Narrative:

On jul/xa/08 an event took place on flight in aircraft X scheduled service from ZZZ to ZZZ2 at XA43 pacific daylight time. The flight had a takeoff weight of 72000 pounds which included 4 flight crew members; 1 FAA flight observer in the cockpit jumpseat giving a line check; passenger and bags. The temperature was a relatively cool 62 degrees with little wind. During the before start checklist; captain had determined that she would take the first legs and briefed a departure off of runway xxl with an engine out turn procedure of a heading left 180 degree at 8 mi from ZZZ1 VOR. She also used the 'my leg standard air carrier brief with flex thrust' terminology. All system checks proved normal during the hangar pick up; taxi to the gate; after start; and before takeoff checklist and therefore we had an on time departure. We were cleared to taxi to runway xxl at ZZZ1 and subsequently cleared for takeoff. We made the turn onto the runway she applied and ask me to set takeoff thrust. We accelerated normally and I called out 80 KTS and when we got to rotation speed of 132 KTS I called out rotate and captain pulled back on the control column and the nose lifted off the ground. Just as the main landing gear broke ground we got the 3 bell chime with a master warning red light and annunciator of a lavatory smoke; fire indication. I announce the malfunction and captain immediately pulls the thrust levers back towards idle as if she was going to abort the takeoff. I call out to her 'captain you are above V1 we're going' and I push the throttles back up to climb. She then says positive rate gear up and resumes the departure. However; we are now climbing out at slower speed and she calls for flap retraction to flaps 1 degree. I notice that we are too slow but I put my hand on the flap lever and announce vmin speed for flaps 1 degree and I tell her I need more speed. We reach that speed and she calls for flaps zero. I once again tell her about the minimum speed and delay until she gives me the speed and then I retract the flaps. Now during this time the fire; smoke indication has disappeared without a trace after about 15-30 seconds. I get the checklist out and attempt to run it and ask if she's ready. We both notice that it's no longer there and at this time captain calls back to the flight attendants and ask if they see smoke or fire. They say no fire or smoke indications. However flight attendant 'B' stated that she heard the smoke alarm going off around rotation later that day. We continued to climb out and I once again ask if she wants to run the checklist. She at that point calls maintenance control and they discuss what happened and that the problem is no longer there and they both decide to press on to ZZZ2 and have them 'meet us in ZZZ2.' it is at this point that our line check observer enters into the discussion and questions captain's decision to continue. We all talk about it and I was asked what was my opinion at which time I stated that the checklist calls for circuit breakers to be pulled and to land immediately. At this time we decide to return to ZZZ1 and declare an emergency at an altitude of 17000 ft. I then contact the flight attendants and advise them that we are returning to field in approximately 10 mins or less and we expect a normal landing and deplaning. I also get the ATIS and contact operations and let them know we are coming back and they in turn contact maintenance control and advise them of our overweight landing. Maintenance calls approach who relays a message to us to not land at a rate of over 300 FPM. We start out on the ILS xxl and do a visual approach. During the approach I call out our descent rate the whole time and during the flare and landing. Captain did an excellent job on touchdown at less than 150 FPM. We landed without incident and taxi clear of the runway where the fire trucks met us and did an inspection for heat smoke and fire and found no trace at all. We kept going to the gate deplaned the passenger. First of all; it is not my intentions to 'throw someone under the bus' or 'lay blame at someone elses' feet. That being said; there are 2 factors which are contributors to this event taking place: 1) a relatively new pilot with a vast knowledge and experience level with regard to turboprops whom has made the transition to jet aircraft. As a result of that any pilot who isn't up to speed in the jet should have V1 and rotate called out separately even if they are the same number and not just 80 and then rotate. Also; new capts should do the full briefing to be a reminder to themselves that V1 has meaning; 'call out 80; V1 rotate; any malfunction prior to V1 abort; after V1 continue.' 2) capts should remove their hands from the thrust lever quadrant once V1 is called. This would eliminate that moment of indecision because no hand on the throttle is a commitment to fly and is a reminder to do so. I question as to why captain pulled those thrust levers back but with no hands on those throttles she can't do anything like that or anyone else for that matter. Lastly; 3) checklist discipline. I made numerous attempts to run the checklist only to be interrupted. Had we run that checklist as directed there would not have been any need to call maintenance control or any discussion about continuing onto ZZZ2. Whether the warning was still there or not; because it was a fire sensor precaution must be taken that is didn't go away.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ700 FO REPORTS LAV SMOKE WARNING ABOVE V1 AND ATTEMPTED REJECT BY CAPT. CLIMB OUT IS CONTINUED WITH FO ASSISTANCE.

