Narrative:

There was a B757 taking off in front of us and my captain advised that he was canceling our flex thrust setting and we were going to use maximum thrust on takeoff to stay way above the B757's wake turbulence on the climb out and departure. Our takeoff weight was approximately 62500 pounds. We used takeoff distance and takeoff speed data from the 63000 pound FLIP card. Our maximum takeoff weight is 75000 pounds. As a result of our light weight and maximum thrust confign; the takeoff roll was very short. We hit 80 KTS before we used 1000 ft of runway. The acceleration caused my seat to slide back 1 notch on the adjustment rails. As I rotated at V1; the captain told me to pull it right up into the command bars which were; about 13 degrees up pitch; to stay above the B757's flight path. I followed my captain's instructions. Upon rotation; I pulled the aircraft up into the command bars and established a very fast positive rate of climb; I then called for the gear to be retracted and the selection of 'climb mode' on the acp. As a result; our vsi rapidly increased to over 3500 FPM. This caused my seat to compress down about 1 inch. This combination of my seat sliding back and down caused my view of the lower 1 inch of my pfd to become obscured by the yoke. At 400 ft I called for the engagement of the navigation mode on the acp. At 600 ft I called 'autoplt on.' at 1500 ft the captain called 'acceleration altitude.' I then selected 200 KTS on the speed button. By the time we hit 200 KTS; I had the flaps and slats fully retracted. I then selected 240 KTS on the speed button (SID speed limit). At 220 KTS; I pulled the thrust levers back out of the toga detent into the climb thrust mode. At 240 KTS in climb thrust we were still climbing at over 2800 FPM. At 7000 ft MSL I pulled the thrust levers out of climb thrust and into cruise to slow down our vsi. I was then at a point on the SID where I could increase speed to 250 KTS; which I did. At 9300 ft I began reducing my thrust so that I would not overshoot my altitude or speed limit. At about the same time I received an RA from my TCAS. I saw an aircraft on the radar at 11000 ft range 5 mi converging from my 2 O'clock position. I looked out the window and saw an MD80 in the same position. At this point the TCAS began to tell me over and over again; 'change vertical speed.' I could not see the bottom of my vsi -- only the top. The top was red. I then did exactly the opposite of what I should have done. I pushed the thrust levers up into toga and began to pitch up to a vsi of over 3800 FPM. About 10-15 seconds later; my captain asked; 'what are you doing?' I told him; 'responding to an RA sir.' he then called; 'my airplane!' he then went to thrust idle and began to descend the aircraft. At the time of the captain calling my airplane; our altitude was approximately 12000 ft MSL. Our clearance was only to 10000 ft. We ended up going right over the top of the MD80's flight path by 1000 ft and we remained about 1 mi in front of him. I then assumed the PNF duties and told TRACON that we had climbed above our assigned altitude due to an RA and that we were descending back to 10000 ft now. The controller thanked me for the advisement and then told me that when we were clear from our TCAS maneuver we were to climb and maintain 17000 ft. I set 17000 ft in the altitude select on the acp and called it out for the captain. My captain and I debriefed the incident. He then asked me if I learned anything. I said 'yes.' he then asked me if I was going to do that again. I said 'no sir!' he then smiled at me and said; 'well; you are ready to take us to ZZZ?' I said 'yes sir' and he turned the plane over to me. The rest of the flight was conducted without incident. I attribute this incident to a combination of human factors. The first was fatigue. We got into ZZZ1 the night before at XA30. We were scheduled to depart at XM50. I got up at XK30. I tried to go to sleep early; but was unable to fall asleep before XG50; which resulted in 3.5 hours of sleep. Being a probationary first officer; I was afraid to call in fatigued after getting a 12 hour overnight and having a 'sick' call or 'ma' note in my file. I rationalized that since we would be done before XS00; I could drink some coffee; 'man-up' and be 'ok.' I underestimated the effects of only getting 3.5 hours of sleep. My situational awareness was very greatly diminished as a result of my fatigue. My ability to think clearly through all the distrs and take appropriate action was also greatly diminished due to fatigue. Second was distraction due to the high performance envelope we were operating the crj in. With my lack of crj experience; only 200 hours; I am not used to operating crj under that light of weight and high thrust settings in a very busy class B environment. It caused me to fall behind the airplane a little bit. Third was my seat sliding back and down during takeoff and rotation causing me to lose sight of the bottom of my pfd. I should have turned the aircraft over to my captain; readjusted my seat; and then resumed my flying duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BESET BY FATIGUE; DISTRS AND LACK OF EXPERIENCE; PROBATIONARY FO OF CARJ RESPONDS INCORRECTLY TO TCAS RA; CLBING INSTEAD OF DSNDING AS DIRECTED.

