WAS UNDERTAKEN. DURING THE CREW CHANGE IN ZZZ2; A CASUAL MENTION WAS MADE OF A SPURIOUS ECAM MESSAGE WE HAD RECEIVED AND THEN DISAPPEARED ON OUR PREVIOUS FLTS; TO THE ONCOMING CREW. MY CREW THEN WENT TO THE HOTEL FOR LAYOVER. APPARENTLY; THE FULL TEXT OF THE ECAM WAS 'FLT CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT.' IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE OUTBOUND CREW EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR SITUATION AND THEN NOTIFIED MAINT. THE ACFT WAS REMOVED FROM SVC AND THE OUTBOUND FLT CANCELED. I AM WRITING THIS ASAP TO REINFORCE TO MYSELF; AND RAISE AWARENESS TO OTHERS; THAT STRICT ADHERENCE TO PROPER ECAM PROCS AND MAINT NOTIFICATION IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. THERE SHOULD BE NO SHORTCUTS OR ASSUMPTIONS MADE WITH 'BOTHERSOME' ECAMS; NO MATTER HOW SHORT IN DURATION. COMPLACENCY WITH THE ELECTRICAL/COMPUTER QUIRKS OF THE AIRBUS IS AN INSIDIOUS TRAP TO FALL INTO AFTER MANY YRS OF FLYING IT; BUT BY NO MEANS AN EXCUSE TO IGNORE LONG ESTABLISHED SOP'S AND THE AIRWORTHINESS OF YOUR ACFT. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL RE-DOUBLE MY EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT EVERY ECAM MESSAGE IS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AND PROPER RESOLUTION WITH MAINT IS ACCOMPLISHED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER DISCOVERED AFTER THE FACT THAT THE NEXT FLT CREW CALLED MAINT TO CHECK THE PROBLEM. MAINTENANCE DISCOVERED THAT AN ACCELEROMETER ON ONE ELEVATOR SERVO WAS GOING BAD. HAD THIS ACCELEROMETER FAILED COMPLETELY THE ECAM MESSAGE WOULD HAVE REMAINED VISIBLE. HAD THIS FAILURE OCCURRED IN FLIGHT IT MAY HAVE ALSO CAUSED FAULTS IN ONE SEC AND ONE ELAC BUT NO DEGRADATION IN FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.