Narrative:

On initial power-up for takeoff; the takeoff confign warning horn sounded at approximately 10 KTS. Takeoff was aborted and exited runway. We had questioned operations about the abnormally forward center of gravity (10%) and receiving the load numbers and were told the center of gravity was correct. Stabilizer trim setting was 5.43 units. In looking at the stabilizer setting; it appeared it was a little higher than 5.43. After confirming the aircraft was properly configured for takeoff; we reset the trim slightly more nose down and attempted another takeoff with the same result. We again performed a low speed abort. At this time we parked at the end of runway 34R. We called operations and maintenance on the radio to discuss the problem. We again requested that operations doublechk the load closeout numbers for accuracy. We discussed our belief with maintenance that stabilizer trim was setting off the warning horn; but that we felt we could trim 1 more trim wheel turn nose down while still reading 5.43 units on the wheel. All agreed this was safe and appropriate. The next takeoff attempt was normal. Later we were told by the aft flight attendant that a passenger told her the same thing had happened the week before on the same flight. Operations should avoid such a forward center of gravity loading. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised his company has added ballast to the tail of aircraft involved in the types of operation unique to this equipment type. Although an inelegant solution; reporter felt it adequately addressed the risk of repeating the incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF AN UNIDENTIFIED ACR ACFT TWICE REJECTS TKOF DUE TO CONFIGURATION WARNING HORN. CAPTAIN SUSPECTS LOAD PLANNING PROVIDED INAPPROPRIATELY NOSE HEAVY STAB TRIM SETTING.

Narrative: ON INITIAL PWR-UP FOR TKOF; THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING HORN SOUNDED AT APPROX 10 KTS. TKOF WAS ABORTED AND EXITED RWY. WE HAD QUESTIONED OPS ABOUT THE ABNORMALLY FORWARD CTR OF GRAVITY (10%) AND RECEIVING THE LOAD NUMBERS AND WERE TOLD THE CTR OF GRAVITY WAS CORRECT. STABILIZER TRIM SETTING WAS 5.43 UNITS. IN LOOKING AT THE STABILIZER SETTING; IT APPEARED IT WAS A LITTLE HIGHER THAN 5.43. AFTER CONFIRMING THE ACFT WAS PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR TKOF; WE RESET THE TRIM SLIGHTLY MORE NOSE DOWN AND ATTEMPTED ANOTHER TKOF WITH THE SAME RESULT. WE AGAIN PERFORMED A LOW SPD ABORT. AT THIS TIME WE PARKED AT THE END OF RWY 34R. WE CALLED OPS AND MAINT ON THE RADIO TO DISCUSS THE PROB. WE AGAIN REQUESTED THAT OPS DOUBLECHK THE LOAD CLOSEOUT NUMBERS FOR ACCURACY. WE DISCUSSED OUR BELIEF WITH MAINT THAT STABILIZER TRIM WAS SETTING OFF THE WARNING HORN; BUT THAT WE FELT WE COULD TRIM 1 MORE TRIM WHEEL TURN NOSE DOWN WHILE STILL READING 5.43 UNITS ON THE WHEEL. ALL AGREED THIS WAS SAFE AND APPROPRIATE. THE NEXT TKOF ATTEMPT WAS NORMAL. LATER WE WERE TOLD BY THE AFT FLT ATTENDANT THAT A PAX TOLD HER THE SAME THING HAD HAPPENED THE WK BEFORE ON THE SAME FLT. OPS SHOULD AVOID SUCH A FORWARD CTR OF GRAVITY LOADING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER ADVISED HIS COMPANY HAS ADDED BALLAST TO THE TAIL OF ACFT INVOLVED IN THE TYPES OF OPERATION UNIQUE TO THIS EQUIPMENT TYPE. ALTHOUGH AN INELEGANT SOLUTION; REPORTER FELT IT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE RISK OF REPEATING THE INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.