Narrative: THERE WAS A B757 TAKING OFF IN FRONT OF US AND MY CAPT ADVISED THAT HE WAS CANCELING OUR FLEX THRUST SETTING AND WE WERE GOING TO USE MAX THRUST ON TKOF TO STAY WAY ABOVE THE B757'S WAKE TURB ON THE CLBOUT AND DEP. OUR TKOF WT WAS APPROX 62500 LBS. WE USED TKOF DISTANCE AND TKOF SPD DATA FROM THE 63000 LB FLIP CARD. OUR MAX TKOF WT IS 75000 LBS. AS A RESULT OF OUR LIGHT WT AND MAX THRUST CONFIGN; THE TKOF ROLL WAS VERY SHORT. WE HIT 80 KTS BEFORE WE USED 1000 FT OF RWY. THE ACCELERATION CAUSED MY SEAT TO SLIDE BACK 1 NOTCH ON THE ADJUSTMENT RAILS. AS I ROTATED AT V1; THE CAPT TOLD ME TO PULL IT RIGHT UP INTO THE COMMAND BARS WHICH WERE; ABOUT 13 DEGS UP PITCH; TO STAY ABOVE THE B757'S FLT PATH. I FOLLOWED MY CAPT'S INSTRUCTIONS. UPON ROTATION; I PULLED THE ACFT UP INTO THE COMMAND BARS AND ESTABLISHED A VERY FAST POSITIVE RATE OF CLB; I THEN CALLED FOR THE GEAR TO BE RETRACTED AND THE SELECTION OF 'CLB MODE' ON THE ACP. AS A RESULT; OUR VSI RAPIDLY INCREASED TO OVER 3500 FPM. THIS CAUSED MY SEAT TO COMPRESS DOWN ABOUT 1 INCH. THIS COMBINATION OF MY SEAT SLIDING BACK AND DOWN CAUSED MY VIEW OF THE LOWER 1 INCH OF MY PFD TO BECOME OBSCURED BY THE YOKE. AT 400 FT I CALLED FOR THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE NAV MODE ON THE ACP. AT 600 FT I CALLED 'AUTOPLT ON.' AT 1500 FT THE CAPT CALLED 'ACCELERATION ALT.' I THEN SELECTED 200 KTS ON THE SPD BUTTON. BY THE TIME WE HIT 200 KTS; I HAD THE FLAPS AND SLATS FULLY RETRACTED. I THEN SELECTED 240 KTS ON THE SPD BUTTON (SID SPD LIMIT). AT 220 KTS; I PULLED THE THRUST LEVERS BACK OUT OF THE TOGA DETENT INTO THE CLB THRUST MODE. AT 240 KTS IN CLB THRUST WE WERE STILL CLBING AT OVER 2800 FPM. AT 7000 FT MSL I PULLED THE THRUST LEVERS OUT OF CLB THRUST AND INTO CRUISE TO SLOW DOWN OUR VSI. I WAS THEN AT A POINT ON THE SID WHERE I COULD INCREASE SPD TO 250 KTS; WHICH I DID. AT 9300 FT I BEGAN REDUCING MY THRUST SO THAT I WOULD NOT OVERSHOOT MY ALT OR SPD LIMIT. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME I RECEIVED AN RA FROM MY TCAS. I SAW AN ACFT ON THE RADAR AT 11000 FT RANGE 5 MI CONVERGING FROM MY 2 O'CLOCK POS. I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW AND SAW AN MD80 IN THE SAME POS. AT THIS POINT THE TCAS BEGAN TO TELL ME OVER AND OVER AGAIN; 'CHANGE VERT SPD.' I COULD NOT SEE THE BOTTOM OF MY VSI -- ONLY THE TOP. THE TOP WAS RED. I THEN DID EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE. I PUSHED THE THRUST LEVERS UP INTO TOGA AND BEGAN TO PITCH UP TO A VSI OF OVER 3800 FPM. ABOUT 10-15 SECONDS LATER; MY CAPT ASKED; 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING?' I TOLD