Narrative: ON JUL/XA/08 AN EVENT TOOK PLACE ON FLT IN ACFT X SCHEDULED SVC FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ2 AT XA43 PACIFIC DAYLIGHT TIME. THE FLT HAD A TKOF WT OF 72000 LBS WHICH INCLUDED 4 FLT CREW MEMBERS; 1 FAA FLT OBSERVER IN THE COCKPIT JUMPSEAT GIVING A LINE CHK; PAX AND BAGS. THE TEMP WAS A RELATIVELY COOL 62 DEGS WITH LITTLE WIND. DURING THE BEFORE START CHKLIST; CAPT HAD DETERMINED THAT SHE WOULD TAKE THE FIRST LEGS AND BRIEFED A DEP OFF OF RWY XXL WITH AN ENG OUT TURN PROC OF A HDG L 180 DEG AT 8 MI FROM ZZZ1 VOR. SHE ALSO USED THE 'MY LEG STANDARD ACR BRIEF WITH FLEX THRUST' TERMINOLOGY. ALL SYS CHKS PROVED NORMAL DURING THE HANGAR PICK UP; TAXI TO THE GATE; AFTER START; AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND THEREFORE WE HAD AN ON TIME DEP. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY XXL AT ZZZ1 AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED FOR TKOF. WE MADE THE TURN ONTO THE RWY SHE APPLIED AND ASK ME TO SET TKOF THRUST. WE ACCELERATED NORMALLY AND I CALLED OUT 80 KTS AND WHEN WE GOT TO ROTATION SPD OF 132 KTS I CALLED OUT ROTATE AND CAPT PULLED BACK ON THE CTL COLUMN AND THE NOSE LIFTED OFF THE GND. JUST AS THE MAIN LNDG GEAR BROKE GND WE GOT THE 3 BELL CHIME WITH A MASTER WARNING RED LIGHT AND ANNUNCIATOR OF A LAVATORY SMOKE; FIRE INDICATION. I ANNOUNCE THE MALFUNCTION AND CAPT IMMEDIATELY PULLS THE THRUST LEVERS BACK TOWARDS IDLE AS IF SHE WAS GOING TO ABORT THE TKOF. I CALL OUT TO HER 'CAPT YOU ARE ABOVE V1 WE'RE GOING' AND I PUSH THE THROTTLES BACK UP TO CLB. SHE THEN SAYS POSITIVE RATE GEAR UP AND RESUMES THE DEP. HOWEVER; WE ARE NOW CLBING OUT AT SLOWER SPD AND SHE CALLS FOR FLAP RETRACTION TO FLAPS 1 DEG. I NOTICE THAT WE ARE TOO SLOW BUT I PUT MY HAND ON THE FLAP LEVER AND ANNOUNCE VMIN SPD FOR FLAPS 1 DEG AND I TELL HER I NEED MORE SPD. WE REACH THAT SPD AND SHE CALLS FOR FLAPS ZERO. I ONCE AGAIN TELL HER ABOUT THE MINIMUM SPD AND DELAY UNTIL SHE GIVES ME THE SPD AND THEN I RETRACT THE FLAPS. NOW DURING THIS TIME THE FIRE; SMOKE INDICATION HAS DISAPPEARED WITHOUT A TRACE AFTER ABOUT 15-30 SECONDS. I GET THE CHKLIST OUT AND ATTEMPT TO RUN IT AND ASK IF SHE'S READY. WE BOTH NOTICE THAT IT'S NO LONGER THERE AND AT THIS TIME CAPT CALLS BACK TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND ASK IF THEY SEE SMOKE OR FIRE. THEY SAY NO FIRE OR SMOKE INDICATIONS. HOWEVER FLT ATTENDANT 'B' STATED THAT SHE HEARD THE SMOKE ALARM GOING OFF AROUND ROTATION LATER THAT DAY. WE CONTINUED TO CLB OUT AND I ONCE AGAIN ASK IF SHE WANTS TO RUN THE CHKLIST. SHE AT THAT POINT CALLS MAINT CTL AND THEY DISCUSS WHAT HAPPENED AND THAT THE PROB IS NO LONGER THERE AND THEY BOTH DECIDE TO PRESS ON TO ZZZ2 AND HAVE THEM 'MEET US IN ZZZ2.' IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT OUR LINE CHK OBSERVER ENTERS INTO THE DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS CAPT'S DECISION TO CONTINUE. WE ALL TALK ABOUT IT AND I WAS ASKED WHAT WAS MY OPINION AT WHICH TIME I STATED THAT THE CHKLIST CALLS FOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BE PULLED AND TO LAND IMMEDIATELY. AT THIS TIME WE DECIDE TO RETURN TO ZZZ1 AND DECLARE AN EMER AT AN ALT OF 17000 FT. I THEN CONTACT THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND ADVISE THEM THAT WE ARE RETURNING TO FIELD IN APPROX 10 MINS OR LESS AND WE EXPECT A NORMAL LNDG AND DEPLANING. I ALSO GET THE ATIS AND CONTACT OPS AND LET THEM KNOW WE ARE COMING BACK AND THEY IN TURN CONTACT MAINT CTL AND ADVISE THEM OF OUR OVERWT LNDG. MAINT CALLS APCH WHO RELAYS A MESSAGE TO US TO NOT LAND AT A RATE OF OVER 300 FPM. WE START OUT ON THE ILS XXL AND DO A VISUAL APCH. DURING THE APCH I CALL OUT OUR DSCNT RATE THE WHOLE TIME AND DURING THE FLARE AND LNDG. CAPT DID AN EXCELLENT JOB ON TOUCHDOWN AT LESS THAN 150 FPM. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND TAXI CLR OF THE RWY WHERE THE FIRE TRUCKS MET US AND DID AN INSPECTION FOR HEAT SMOKE AND FIRE AND FOUND NO TRACE AT ALL. WE KEPT GOING TO THE GATE DEPLANED THE PAX. FIRST OF ALL; IT IS NOT MY INTENTIONS TO 'THROW SOMEONE UNDER THE BUS' OR 'LAY BLAME AT SOMEONE ELSES' FEET. THAT BEING SAID; THERE ARE 2 FACTORS WHICH ARE CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS EVENT TAKING PLACE: 1) A RELATIVELY NEW PLT WITH A VAST KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE LEVEL WITH REGARD TO TURBOPROPS WHOM HAS MADE THE TRANSITION TO JET ACFT. AS A RESULT OF THAT ANY PLT WHO ISN'T UP TO SPD IN THE JET SHOULD HAVE V1 AND ROTATE CALLED OUT SEPARATELY EVEN IF THEY ARE THE SAME NUMBER AND NOT JUST 80 AND THEN ROTATE. ALSO; NEW CAPTS SHOULD DO THE FULL BRIEFING TO BE A REMINDER TO THEMSELVES THAT V1 HAS MEANING; 'CALL OUT 80; V1 ROTATE; ANY MALFUNCTION PRIOR TO V1 ABORT; AFTER V1 CONTINUE.' 2) CAPTS SHOULD REMOVE THEIR HANDS FROM THE THRUST LEVER QUADRANT ONCE V1 IS CALLED. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE THAT MOMENT OF INDECISION BECAUSE NO HAND ON THE THROTTLE IS A COMMITMENT TO FLY AND IS A REMINDER TO DO SO. I QUESTION AS TO WHY CAPT PULLED THOSE THRUST LEVERS BACK BUT WITH NO HANDS ON THOSE THROTTLES SHE CAN'T DO ANYTHING LIKE THAT OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER. LASTLY; 3) CHKLIST DISCIPLINE. I MADE NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO RUN THE CHKLIST ONLY TO BE INTERRUPTED. HAD WE RUN THAT CHKLIST AS DIRECTED THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANY NEED TO CALL MAINT CTL OR ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT CONTINUING ONTO ZZZ2. WHETHER THE WARNING WAS STILL THERE OR NOT; BECAUSE IT WAS A FIRE SENSOR PRECAUTION MUST BE TAKEN THAT IS DIDN'T GO AWAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.