HIM; 'RESPONDING TO AN RA SIR.' HE THEN CALLED; 'MY AIRPLANE!' HE THEN WENT TO THRUST IDLE AND BEGAN TO DSND THE ACFT. AT THE TIME OF THE CAPT CALLING MY AIRPLANE; OUR ALT WAS APPROX 12000 FT MSL. OUR CLRNC WAS ONLY TO 10000 FT. WE ENDED UP GOING RIGHT OVER THE TOP OF THE MD80'S FLT PATH BY 1000 FT AND WE REMAINED ABOUT 1 MI IN FRONT OF HIM. I THEN ASSUMED THE PNF DUTIES AND TOLD TRACON THAT WE HAD CLBED ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT DUE TO AN RA AND THAT WE WERE DSNDING BACK TO 10000 FT NOW. THE CTLR THANKED ME FOR THE ADVISEMENT AND THEN TOLD ME THAT WHEN WE WERE CLR FROM OUR TCAS MANEUVER WE WERE TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 17000 FT. I SET 17000 FT IN THE ALT SELECT ON THE ACP AND CALLED IT OUT FOR THE CAPT. MY CAPT AND I DEBRIEFED THE INCIDENT. HE THEN ASKED ME IF I LEARNED ANYTHING. I SAID 'YES.' HE THEN ASKED ME IF I WAS GOING TO DO THAT AGAIN. I SAID 'NO SIR!' HE THEN SMILED AT ME AND SAID; 'WELL; YOU ARE READY TO TAKE US TO ZZZ?' I SAID 'YES SIR' AND HE TURNED THE PLANE OVER TO ME. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. I ATTRIBUTE THIS INCIDENT TO A COMBINATION OF HUMAN FACTORS. THE FIRST WAS FATIGUE. WE GOT INTO ZZZ1 THE NIGHT BEFORE AT XA30. WE WERE SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XM50. I GOT UP AT XK30. I TRIED TO GO TO SLEEP EARLY; BUT WAS UNABLE TO FALL ASLEEP BEFORE XG50; WHICH RESULTED IN 3.5 HRS OF SLEEP. BEING A PROBATIONARY FO; I WAS AFRAID TO CALL IN FATIGUED AFTER GETTING A 12 HR OVERNIGHT AND HAVING A 'SICK' CALL OR 'MA' NOTE IN MY FILE. I RATIONALIZED THAT SINCE WE WOULD BE DONE BEFORE XS00; I COULD DRINK SOME COFFEE; 'MAN-UP' AND BE 'OK.' I UNDERESTIMATED THE EFFECTS OF ONLY GETTING 3.5 HRS OF SLEEP. MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS VERY GREATLY DIMINISHED AS A RESULT OF MY FATIGUE. MY ABILITY TO THINK CLEARLY THROUGH ALL THE DISTRS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION WAS ALSO GREATLY DIMINISHED DUE TO FATIGUE. SECOND WAS DISTR DUE TO THE HIGH PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE WE WERE OPERATING THE CRJ IN. WITH MY LACK OF CRJ EXPERIENCE; ONLY 200 HRS; I AM NOT USED TO OPERATING CRJ UNDER THAT LIGHT OF WT AND HIGH THRUST SETTINGS IN A VERY BUSY CLASS B ENVIRONMENT. IT CAUSED ME TO FALL BEHIND THE AIRPLANE A LITTLE BIT. THIRD WAS MY SEAT SLIDING BACK AND DOWN DURING TKOF AND ROTATION CAUSING ME TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE BOTTOM OF MY PFD. I SHOULD HAVE TURNED THE ACFT OVER TO MY CAPT; READJUSTED MY SEAT; AND THEN RESUMED MY FLYING DUTIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.